Ranking Theory and Conditional Reasoning

Ranking theory is a formal epistemology that has been developed in over 600 pages in Spohn's recent book The Laws of Belief, which aims to provide a normative account of the dynamics of beliefs that presents an alternative to current probabilistic approaches. It has long been received in the AI community, but it has not yet found application in experimental psychology. The purpose of this paper is to derive clear, quantitative predictions by exploiting a parallel between ranking theory and a statistical model called logistic regression. This approach is illustrated by the development of a model for the conditional inference task using Spohn's (2013) ranking theoretic approach to conditionals.     

Understanding and disagreement in belief ascription

It seems uncontroversial that Dalton wrongly believed that atoms are indivisible. However, the correct analysis of Dalton’s belief and the way it relates to contemporary beliefs about atoms is, on closer inspection, far from straightforward. In this paper, I introduce four features that any candidate analysis is plausibly bound to respect. I argue that theories that individuate concepts at the level of understanding are doomed to fail in this endeavor. I formally sketch an alternative and suggest that cases such as the one presented provide support for the claim that the genuine source for concept individuation is public sharable thought.     

不同任务类型条件下4～6年级儿童比例推理策略的表现

随机选取小学4~6年级被试86名,从辅助策略、比例推理策略的策略选择和策略效用三方面,通过五种类型的天平任务考察儿童比例推理策略的表现。结果表明:(1)儿童最常使用手指动作辅助加工基本数量信息。辅助策略的使用率随年龄增长而减少,五年级开始使用出声思维,反映出元认知能力的发展。(2)在正式学习比例知识之前,各年级儿童都能使用两种以上策略,也能根据任务难度自发产生新策略,具备策略选择的多样性和适应性。其中,三个年级均能使用定性比例推理策略(双维策略,IIIA策略,补偿策略),表明儿童初步认识了距离和重量两个维度的共变关系。此外,六年级儿童能使用"运货车策略"将冲突问题灵活地化解为简单问题。(3)儿童的错误策略表现为:在冲突任务中盲目使用补偿策略、简单策略或加法策略。(4)分层回归分析表明,在控制年龄后,儿童的一般推理能力越高,其对重量策略的依赖性越低,且可能更容易发掘距离维度的意义,其使用运货车策略的频次更多。此外,一般推理能力对解决冲突类天平任务的正确次数有正向预测作用。     

Postwar Recovery to Stress Symptoms Ratio as a Measure of Resilience,Individual Characteristics,Sense of Danger,and Age

This study maintains that postwar resilience should be defined by the proportion of recovery from war adversity and level of postwar symptoms. We hypothesize first that four resilience-promoting factors will predict this measure of resilience. Second, these associations will be mediated by sense of postwar danger. Third, war-afflicted older people will be comparable to younger people on these variables. The sample included 829 Israeli adults who experienced the 2006 second Lebanon war. Results that have generally supported these hypotheses have been discussed in terms of the definition of resilience, the role of sense of danger in postwar adjustment, and the resilience of older people to war.     

向死而生,以财解忧?存在不安全感对物质主义的影响

以大学生为被试,通过情境实验考察存在不安全感对内隐物质主义态度及外显物质主义倾向的影响,并探索潜在的动机机制:控制感寻求的中介作用。结果表明,高存在不安全感组的内隐物质主义态度显著高于低存在不安全感组,控制感寻求在其中起中介作用;但存在不安全感对外显物质主义倾向的影响并不显著。该结果为死亡心理防御的动机机制提供了新的实证依据:对中国被试而言,物质主义也是个体应对存在不安全感的一种策略,该策略可以满足个体寻求确认和控制的需要。     

真实创新预览、企业可雇佣性责任感与可雇佣型建言的关系

以59家科技型创业企业368名知识员工为被试,从新型员工—组织关系模式下个体认知的视角,探讨了企业真实创新预览与知识员工可雇佣型建言的关系,以及知识员工之企业可雇佣性责任感的中介作用。PLSSEM分析结果表明:(1)企业真实创新预览对知识员工的企业可雇佣性责任感各维度、可雇佣型建言具有显著正向影响;(2)知识员工的企业可雇佣性责任感各维度中,基于角色内胜任力提高、基于角色外能力提升2个维度对知识员工可雇佣型建言具有显著正向影响,并在企业真实创新预览与知识员工可雇佣型建言之间起部分中介作用;而基于个人生涯发展维度对知识员工可雇佣型建言的影响不显著,其在企业真实创新预览与知识员工可雇佣型建言之间也不起中介作用。     

