Temptation and Deliberation

There is a great deal of plausibility to the standard view that if one is rational and it is clear at the time of action that a certain move, say M₁, would serve one’s concerns better than any other available move, then one will, as a rational agent, opt for move M₁. Still, this view concerning rationality has been challenged at least in part because it seems to conflict with our considered judgments about what it is rational to do in cases of temptation that share the structure of Warren Quinn’s self-torturer case. I argue that there is a way to accomodate our considered judgments about the relevant cases of temptation without giving up the standard view or dismissing, as in some way rationally defective, the concerns of the agents in the relevant cases. My reasoning relies on the idea that, at least in some cases, whether an action serves one’s concerns well depends on what action(s) or course(s) of action it is part of. In the final section of the paper, I explain how this idea sheds light on an important source of frustration in collective decision-making.     

A metaphilosophical dialogue

Three philosophical attitudes in dialogue are suggested in answering the question posed by the Journal. An inviting, First Inner Voice undeerstands philosophy as a shareable theoretical task that can be explained and understood even across distant philosophical paradigms. A Second Inner Voice, sometimes termed in the dialogue as sceptic, distrusts any metaphilosophical definition of what philosophy is and what it should do, but would, nevertheless, aspire to retain a certain universalistic understanding of its own work, though it cannot be strongly and conceptualy rendered. A Third Inner Voice, regarded in the text as somewhat Hegelian, insists in the unavoidability of strong philosophical definitions both in historical and in conceptual terms. No proposal or conclusion is forwarded regarding what should be done in contemporary philosophy, though an analysis of harm experiences is taken as an example of philosophical work     

Responses to organizational harm: Mechanism of blaming managers as proxies for a culpable organization

Recent research has shown that perceivers who are culturally oriented to focus on the causal influence of groups tend to assign blame to an organization and extend the blame to an individual representing it (i.e. proxy blaming). The present research investigates the mechanism of this blame extension. Results show that it occurs when punishing the organization is impossible rather than possible (Study 1) and that this blaming is brought about by the perception that the target individual is in the role to represent the organization, not by the perception that he/she is the typical member of the culpable organization (Study 2). Implications of these findings in the responsibility literature are discussed.     

Biotechnology in the Japanese media: Comparative analysis of newspaper articles on genetic engineering in Japan and Europe

The present study examined how the representations of biotechnology using genetic engineering have been developed in Japan relying on media analysis. Specifically, using the online database of the Asahi Shimbun , one of the major opinion-forming newspapers in Japan, the annual numbers of articles concerning biotechnology were tallied from 1985 to 2000, and an analysis was conducted of the content of 850 articles from 10 particular years. Specifically, a framework in which a biotechnological issue was presented was focused on; the changes of dominant frames and the relationships between frames and specific biotechnological applications (e.g. medicine, agrifood and cloning) were investigated. The results showed that: (i) the number of articles increased sharply in particular since 1996–1997; (ii) although general attitudes toward biotechnology were persistently positive, a frame of biotechnological article became more diverse (i.e. the prospect frames were considerably dominant in the earlier phases, but the concern frames also became prominent in the later phases); and (iii) several articles were found which reported cloned animals in a frame of emotional attachment, a frame unique to Japan. These results were compared with those of European countries and discussed from a perspective of the theory of collective symbolic coping.     

Epicureanism About Death and Immortality

In this paper I discuss some of Martha Nussbaum’s defenses of Epicurean views about death and immortality. Here I seek to defend the commonsense view that death can be a bad thing for an individual against the Epicurean; I also defend the claim that immortality might conceivably be a good thing. In the development of my analysis, I make certain connections between the literatures on free will and death. The intersection of these two literatures can be illuminated by reference to my notion of a Dialectical Stalemate.     

中国人的群体参照记忆效应

在自我参照效应范式中加入参照认同群体加工任务,比较了中国被试在参照中国人和参照美国人进行记忆加工时的再认率及“记得”与“知道”判断的成绩。两项实验结果一致表明,参照中国人加工的再认成绩显著高于参照美国人,表明记忆加工的认同群体参照效应,而在“记得”与“知道”指标上并无差异;参照中国人加工的再认成绩和“记得”判断成绩显著低于自我参照加工。根据个体自我、关系自我和集体自我的分类方法,自我参照效应反映了个体自我对于记忆加工的影响,群体参照效应则主要反映了集体自我的影响     

小学儿童的道德行为及其与道德观念的相关——诚实原则和集体主义价值观冲突情境下的研究

研究探讨了585名7、9、11岁的小学儿童在诚实原则和集体主义价值观冲突的真实情境下的道德行为及其与道德观念的相关。结果表明,在诚实原则和集体主义价值观冲突情境下,小学儿童的道德行为主要受到诚实原则的支配,表现为:为集体说谎行为发生率都很低;随着年龄的增长,小学儿童的为集体说谎行为的发生率显著增高;小学儿童的为集体说谎行为不存在性别差异;7岁、9岁儿童的为集体说谎行为与集体观念无关,11岁儿童的为集体说谎行为与集体观念显著正相关。     

The Normative Core Of Paternalism

The philosophical debate on paternalism is conducted as if the property of being paternalistic should be attributed to actions. Actions are typically deemed to be paternalistic if they amount to some kind of interference with a person and if the rationale for the action is the good of the person interfered with. This focus on actions obscures the normative issues involved. In particular, it makes it hard to provide an analysis of the traditional liberal resistance to paternalism. Given the fact that actions most often have mixed rationales, it is not clear how we should categorize and evaluate interfering actions for which only part of the rationale is the good of the person. The preferable solution is to attribute the property of being paternalistic not to actions, but to compounds of reasons and actions. The framework of action–reasons provides the tools for distinguishing where exactly paternalism lies in the complex web of reasons and actions.     

Terrorism,War, and The Killing of the Innocent

Commonsense moral thought holds that what makes terrorism particularly abhorrent is the fact that it tends to be directed toward innocent victims. Yet contemporary philosophers tend to doubt that the concept of innocence plays any significant role here, and to deny that prohibitions against targeting noncombatants can be justified through appeal to their moral innocence. I argue, however, that the arguments used to support these doubts are ultimately unsuccessful. Indeed, the philosophical positions in question tend to misunderstand the justification of both the prohibition against targeting noncombatants, and that of the permission to attack combatants, for which the paper offers a new account. Such misunderstandings make it all too easy to justify both terrorist actions and morally objectionable actions on the part of nations at war. Taking proper account of the role of innocence in the context of armed conflict will alter our ordinary ways of thinking about the ethics of war, with respect to both jus in bello and jus ad bellum.