FREE YOUR MIND: BUDDHISM,CAUSALITY, AND THE FREE WILL PROBLEM

The problem of free will is associated with a specific and significant kind of control over our actions, which is understood primarily in the sense that we have the freedom to do otherwise or the capacity for self-determination. Is Buddhism compatible with such a conception of free will? The aim of this article is to address three critical issues concerning the free will problem: (1) what role should accounts of physical and neurobiological processes play in discussions of free will? (2) Is a conception of mental autonomy grounded in practices of meditative cultivation compatible with the three cardinal Buddhist doctrines of momentariness, dependent arising, and no-self? (3) Are there enough resources in Buddhism, given its antisubstantialist metaphysics, to account for personal agency, self-control, and moral responsibility?     

JUST WAR THEORY,HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION,AND THE NEED FOR A DEMOCRATIC FEDERATION

The primary purpose of government is to secure public goods that cannot be achieved by free markets. The Coordination Principle tells us to consolidate sovereign power in a single institution to overcome collective action problems that otherwise prevent secure provision of the relevant public goods. There are several public goods that require such coordination at the global level, chief among them being basic human rights. The claim that human rights require global coordination is supported in three main steps. First, I consider Pogge's and Habermas's analyses as alternatives to Hobbesian conceptions of justice. Second, I consider the core conventions of international law, which are in tension with the primacy of state sovereignty in the UN system. Third, I argue that the just war tradition does not limit just causes for war to self‐defense; it supports saving innocent third parties from crimes against humanity as a just reason for war. While classical authors focused less on this issue, the point is especially clear in twentieth‐century just war theories, such as those offered by the American Catholic bishops, Jean Elshtain, Brian Orend, and Michael Walzer. Against Walzer, I argue that we add intractable military tyranny to the list of horrors meriting intervention if other ad bellum conditions are met. But these results require us to reexamine the “just authority” of first resort to govern such interventions. The Coordination Principle implies that we should create a transnational federation with consolidated powers in place of a treaty organization requiring near‐unanimity. But to be legitimate, such a global institution must also be directly answerable to the citizens of its member states. While the UN Security Council is inadequate on both counts, a federation of democracies with a directly elected executive and legislature could meet both conditions.     

Altered states of consciousness are related to higher sexual responsiveness

Altered states of consciousness lead to profound changes in the sense of self, time and space. We assessed how these changes were related to sexual responsiveness during sex. 116 subjects reported (a) intensity of awareness concerning body, space and time, and (b) satisfaction, desire, arousal, and orgasm occurrence. We differentiated vaginal intercourse orgasm from noncoital orgasm. Female vaginal intercourse orgasm was further differentiated as with or without concurrent clitoral masturbation. Overall, sexual responsiveness was related to greater body awareness and lesser time and space awareness. Satisfaction, desire, and arousal were especially associated with less time awareness in women. Female orgasms during vaginal intercourse were related to greater body awareness and lesser time awareness, but noncoital orgasms were unrelated. Our findings provide empirical support for the hypotheses that altered states of consciousness with attentional absorption are strongly related to sexual responsiveness in women, and to a lesser extent in men.     

Psychology of Science/Theology of Science: Reaching Out or Narrowing?

Formalizing a “psychology of science” today will constrain intellectual freedom in ways more likely stultifying than liberating. We should be more improvisational in seeking ideas from academic psychology to develop a more comprehensive purview. I suggest that a psychology of science should look at systematic theology and empirical theology. Liberal theologians have long experience trying to distill from religion those structural aspects that affirm openness in a search for truth. Science, as well as religion, has its myths and rituals, but theologians are more experienced than scientists at a large mythohistorical scale. There are distortions in the extreme degree to which psychological science has traditionally emphasized empiricism, positivism, hypothesis testing, and falsifiability. I argue for less critical reduction and more creative augmentation. This could include looking outside academia at cognitive competencies of people in trades. Exaggerated parsimony is an old story. This is illustrated by the opposition to David Hartley's 1749 theory of neural oscillations. There is an inexorable “margin of uncertainty” where scientific prediction and control can never outstrip the new uses to which human beings put ideas. Facts and values interact in this margin; theology has long made a home there, but scientists sometimes have been excessive in rejecting the “naturalistic fallacy.” There is also often a degree of disingenuousness in psychology's reluctance to take subjective phenomena seriously; here there may be lessons in how empirical theology has handled subjectivity, as well as in taking an honest look at the way much of the methodology of experimental psychology incorporates subjective assessments. Feist's book is a start, but these things need more thought before codifying a psychology of science.     

Fluctuations of answer and confidence rating in a general-knowledge problem task: Is confidence rating a result of direct memory-relevant output monitoring?

