DEFINING “RELIGION” AS NATURAL: A CRITICAL INVITATION TO ROBERT McCAULEY

Previous critics have argued that Robert McCauley defines religion and science selectively and arbitrarily, cutting them to fit his model in Why Religion Is Natural and Science Is Not. McCauley has responded that final definitions are “overrated” and that artificial distinctions can serve an important role in naturalistic investigation. I agree with this position but argue that a genealogy of the category of religion is crucial to the methodology that McCauley describes. Since the inherent ambiguity of religion will undermine any essential claims about its cognitive naturalness, I invite McCauley to consider how his research might investigate scientific and religious cognition in new terms.     

EXPLANATORY MODESTY

Although I certainly have differences with some of my commentators, I am grateful for the time, effort, and attention that each has devoted to my book, Why Religion Is Natural and Science Is Not. They have helpfully pointed out features of my positions that need clarification and elaboration. I am also grateful to the editor of Zygon, Willem Drees, for this opportunity to undertake that task here.     

RALPH BURHOE: RECONSIDERING THE MAN AND HIS VISION OF YOKING RELIGION AND SCIENCE

Ralph Wendell Burhoe was a leading figure in relating religion and science in the second half of the twentieth century. His autodidactic style and character as a public intellectual resulted in a vision that is comprehensive in its concern for the salvation of society. He does not fit easily into academic frameworks, even though he has been influential upon scholars who work in academia. This article discusses some conundrums posed by his work. There are also brief presentations of the concerns that motivated Burhoe, his style of work, and the content of his vision.     

MIRACLES AND TWO ACCOUNTS OF SCIENTIFIC LAWS

Since early modernity, it has often been assumed that miracles are incompatible with the existence of the natural laws utilized in the sciences. This paper argues that this assumption is largely an artifact of empiricist accounts of laws that should be rejected for reasons internal to philosophy of science, and that no such incompatibility arises on the most important alternative interpretations, which treat laws as expressions of forces, dispositions, or causal powers.     

医院重点专科发展过程阶段论

讨论医院重点专科发展过程的阶段划分及特征,对于我们在重点专科建设中正确地把握方向、恰当地评估成效和有力地予以推进都有十分重大和现实的意义。本文把医院重点专科发展过程分为科室建设、学科建设、科学建设阶段,并从功能目标、效率效益、人才队伍、场地设施、技术设备、技术特色、教学培训、科学研究、文化氛围、能级水平十个方面对各阶段的特征进行归纳描述。三个阶段各具不同内涵特征,又存在相互内在关联,具有方向性、连续性、可加速性、交叉性和包涵性等规律。     

关于医疗、科研的一点认识

临床医疗是医院的根本使命,在权重上医疗自然重于科研.医疗实践是科研的出发点与归宿,决定了科研的基本走向.当前,科研工作受到前所未有的重视,科研作为医疗人员绩效考核的权重过大,偏离了医院的根本使命,会对科研、医疗、医护人员乃至整个社会造成伤害.SCI论文与临床关系不密切,不宜用来评价临床医师的水准.应该建立科学的考评机制,考核标准应细化、全面,对科研的奖励应适度.对于医护人员的考核应以医疗为主、科研为辅.     

The Human Mind in This World and the Next: Scientific and Early Theological Perspectives

The understanding of the mind usually adopted within the current science-theology dialogue is questionable. It fails to take into account something necessary to provide a non-reductionist understanding of religious faith: what in ancient and medieval theology was termed the nous. While this concept may require re-interpretation for our present age in terms of a different philosophical framework, any recognition of its reality will have a major impact on two aspects of current discussion: our response to philosophical idealism and our understanding of the eschatological state.     

Loss Aversion,Intellectual Inertia,and a Call for a More Contrarian Science: A Reply to Simonson & Kivetz and Higgins & Liberman

Higgins and Liberman (2018) and Simonson and Kivetz (2018) offer scholarly and stimulating perspectives on loss aversion and the implications for the sociology of science of its acceptance as a virtual law of nature. In our view, Higgins and Liberman (2018) largely complement our conclusion that the empirical evidence does not support loss aversion. Moreover, in alignment with our call for a contextualized perspective, they provide an excellent discourse on how a more nuanced view of reference points and consumers’ regulatory focus enriches our understanding of the psychological impact of losses and gains. Simonson and Kivetz (2018) approached our perspective with skepticism, and, while they retain some skepticism, they express agreement on the larger point that loss aversion has been accepted too uncritically. Both commentaries point to a need for a critical reevaluation of prevailing paradigms. Here, we build on these perspectives, as well as our experience working on the topic of loss aversion, to call for structural changes to facilitate scholarly debate on science's status quo.