Violence against Women in Contemporary Ghanaian Society

Abstract

Overcoming violence against women requires critical reflective questioning both by individuals and human societies. At stake are not just questions of whether we respond to situations of violence but more importantly, where, when and how we respond. This paper examines the problem with respect to new dimensions arising from existing interventions on violence against women in the Ghanaian context. It calls for well-planned and sustained strategies to help break the cycle of violence being created.

The paper also calls upon the Church to look within its own resources for strategies that are life transforming to help break the vicious cycle. It notes that the Church is not only well placed to respond appropriately but it has been commissioned and given the requisite tools to do so. The call is therefore for the Church to enlist these foundational resources available to it and to put them to good use as it is demanded by its calling.     

Crossnational deviance in the workplace: Diverging impact of organizational commitment in Canada and Belgium

Using a self-report questionnaire from the aggressor's point of view, this study contrasted employees' frustration, perception of procedural justice, organizational commitment, and their relationships to interpersonal deviance in Canada and Belgium. Significant main effects were found in both countries for frustration and procedural justice on psychological and physical violence. Moreover, hierarchical regression analyses revealed significant interactions of country by normative and continuance commitment in interpersonal deviance, indicating the unique patterns relationships in Canada and Belgium. Hofstede's model of cultural dimensions was used to discuss the results.     

Unintentional collective action

In this paper, I examine the manner in which analyses of the action of single agents have been pressed into service for constructing accounts of collective action. Specifically, I argue that the best analogy to collective action is a class of individual action that Carl Ginet has called ‘aggregate action.’ Furthermore, once we use aggregate action as a model of collective action, then we see that existing accounts of collective action have failed to accommodate an important class of (what I shall call) ‘unintentional collective actions.’     

Scandalous subwomen and sublime superwomen: exploring portrayals of female suicide bombers’ agency

When the terms ‘women’ and ‘violence’ are used, it is usually in the context of women as victims and rarely as perpetrators of violence, and yet women do behave aggressively – for instance, as female suicide bombers. An ethical analysis of this role, however, has tended to be somewhat overlooked, partly because of the gender stereotypes at play, with little (or spurious) focus on the agency and autonomy of the women. This has resulted in an incomplete understanding of the unique ways in which societies treat female political aggressions, and the consequences of this for their agency. This paper seeks to redress these issues by evaluating two different societal portrayals of female suicide bombers; that of the ‘scandalous subwoman’ and the ‘sublime superwoman’. It argues that violent women's agency is often distorted to extremes beyond that of their male counterparts, and that it is imperative to avoid misrepresenting them either as agentless victims (‘subwomen’) or wholly agentic (‘superwomen’) since, even in times of political instability, they can rarely be dichotomised in this binary way.     

School shooting fatalities and school corporal punishment: A look at the states

Student deaths from school shootings were examined across all 50 states according to the state’s policy on the use of corporal punishment in schools after controlling for associated differences in poverty rates and the prevalence of conservative Christian religions. There were significantly more school shooting deaths found in states allowing school corporal punishment compared with those that do not. The odds of fatal involvement in a school shooting were greatest in states permitting school corporal punishment compared with those prohibiting it (odds ratio, 2.04) or restricting it to districts serving less than half the student population (odds ratio, 1.77). Moreover, the rate of school corporal punishment was moderately correlated with the rate of fatal school shootings both across all states and within the South, the region in which endorsement of school corporal punishment is most prevalent.Aggr. Behav. 28:173–183, 2002. © 2002 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.     

Gender,the Perception of Aggression,and the Overestimation of Gender Bias

The purpose of this study was to investigate how the gender of aggressor, target, and observer influences the perception and evaluation of aggression. One hundred seventy-one university students (predominantly White) read 1 of 8 vignettes that described an aggressive act. The aggressor–target gender combinations and the aggressive act were varied. Data did not support the hypothesis that, because of the impact of gender stereotypes, participants would perceive more aggressiveness in men's aggression than in women's aggression. Participants rated women's aggression as more acceptable than men's aggression, and male participants considered the aggression more acceptable, apparently because they saw the act as less aggressive. In addition, participants estimated how most men/women would perceive and evaluate the aggression. Results suggest that people overestimate how biased others are toward members of their own gender.     

