Philosophy and Science Dialogue: Free Will

In this dialogue Derk Pereboom and Marcel Brass discuss the free will problem from the perspective of philosophy and cognitive neuroscience. First, they give their opinion on how the two disciplines contribute to the free will problem. While Pereboom is optimistic regarding the contribution of science, Brass is more pessimistic and questions the usefulness of an empirical approach to the question whether free will exists or not. Then they outline their position on the free will problem. The idea of a transcendental agent is discussed in more detail. Furthermore, it is discussed whether free will scepticism is a politically, socially, psychologically viable position. Pereboom argues that promoting the idea of free will scepticism can have a positive impact on retributive emotions and the political practice regarding retributive punishment. Brass argues that retributive emotions are deeply rooted in evolution and therefore difficult to change via high-level beliefs about free will. Finally, the future of the free will debate is discussed. Both agree that the dialogue between philosophy and psychology should be intensified. Philosophy can benefit from taking empirical research more seriously. Psychology and neuroscience can benefit from philosophy by appreciating the sophistication and conceptual clarity of the philosophical debate. Both have to find a common language and define common problems that can be tackled from both perspectives.     

书院诚信教育简析

古代书院非常重视生徒的诚信教育.书院教育家认为"诚"既是"天之道",又是"人事之本然",故教育生徒要保持人的"诚"之本质,进而坚守"言行相顾"之"信",担负于他人、社会之责任.     

Torture and Religious Practice1

Abstract : This essay explores the connection between religious practices and torture with specific reference to the debate in the USA about ‘waterboarding’ as part of the so‐called War on Terror. After isolating some defining features of torture, the essay examines the historical background of waterboarding in the symbolism of Christian baptism and how this symbolism was used during the Inquisition and the Reformation as part of the torture of heretics and others. Mindful of this sordid use of a Christian rite meant to celebrate new life, the essay thereby clarifies Christian responsibility in the political order. That responsibility requires uncovering the religious roots of some forms of torture, resisting their use by the State, and, further, seeking to render current Christian practice both humane and life giving.     

大学生对网瘾和作弊的责任推断与应对策略

运用情景模拟和角色扮演的方法,研究大学生对网瘾和作弊的责任归因结构及其应对策略。对416名被试的研究结果显示：（1）责任归因的心理结构是一个“责任推断→责任情感→责任行为”的一元结构模式。（2）我国大学生的责任推断过程与维纳的经典理论基本一致,但在行为应对策略上存在一定的文化差异。（3）大学生对网瘾和作弊的责任推断倾向明显并与情感体验基本保持一致,但与行为应对策略存在一定的冲突。（4）大学生在网瘾和作弊的责任推断、情感体验以及应对策略上存在一定差异。     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">My Way</Emphasis> and Life’s Highway: Replies to Steward,Smilansky, and Perry

I seek to reply to the thoughtful and challenging papers by Helen Steward, Saul Smilansky, and John Perry. Steward argues that agency itself requires access to alternative possibilities; I attempt to motivate my denial of this view. I believe that her view here is no more plausible than the view (which she rejects) that it is unfair to hold someone morally responsible, unless he has genuine access to alternative possibilities. Smilansky contends that compatibilism is morally shallow, and that we can see this from the “ultimate perspective.” In reply, I explore the nature of “zooming” arguments, and I contend that even from a somewhat more detached perspective, important features that distinguish us from mere animals can be discerned (even in a causally deterministic universe). Finally, I seek to address Perry’s defense of classical compatibilism. My main objection to his form of compatbilism is that agents must be construed as having a certain kind of “baggage”—even on his own account.

The (near) necessity of alternate possibilities for moral responsibility

Harry Frankfurt has famously criticized the principle of alternate possibilities—the principle that an agent is morally responsible for performing some action only if able to have done otherwise than to perform it—on the grounds that it is possible for an agent to be morally responsible for performing an action that is inevitable for the agent when the reasons for which the agent lacks alternate possibilities are not the reasons for which the agent has acted. I argue that an incompatibilist about determinism and moral responsibility can safely ignore so-called “Frakfurt-style cases” and continue to argue for incompatibilism on the grounds that determinism rules out the ability to do otherwise. My argument relies on a simple—indeed, simplistic—weakening of the principle of alternate possibilities that is explicitly designed to be immune to Frankfurt-style criticism. This alternative to the principle of alternate possibilities is so simplistic that it will no doubt strike many readers as philosophically fallow. I argue that it is not. I argue that the addition of one highly plausible premise allows for the modified principle to be employed in an argument for incompatibilism that begins with the observation that determinism rules out the ability to do otherwise. On the merits of this argument I conclude that deterministic moral responsibility is impossible and that Frankfurt’s criticism of the principle of alternate possibilities—even if successful to that end—may be safely ignored.

论构建和谐医患关系的社会责任

围绕近年来备受社会关注的医患关系,对当前医患关系不和谐的社会失责进行了分析,认为造成这种失责原因是医疗体制不合理、社会卫生保障制度不完善、医疗卫生改革滞后、医药市场存在严重弊端、医学人文教育不尽人意等。在此基础上,明确提出构建和谐医患关系的社会责任是要建立平等互惠的医患关系、完善和谐医患关系的制度建设、建立有效的社会监督体系、健全社会医疗保障体系、深化医疗卫生体制改革、加强对医患冲突的社会管理等。     

医护人员人文素质缺乏的管理责任及干预策略

医护人员人文素质缺乏与医学教育缺陷、人文管理意识不强、后续人文素质培养不利及执业环境恶化等综合因素密切相关。卫生行政主管部门和医院管理者首先应当确立人文管理理念,营造医院的人文氛围,承担起促进医学教育体制改革、加强岗位培训和着力培养社会需要的“人文科学型”医护人员的责任。     

公共领域中的集群效能研究述评

公共领域中的集群效能是指公众通过分享所在地区的公共信任和社会凝聚力, 从而对于共同努力实现所在地区特定目标的一种集体信念和预期。公共领域中的集群效能有其独特的测量方法和研究结论, 集群效能的相关前因变量可以分为社会认同、社会经济地位和社会参与, 集群效能的相关影响作用研究可以分为公共安全、政治行为、公共卫生三个领域内的研究。文章最后指出未来在公共领域中集群效能研究有必要加强作用机制、动态变化等方面的探讨。     

Triangulating Political Responsibility: The Motivated Formation of Responsibility Judgments

This article analyzes the process through which partisan bias arises during the formation of citizens' judgments of political responsibility. Informed by theories of motivated political reasoning, it argues that exposure to partisan cues motivates partisans to pursue directional goals, goals which bias the cognitive processing of information and, in turn, overall judgments of responsibility. It further argues that the nature of this biased processing will be such that partisans devalue information inconsistent with their partisan affect. Using a pair of experiments, I test these hypotheses by manipulating both objective evidence concerning gubernatorial responsibility for a state's fiscal imbalance and the presence of partisan cues. Findings support both sets of expectations. The results also suggest that the effects of partisan bias are greater in judgments tied to institutional actions than in those tied to institutional roles and expectations.