In order to examine whether confidence rating is a result of direct memory-relevant output monitoring, a general-knowledge test was used. A question set was answered in experimental session 1, and the same question set was employed in session 2. Subjects chose one answer from two alternatives. No significant difference in answer accuracy was found between sessions, which suggests that identical information processing was carried out, and that any difference between sessions was based on probabilistic fluctuation. The major results were as follows: (a) In both sessions, answer accuracy was an increasing function of confidence. (b) Answer-change rate (rate of different answers to the same question between sessions) decreased monotonically with confidence. (c) The distributions of confidence rating in session 2, conditional on the rating in session 1, were nearly identical in no-answer-change and answer-change cases. These results suggest that confidence rating is not a result of monitoring memory-relevant output itself but an estimation of possibility of answer fluctuation.     

Weigh(t)ing for Awareness

We wished to learn if weight perception can be extinguished by studying two patients with right hemisphere brain damage. When lifting weights simultaneously, a patient with right frontal damage was not biased in her judgments of which weight was heavier. By contrast, a patient with right parietal damage reported left-sided weights as being lighter than those on the right. Psychophysical power functions revealed that her awareness of increasing weights on the left was dampened compared to the right when lifting weights individually on each side. Strikingly, her awareness of weight changes on the left was completely abolished when she lifted weights in both hands simultaneously. She demonstrated an unusual split in awareness, being motorically aware of and actively engaged with left-sided weights while being unaware of their incremental changes.     

‘They will not control us’: Ingroup positivity and belief in intergroup conspiracies

This research examined the role of different forms of positive regard for the ingroup in predicting beliefs in intergroup conspiracies. Collective narcissism reflects a belief in ingroup greatness contingent on others’ recognition. We hypothesized that collective narcissism should be especially likely to foster outgroup conspiracy beliefs. Non‐narcissistic ingroup positivity, on the other hand, should predict a weaker tendency to believe in conspiracy theories. In Study 1, the endorsement of conspiratorial explanations of outgroup actions was positively predicted by collective narcissism but negatively by non‐narcissistic ingroup positivity. Study 2 showed that the opposite effects of collective narcissism and non‐narcissistic ingroup positivity on conspiracy beliefs were mediated via differential perceptions of threat. Study 3 manipulated whether conspiracy theories implicated ingroup or outgroup members. Collective narcissism predicted belief in outgroup conspiracies but not in ingroup conspiracies, while non‐narcissistic ingroup positivity predicted lower conspiracy beliefs, regardless of them being ascribed to the ingroup or the outgroup.     

The Irony of Social Trust: Individual‐level and Contextual‐level Links with Protest Intention and Radical Right Support in Switzerland

This research examines how social trust translates into dynamics of mobilisation for inclusion or exclusion in Swiss cantons by studying how social trust is linked to equality‐directed protest intention versus radical right support, comparing individual‐level and contextual‐level relationships. The study is based on data from the Swiss Household Panel collected between 2002 and 2008. The impact of individual‐level and contextual‐level social trust is analysed in three‐level regression models of repeated observations, nested in individuals who are nested in cantons. The results indicate complex patterns that depend on the level at which social trust is assessed and confirm the need for a contextualised view of social trust and social capital. For individuals, higher social trust is associated with higher protest intention and lower radical right support. However, in cantons characterised by higher rates of social trust, individuals are less likely to engage in protest actions and more likely to support the radical right. Further analyses show that canton‐level social trust is intertwined with other contextual factors, suggesting that in certain configurations, that is, combined with low levels of cultural and social diversity, climates of social trust may be linked to more restricted forms of solidarity and the persistence of inequality. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Protest Against Waste Contamination in the ‘Land of Fires’: Psychological Antecedents for Activists and Non‐activists

The ‘Land of Fires’ is a district in Italy characterized by illegal waste disposal, waste burning, and citizen protests over contamination. This study investigates the relevance of several psycho‐social factors that predict citizens' intention to protest, taking into account different research traditions. In addition, we hypothesize the effect of protest antecedents to be moderated by past participation behaviour (i.e. the level of activism). Hence, our study is a first attempt to explore the effect of protest antecedents as a function of the individual level of activism through a cross‐sectional survey study (N = 306). The results show significant effects of collective identity, sense of injustice, costs of protest, and perceived risk (cognitive dimension) on intention to protest. The effects of collective efficacy and perceived risk (affective dimension) are moderated by participants' level of activism, and these effects are significant only for non‐activists. The relevance of this new approach is discussed, as well as practical implications and possible further developments. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Artificial consciousness and the consciousness-attention dissociation

Artificial Intelligence is at a turning point, with a substantial increase in projects aiming to implement sophisticated forms of human intelligence in machines. This research attempts to model specific forms of intelligence through brute-force search heuristics and also reproduce features of human perception and cognition, including emotions. Such goals have implications for artificial consciousness, with some arguing that it will be achievable once we overcome short-term engineering challenges. We believe, however, that phenomenal consciousness cannot be implemented in machines. This becomes clear when considering emotions and examining the dissociation between consciousness and attention in humans. While we may be able to program ethical behavior based on rules and machine learning, we will never be able to reproduce emotions or empathy by programming such control systems—these will be merely simulations. Arguments in favor of this claim include considerations about evolution, the neuropsychological aspects of emotions, and the dissociation between attention and consciousness found in humans. Ultimately, we are far from achieving artificial consciousness.