试论《周易》的原初意义与现代意义

文章首先阐述了考察《周易》价值的方法,然后运用这一方法全面考察了《周易》的原初意义与现代意义。作者认为,《周易》的产生标志着中华民族抽象思维能力的关键性跃迁;《周易》的内容折射着当时的自然、社会和人文状况,记载着古代先民对于当时复杂的自然、社会和人生问题的特别关注与初步思考;《周易》的人生智慧和行为原则,反映着趋利避害和预见未来的价值取向;《周易》的思维方式汇集着当时的思维工具和认识方法,表达着最初的终极关怀和哲学意识。而《周易》所提供的始源性材料,有助于我们从根源性上来把握中华文化及其当代特点;易学史的演变与发展则为我们更好地把握历史文化发展进程提供了重要的思想资料;《周易》所表达的人生智慧和思维方式对于当今人类把握现实与面向未来也具有极为重要的启示和借鉴意义。     

Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings

Can collectives feel guilt with respect to what they have done? It hasbeen claimed that they cannot. Yet in everyday discourse collectives areoften held to feel guilt, criticized because they do not, and so on.Among other things, this paper considers what such so-called collectiveguilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimesappropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed beguilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collectiveto intend to do something and to act in light of that intention.According to this account, and in senses that are explained, there is acollective that intends to do something if and only if the members of agiven population are jointly committed to intend as a body to do thatthing. A related account of collective belief is also presented. It isthen argued that, depending on the circumstances, a group's action canbe free as opposed to coerced, and that the idea that a collective assuch can be guilty of performing a wrongful act makes sense. The ideathat a group might feel guilt may be rejected because it is assumed thatto feel guilt is to experience a ``pang'' or ``twinge'' of guilt –nothing more and nothing less. Presumably, though, there must becognitions and perhaps behavior involved. In addition, the primacy, eventhe necessity, of ``feeling-sensations'' to feeling guilt in theindividual case has been questioned. Without the presumption that it isalready clear what feeling guilt amounts to, three proposals as to thenature of collective guilt feelings are considered. A ``feeling ofpersonal guilt'' is defined as a feeling of guilt over one's own action.It is argued that it is implausible to construe collective guiltfeelings in terms of members' feelings of personal guilt. ``Membershipguilt feelings'' involve a group member's feeling of guilt over what hisor her group has done. It is argued that such feelings are intelligibleif the member is party to the joint commitment that lies at the base ofthe relevant collective intention and action. However, an account ofcollective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting.Finally, a ``plural subject'' account of collective guilt feelings isarticulated, such that they involve a joint commitment to feel guilt asa body. The parties to a joint commitment of the kind in question may asa result find themselves experiencing ``pangs'' of the kind associatedwith personal and membership guilt feelings. Since these pangs, byhypothesis, arise as a result of the joint commitment to feel guilt as abody, they might be thought of as providing a kind of phenomenology forcollective guilt. Be that as it may, it is argued the plural subjectaccount has much to be said for it.     

Group Responsibility for Ethnic Conflict

When a group of persons such as a nation orcorporation has a relatively clear structureand set of decision procedures, it is capableof acting and should, it can well be argued, beconsidered morally as well as legallyresponsible. This is not because it is afull-fledged moral person, but becauseassigning responsibility is a human practice,and we have good moral reasons to adopt thepractice of considering such groupsresponsible. From such judgments, however,little follows about the responsibility ofindividual members of such groups; much moreneeds to be ascertained about which officialsor executives are responsible for what beforewe can consider individual members of nationsor corporations responsible.Whether an unorganized group can be morallyresponsible is much less clear, but there havebeen useful discussions in recent years of thepossible responsibility of whites for racism,or males for sexism, and the like. In thisessay I explore arguments for consideringgroups or their members responsible for ethnicconflict. Such groups may lack a clearorganizational structure, but they are notrandom assortments of persons. Groups can andoften should take responsibility for theattitudes and actions of their members, and cansometimes be considered responsible for failingto do so. And persons often can and shouldtake responsibility for the attitudes andactions of the groups of which they aremembers.     

