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131.
Anthony F. Beavers 《Metaphilosophy》2002,33(1&2):70-82
132.
运动员的生活满意感:个人自尊与集体自尊的贡献 总被引:40,自引:0,他引:40
评估了个人自尊与集体自尊在预测运动员的一般生活满意感和训练比赛满意感时的相对重要性。被试为139名中国运动员,男68名,女71名,平均年龄19.64岁。分层回归的结果发现,在控制了人口统计学变量、个人自尊和社会支持3类变量以后,集体自尊单独解释了训练比赛满意感总方差的13%。优势分析的结果表明,预测训练比赛满意感时,集体自尊最为重要,贡献了已解释方差的67%。这些结果提示,需要用不同的自尊来预测不同的满意感。 相似文献
133.
Noreen Herzfeld 《Zygon》2002,37(2):303-316
There is remarkable convergence between twentieth-century interpretations of the image of God ( imago Dei ), what it means for human beings to be created in God's image, and approaches toward creating in our own image in the field of artificial intelligence (AI). Both fields have viewed the intersection between God and humanity or humanity and computers in terms of either (1) a property or set of properties such as intelligence, (2) the functions we engage in or are capable of, or (3) the relationships we establish and maintain. Each of these three approaches reflects a different understanding of what stands at the core of our humanity. Functional and relational approaches were common in the late twentieth century, with a functional understanding the one most accepted by society at large. A relational view, however, gives new insights into human dignity in a computer age as well as new approaches to AI research. 相似文献
134.
Margaret Gilbert 《The Journal of Ethics》2002,6(2):115-143
Can collectives feel guilt with respect to what they have done? It hasbeen claimed that they cannot. Yet in everyday discourse collectives areoften held to feel guilt, criticized because they do not, and so on.Among other things, this paper considers what such so-called collectiveguilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimesappropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed beguilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collectiveto intend to do something and to act in light of that intention.According to this account, and in senses that are explained, there is acollective that intends to do something if and only if the members of agiven population are jointly committed to intend as a body to do thatthing. A related account of collective belief is also presented. It isthen argued that, depending on the circumstances, a group's action canbe free as opposed to coerced, and that the idea that a collective assuch can be guilty of performing a wrongful act makes sense. The ideathat a group might feel guilt may be rejected because it is assumed thatto feel guilt is to experience a ``pang'' or ``twinge'' of guilt –nothing more and nothing less. Presumably, though, there must becognitions and perhaps behavior involved. In addition, the primacy, eventhe necessity, of ``feeling-sensations'' to feeling guilt in theindividual case has been questioned. Without the presumption that it isalready clear what feeling guilt amounts to, three proposals as to thenature of collective guilt feelings are considered. A ``feeling ofpersonal guilt'' is defined as a feeling of guilt over one's own action.It is argued that it is implausible to construe collective guiltfeelings in terms of members' feelings of personal guilt. ``Membershipguilt feelings'' involve a group member's feeling of guilt over what hisor her group has done. It is argued that such feelings are intelligibleif the member is party to the joint commitment that lies at the base ofthe relevant collective intention and action. However, an account ofcollective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting.Finally, a ``plural subject'' account of collective guilt feelings isarticulated, such that they involve a joint commitment to feel guilt asa body. The parties to a joint commitment of the kind in question may asa result find themselves experiencing ``pangs'' of the kind associatedwith personal and membership guilt feelings. Since these pangs, byhypothesis, arise as a result of the joint commitment to feel guilt as abody, they might be thought of as providing a kind of phenomenology forcollective guilt. Be that as it may, it is argued the plural subjectaccount has much to be said for it. 相似文献
135.
