Exercise of Human Agency Through Collective Efficacy

Social cognitive theory adopts an agentic perspective in which individuals are producers of experiences and shapers of events. Among the mechanisms of human agency, none is more focal or pervading than the belief of personal efficacy. This core belief is the foundation of human agency. Unless people believe that they can produce desired effects and forestall undesired ones by their actions, they have little incentive to act. The growing interdependence of human functioning is placing a premium on the exercise of collective agency through shared beliefs in the power to produce effects by collective action. The present article analyzes the nature of perceived collective efficacy and its centrality in how people live their lives. Perceived collective efficacy fosters groups' motivational commitment to their missions, resilience to adversity, and performance accomplishments.     

“We Must Be the Change We Want to See in the World”: Integrating Norms and Identities through Social Interaction

In this article, we propose a social psychological mechanism for the formation of new social change movements. Here, we argue that social change follows the emergence of shared injunctive social norms that define new collective identities, and we systematically spell out the nature of the processes through which this comes about. We propose that these norms and identities are created and negotiated through validating communication about a normative conflict; resulting in an identity‐norm nexus (INN), whereby people become the change they want to see in the world. We suggest that injunctive norms are routinely negotiated, validated, and integrated with shared identity in order to create the potential to effect change in the world. Norms and identities need not be integrated or connected in this way, but the power of social actors to form new social movements to bring about sociopolitical change will tend to be severely limited unless they can bring about the integration of identity and action.     

“Yesterday Redeemed and Tomorrow Made More Beautiful”: Historical Injustice and Possible Collective Selves

This research examines the ways in which talk about reparations for historical injustice demonstrates individuals' ambitions for future collective identities. Interviews with White Tulsans (n = 25) illustrate how discursive temporal constructions justify support for or opposition to reparations for the 1921 Tulsa Race Riot. It is argued that White Tulsans strategically employed these constructions to either transform or maintain collective identities. These findings bring a discursive approach to theories of collective continuity (Sani, Bowe, & Herrera, 2008) and possible selves (Cinnirella, 1998; Markus & Nurius, 1986; McAdams, 2006; Vignoles, 2008). From this perspective, reckoning with the past is as much about who we can be tomorrow as it is guilt for who we were yesterday.     

“The Group Knobe Effect”: evidence that people intuitively attribute agency and responsibility to groups

In the current paper, we present and discuss a series of experiments in which we investigated people’s willingness to ascribe intentions, as well as blame and praise, to groups. The experiments draw upon the so-called “Knobe Effect”. Knobe [2003. “Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language.” Analysis 63: 190–194] found that the positiveness or negativeness of side-effects of actions influences people’s assessment of whether those side-effects were brought about intentionally, and also that people are more willing to assign blame for negative side-effects of actions than they are to assign praise for positive side-effect of actions. Building upon this research, we found evidence that the positiveness or negativeness of side-effects of group actions influences people’s willingness to attribute intentions to groups (Experiment 1a), and that people are more willing to assign blame to groups for negative side-effects of actions than they are to assign praise to groups for positive side-effects of actions (Experiment 1b). We also found evidence (Experiments 2a, 2b, 3 and 4) that the “Group Knobe Effect” persists even when intentions and blame/praise are attributed to groups non-distributively, indicating that people tend not to think of group intentions and group blame/praise in distributive terms. We conclude that the folk are collectivist about group intentions, and also about the blameworthiness and praiseworthiness of groups.     

Impact of assertive and accusatory communication of distress and anger: A verbal component analysis

Forty undergraduate women were asked to imagine discussing an important problem in their relationship with a personally close partner and to rate likely emotional and behavioral reactions to four kinds of statements: 1) assertive communication of distress, 2) assertive communication of anger, 3) accusatory communication of distress, and 4) accusatory communication of anger. Accusatory “you” statements were rated as more aversive and evoked more negative emotional and behavioral response inclinations than did assertive “I” messages. Statements including “anger” words evoked more negative emotional and behavioral response inclinations than statements including “distress” words. Findings were related to research on cue-controlled aggression and the work of Staats, which predicts ways that verbal labels (language) exert control over emotions and behavior.     

Identity Politics and Politicized Identities: Identity Processes and the Dynamics of Protest

Over the last decades, the concept of identity has become increasingly central in the social psychology of protest. Collective identity, politicized collective identity, dual identity, and multiple identities are concepts that help to understand and describe the social psychological dynamics of protest. In this article, I theorize about identity processes in the context of protest participation: how group identification establishes the link between social identity and collective identity, how multiple identities and dual identities influence protest participation, and how collective identity politicizes and radicalizes. I will illustrate my argument with results from research into collective action participation among farmers in the Netherlands and Spain, Turkish, and Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands and New York, South African citizens, and participants in street demonstrations conducted by my research group at VU‐University.     

Counterfactual and semi-factual thoughts in moral judgements about failed attempts to harm

People judge that an individual who attempts to harm someone but fails should be blamed and punished more when they imagine how things could have turned out worse, compared to when they imagine how things could have turned out the same, or when they think only about what happened. This moral counterfactual amplification effect occurs when people believe the protagonist had no reason for the attempt to harm, and not when the protagonist had a reason, as Experiment 1 shows. It occurs for intentional failed attempts to harm and also for accidental near-misses, as Experiment 2 shows, but not for failed attempts in which the harm occurs anyway by another cause, for both general judgments about the event and specific judgments about the individual's actions, as Experiments 3 and 4 show. The implications for understanding the role of counterfactual thoughts in moral judgement are discussed.     

自我建构理论的发展与评价

出现于20世纪90年代初的自我建构理论是自我图式理论的一个分支,致力于从个体看待自我和他人关系的角度探讨个体自我表征的构成。本文回顾了该领域从"独立型与依存型自我建构理论"到"三重自我建构理论"的发展脉络,较为详细地介绍了这两种理论的基本观点以及不同研究者围绕三重自我建构相互间关系所进行的争论。最后,本文从个体自我表征系统的结构、关系自我与集体自我的内涵以及三重自我建构之间关系的角度提出了后续研究的方向。     

由比较看荣格的人本主义心理学思想倾向

荣格的分析心理学体系是在弗洛伊德理论基础上的发展。在该体系内,他着重从内因的角度探讨个体的心理动力系统及社会性,强调个体的整体性、不可分割性以及具有的基本自由和主动性。进而将研究对象扩展至健全的个体,采用综合建构的方法进行分析。在人类命运问题上,他也持乐观态度,从而表现出与人本主义心理学思想渐趋一致的发展倾向。     

Welfare and Self-Governance

Two ideas have dominated ethical thought since the time of Bentham and Kant. One is utilitarianism, the other is an idea of moral agency as self-governance. Utilitarianism says that morality must somehow subserve welfare, self-governance says that it must be graspable directly by individual moral insight. But these ideas seem to war with one another. Can we eliminate the apparent conflict by a careful review of what is plausible in the two ideas? In seeking an answer to this question I examine (1) the implications of welfarism, (2) the nature of moral obligation (3) the nature of our moral knowledge.