Collective Responsibility

The basic bearer of responsibility is individuals, because that isall there are – nothing else can literally be the bearer of fullresponsibility. Claims about group responsibility therefore needanalysis. This would be impossible if all actions must be understoodas ones that could be performed whether or not anyone else exists.Individuals often act by virtue of membership in certain groups;often such membership bears a causal role in our behavior, andsometimes people act deliberately in order to promote the prospectsof members of a given group. Nevertheless, it is rational to awardproportionally to individual contributions to those actions andindividual shares in the production of the consequences of thoseactions.     

Can Collective Responsibility for Perpetrated Evil Persist over Generations?

In the first part of the paper an argument is developed to the effect that (1) there is no moral ground for individual persons to feel responsible for or guilty about crimes of their group to which they have in no way contributed; and (2) since there is no irreducibly collective responsibility nor guilt at any time, there is no question of them persisting over time. In the second part it is argued that there is nevertheless sufficient reason for innocent individual members of a group (that persists over time) to take on responsibility and guilt for the evil other (earlier) members have committed. The reason depends on the acceptability of a particular psychological theory of personal identity.     

Joint Commitments

I question the adequacy of Margaret Gilbert's account of collectivefeelings of guilt as collective judgments which do not necessarilyhave any phenomenological components. I question whether joint commitment theory in its present form helps us to understand orresolve social conflicts.     

Individual differences in children's understanding of social evaluation concerns

Recent research suggests that children's understanding of self‐presentational behaviour—behaviour designed to shape social evaluation—is a function of both cognitive and motivational variables. Furthermore, the motivational factors involved are likely to reflect individual differences in the salience of concerns about social evaluation. The present research represents a first effort to determine whether measures of such differences are indeed associated with the understanding of self‐presentational behaviour. In a first experiment, a teacher rating measure of self‐monitoring was found to be positively associated with the understanding of self‐presentational motives. In a second experiment, a more narrowly specified self‐report measure of public self‐consciousness was found to have a similar association with the understanding of self‐presentation, with no such association found for private self‐consciousness. These preliminary results make it clear that our formulations of development in social cognition must indeed include a consideration of individual differences in motivational orientations. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

再认中意识和无意识的贡献大小--兼论内隐记忆的抗老化现象

本研究以探索记忆中意识和无意识贡献大小为目的,采用年龄和材料两个自变量,年龄分中青年和老年两组,被试均为23人,材料分文字和非文字两种。实验通过PDP的包含和排除测验计算意识和无意识的贡献大小。结果发现：(1)意识在不同年龄和不同材料的记忆中所起作用的差异极为显著;(2)无意识在文字材料的记忆中所起作用的差异极为显著;(3)无意识在非文字材料和不同年龄的记忆中所起的作用的差异均不显著。由此推论,老年人记忆中无意识贡献并未下降。这似说明,老年人内隐记忆并未老化。     

政府信用与政府自觉

政府信用是社会信用的基础和源头,政府信用是社会信用体系建设的关键,因此,政府信用的提高对于提升个人信用和企业信用具有十分重要的意义。政府信用失范是政府信用缺失、信用贫困、信用滥用、信用危机的统称,政府信用失范将会造成政府失效乃至政府失败。在目前政府主导形态下,政府信用的提高和信用危机的克服主要依赖于政府的行为自主性——政府自觉。     

Innocence Without Naivete,Uprightness Without Stupidity: The Pedagogical Kavannah of Emmanuel Levinas

While it is impossible to transfigurephilosophical and Judaic thought of EmmanuelLevinas into a moral agenda for education orthe programmatic regularities of a pedagogicalmethodology, this paper argues for theimportance of his work for re-openingeducational questions. These questions engagethe problem of what it could mean to livehistorically, to live within an uprightattentiveness to traces of those who haveinhabited times and places other than one'sown. In this sense, I address the problem ofremembrance as a question of and for history,as a force of inhabitation, as an inheritance weare obligated to live within, that intertwineswith our sense of limits and possibilities,hopes and fears, identities and distinctions.Substantively, this problem is manifest in howone attends to the experiences of others: howone reads, how one views, and how one listens,always historically specific normalizedpractices that in any given epoch are ingrainedin what it means to live in consort withothers, to live as though the lives of otherpeople mattered. The paper seeks to display thefecundity of the thought of Levinas forre-thinking such issues.