Virginia Held 《The Journal of Ethics》2002,6(2):157-178
When a group of persons such as a nation orcorporation has a relatively clear structureand set of decision procedures, it is capableof acting and should, it can well be argued, beconsidered morally as well as legallyresponsible. This is not because it is afull-fledged moral person, but becauseassigning responsibility is a human practice,and we have good moral reasons to adopt thepractice of considering such groupsresponsible. From such judgments, however,little follows about the responsibility ofindividual members of such groups; much moreneeds to be ascertained about which officialsor executives are responsible for what beforewe can consider individual members of nationsor corporations responsible.Whether an unorganized group can be morallyresponsible is much less clear, but there havebeen useful discussions in recent years of thepossible responsibility of whites for racism,or males for sexism, and the like. In thisessay I explore arguments for consideringgroups or their members responsible for ethnicconflict. Such groups may lack a clearorganizational structure, but they are notrandom assortments of persons. Groups can andoften should take responsibility for theattitudes and actions of their members, and cansometimes be considered responsible for failingto do so. And persons often can and shouldtake responsibility for the attitudes andactions of the groups of which they aremembers. 相似文献
136.
Jan Narveson 《The Journal of Ethics》2002,6(2):179-198
The basic bearer of responsibility is individuals, because that isall there are – nothing else can literally be the bearer of fullresponsibility. Claims about group responsibility therefore needanalysis. This would be impossible if all actions must be understoodas ones that could be performed whether or not anyone else exists.Individuals often act by virtue of membership in certain groups;often such membership bears a causal role in our behavior, andsometimes people act deliberately in order to promote the prospectsof members of a given group. Nevertheless, it is rational to awardproportionally to individual contributions to those actions andindividual shares in the production of the consequences of thoseactions. 相似文献
137.
Ton Van Den Beld 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2002,5(2):181-200
In the first part of the paper an argument is developed to the effect that (1) there is no moral ground for individual persons to feel responsible for or guilty about crimes of their group to which they have in no way contributed; and (2) since there is no irreducibly collective responsibility nor guilt at any time, there is no question of them persisting over time. In the second part it is argued that there is nevertheless sufficient reason for innocent individual members of a group (that persists over time) to take on responsibility and guilt for the evil other (earlier) members have committed. The reason depends on the acceptability of a particular psychological theory of personal identity. 相似文献
138.
Burleigh Wilkins 《The Journal of Ethics》2002,6(2):145-155
I question the adequacy of Margaret Gilbert's account of collectivefeelings of guilt as collective judgments which do not necessarilyhave any phenomenological components. I question whether joint commitment theory in its present form helps us to understand orresolve social conflicts. 相似文献
139.
John Fox 《Journal of Applied Logic》2003,1(3-4):197
Since Pascal introduced the idea of mathematical probability in the 17th century discussions of uncertainty and “rational” belief have been dogged by philosophical and technical disputes. Furthermore, the last quarter century has seen an explosion of new questions and ideas, stimulated by developments in the computer and cognitive sciences. Competing ideas about probability are often driven by different intuitions about the nature of belief that arise from the needs of different domains (e.g., economics, management theory, engineering, medicine, the life sciences etc). Taking medicine as our focus we develop three lines of argument (historical, practical and cognitive) that suggest that traditional views of probability cannot accommodate all the competing demands and diverse constraints that arise in complex real-world domains. A model of uncertain reasoning based on a form of logical argumentation appears to unify many diverse ideas. The model has precursors in informal discussions of argumentation due to Toulmin, and the notion of logical probability advocated by Keynes, but recent developments in artificial intelligence and cognitive science suggest ways of resolving epistemological and technical issues that they could not address. 相似文献
140.
There has been a proliferation of new measures of individual differences in emotional processing, but too little research that evaluates the distinctiveness and utility of such measures. We critically evaluated the Level of Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS), which is a measure of people's awareness of emotions in both the self and others. Across two studies, university students (N=124 and 107 for study 1 and 2, respectively) completed the LEAS, as well as a battery of personality measures and ability tests, and a mood-induction task. The LEAS was statistically distinct from a wide variety of personality measures, emotional intelligence tests, and self-report ability measures. In addition, both studies demonstrated that people high in emotional awareness were less likely than others to show mood congruent biases in their judgments (e.g. when bad moods lead to negative judgments and good moods to good judgments). The LEAS appears to be both distinctive and useful in understanding mood-relevant processes. 相似文献