运动员的生活满意感:个人自尊与集体自尊的贡献

评估了个人自尊与集体自尊在预测运动员的一般生活满意感和训练比赛满意感时的相对重要性。被试为139名中国运动员,男68名,女71名,平均年龄19．64岁。分层回归的结果发现,在控制了人口统计学变量、个人自尊和社会支持3类变量以后,集体自尊单独解释了训练比赛满意感总方差的13％。优势分析的结果表明,预测训练比赛满意感时,集体自尊最为重要,贡献了已解释方差的67％。这些结果提示,需要用不同的自尊来预测不同的满意感。     

Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings

Can collectives feel guilt with respect to what they have done? It hasbeen claimed that they cannot. Yet in everyday discourse collectives areoften held to feel guilt, criticized because they do not, and so on.Among other things, this paper considers what such so-called collectiveguilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimesappropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed beguilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collectiveto intend to do something and to act in light of that intention.According to this account, and in senses that are explained, there is acollective that intends to do something if and only if the members of agiven population are jointly committed to intend as a body to do thatthing. A related account of collective belief is also presented. It isthen argued that, depending on the circumstances, a group's action canbe free as opposed to coerced, and that the idea that a collective assuch can be guilty of performing a wrongful act makes sense. The ideathat a group might feel guilt may be rejected because it is assumed thatto feel guilt is to experience a ``pang'' or ``twinge'' of guilt –nothing more and nothing less. Presumably, though, there must becognitions and perhaps behavior involved. In addition, the primacy, eventhe necessity, of ``feeling-sensations'' to feeling guilt in theindividual case has been questioned. Without the presumption that it isalready clear what feeling guilt amounts to, three proposals as to thenature of collective guilt feelings are considered. A ``feeling ofpersonal guilt'' is defined as a feeling of guilt over one's own action.It is argued that it is implausible to construe collective guiltfeelings in terms of members' feelings of personal guilt. ``Membershipguilt feelings'' involve a group member's feeling of guilt over what hisor her group has done. It is argued that such feelings are intelligibleif the member is party to the joint commitment that lies at the base ofthe relevant collective intention and action. However, an account ofcollective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting.Finally, a ``plural subject'' account of collective guilt feelings isarticulated, such that they involve a joint commitment to feel guilt asa body. The parties to a joint commitment of the kind in question may asa result find themselves experiencing ``pangs'' of the kind associatedwith personal and membership guilt feelings. Since these pangs, byhypothesis, arise as a result of the joint commitment to feel guilt as abody, they might be thought of as providing a kind of phenomenology forcollective guilt. Be that as it may, it is argued the plural subjectaccount has much to be said for it.     

Group Responsibility for Ethnic Conflict

When a group of persons such as a nation orcorporation has a relatively clear structureand set of decision procedures, it is capableof acting and should, it can well be argued, beconsidered morally as well as legallyresponsible. This is not because it is afull-fledged moral person, but becauseassigning responsibility is a human practice,and we have good moral reasons to adopt thepractice of considering such groupsresponsible. From such judgments, however,little follows about the responsibility ofindividual members of such groups; much moreneeds to be ascertained about which officialsor executives are responsible for what beforewe can consider individual members of nationsor corporations responsible.Whether an unorganized group can be morallyresponsible is much less clear, but there havebeen useful discussions in recent years of thepossible responsibility of whites for racism,or males for sexism, and the like. In thisessay I explore arguments for consideringgroups or their members responsible for ethnicconflict. Such groups may lack a clearorganizational structure, but they are notrandom assortments of persons. Groups can andoften should take responsibility for theattitudes and actions of their members, and cansometimes be considered responsible for failingto do so. And persons often can and shouldtake responsibility for the attitudes andactions of the groups of which they aremembers.     

Collective Responsibility

The basic bearer of responsibility is individuals, because that isall there are – nothing else can literally be the bearer of fullresponsibility. Claims about group responsibility therefore needanalysis. This would be impossible if all actions must be understoodas ones that could be performed whether or not anyone else exists.Individuals often act by virtue of membership in certain groups;often such membership bears a causal role in our behavior, andsometimes people act deliberately in order to promote the prospectsof members of a given group. Nevertheless, it is rational to awardproportionally to individual contributions to those actions andindividual shares in the production of the consequences of thoseactions.