When will is not the same as should: The role of modals in reasoning with legal conditionals

Naïve reasoners reject logically valid conclusions from conditional rules if they can think of exceptions in which the antecedent is true, but the consequent is not. However, when reasoning with legal conditionals (e.g., “If a person kills another human, then this person should be punished for manslaughter”) people hardly consider exceptions but evaluate conclusions depending on their own sense of justice. We show that participants’ reluctance to consider exceptions in legal reasoning depends on the modal auxiliary used. In two experiments we phrased legal conditionals either with the modal “should” (i.e., “ . . . then this person should be punished”), or with “will” (i.e., “ . . . then this person will be punished”) and presented them as modus ponens or modus tollens inferences. Participants had to decide whether the offender should or will be punished (modus ponens) or whether the offender indeed committed the offence (modus tollens). For modus ponens inferences phrased with “should” we replicate previous findings showing that participants select conclusions on the basis of their own sense of justice (Experiments 1 and 2). Yet, when the legal conditional is phrased with the modal “will” this effect is attenuated (Experiments 1 and 2), and exceptions are considered (Experiment 1). The modal auxiliary did not affect modus tollens inferences.     

Considering too few alternatives: The mental model theory of extensional reasoning

When solving a simple probabilistic problem, people tend to build an incomplete mental representation. We observe this pattern in responses to probabilistic problems over a set of premises using the conjunction, disjunction, and conditional propositional connectives. The mental model theory of extensional reasoning explains this bias towards underestimating the number of possibilities: In reckoning with different interpretations of the premises (logical rules, mental model theoretical, and, specific to conditional premises, conjunction and biconditional interpretation) the mental model theory accounts for the majority of observations. Different interpretations of a premise result in a build-up of mental models that are often incomplete. These mental models are processed using either an extensional strategy relying on proportions amongst models, or a conflict monitoring strategy. The consequence of considering too few possibilities is an erroneous probability estimate akin to that faced by decision makers who fail to generate and consider all alternatives, a characteristic of bounded rationality. We compare our results to the results published by Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, Legrenzi, and Caverni [Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 62 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]–88 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]. doi:10 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar].1037 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]/0033 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]-295X Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar].106 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar].1 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar].62 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]], and we observe lower performance levels than those in the original article.     

Explanation,updating, and accuracy

There is evidence that people update their credences partly on the basis of explanatory considerations. Philosophers have recently argued that to minimise the inaccuracy of their credences, people's updates also ought to be partly based on such considerations. However, there are many ways in which explanatory considerations can factor into updating, not all of which minimise inaccuracy. It is an open question whether in their updating, people take explanatory considerations into account in a way that philosophers would deem recommendable. To address this question, we re-analyse data from an experiment reported in Douven and Schupbach, “The role of explanatory considerations in updating” (Cognition, 2015).     

材料模式与认知负荷对小学生类比学习的影响

探讨学习材料不同模式和学习过程不同的认知负荷对小学生类比推理学习迁移的影响.包括两个分实验.实验1探讨学习材料的不同组织模式对小学生类比推理学习迁移的影响,两组小学生分别学习模式化与非模式化的材料,然后完成迁移程度远近不同的四类测题.结果表明,非模式化条件下完成远迁移题目的成绩显著优于模式化条件下的成绩.实验2探讨小学生在不同认知负荷条件下类比推理学习的迁移效果,两组小学生分别在高认知负荷与低认知负荷情况下学习类比推理的材料,然后完成上述四类测题.结果表明,高认知负荷条件下完成远迁移题目的成绩显著优于低认知负荷条件下的成绩.本实验结果表明,对于小学生类比推理的学习来说,非模式化、高负荷的学习更有利于促进迁移,支持了积极反应理论.