Conceptions about the mind-body problem and their relations to afterlife beliefs,paranormal beliefs,religiosity, and ontological confusions

We examined lay people’s conceptions about the relationship between mind and body and their correlates. In Study 1, a web survey (N = 850) of reflective dualistic, emergentistic, and monistic perceptions of the mind-body relationship, afterlife beliefs (i.e., common sense dualism), religiosity, paranormal beliefs, and ontological confusions about physical, biological, and psychological phenomena was conducted. In Study 2 (N = 73), we examined implicit ontological confusions and their relations to afterlife beliefs, paranormal beliefs, and religiosity. Correlation and regression analyses showed that reflective dualism, afterlife beliefs, paranormal beliefs, and religiosity were strongly and positively related and that reflective dualism and afterlife beliefs mediated the relationship between ontological confusions and religious and paranormal beliefs. The results elucidate the contention that dualism is a manifestation of universal cognitive processes related to intuitions about physical, biological, and psychological phenomena by showing that especially individuals who confuse the distinctive attributes of these phenomena tend to set the mind apart from the body.     

When intuitions are helpful: Prior beliefs can support reasoning in the bat-and-ball problem

Intuitions are often considered suboptimal because they can bias people's thinking. The bat-and-ball problem is a celebrated example of this potentially detrimental aspect of intuitions since it elicits a very appealing and prepotent intuitive but incorrect response. We propose to show that certain kinds of intuitions (i.e., prior beliefs) can help people to reason better on this task. In two experiments, participants answered either a classic congruent version of the bat-and-ball problem in which the intuitively cued response fitted with prior knowledge (i.e., was believable) or a modified incongruent version in which the intuitively cued response conflicted with prior knowledge (i.e., was unbelievable). Results indicate that participants who solved the modified unbelievable version performed better than participants who solved the classic believable version. Our data highlight that prior beliefs, even in the bat-and-ball problem, can accidentally make people perform better, probably because they encourage them to adopt a more effortful processing strategy.     

Adjustment of cognitive control to the frequency of dual-task interference

ABSTRACT

This study explored whether the control mechanisms recruited for optimising performance are similar for dual-task and interference-task settings. We tested whether the frequency of appearance of a secondary task resulted in an adjustment of anticipatory and reflexive forms of attentional control, as has been observed with other interference tasks (e.g. stroop and flanker). The results of two experiments demonstrated a proportion congruency effect (PCE): when a secondary task frequently appeared, primary task performance was slower. Additionally, there was a relative slowdown of dual-task performance in blocks wherein the secondary task appeared infrequently compared to blocks wherein it appeared frequently. However, this slowdown occurred when the primary task entailed a low level of control (Experiment 1) but was absent when it demanded a high level of control (Experiment 2). Overall, the results suggest that level of control can be adjusted to task demands related to the frequency of the secondary task.     

Does P3 Reflect Attentional or Memory Performances,or Cognition more Generally?

The study evaluated the off-line relationship of attention, memory and other cognitive performances with the auditory event-related potentials P3 (P300) and N2. The sample comprised 200 middle-aged construction workers. Verbal, visuomotor and memory tests were administered. Attentional domains were examined using CogniSpeed software. Slowed reaction times in the test of sustained attention (vigilance) were associated with delayed P3 latency (p < 0.001) and decreased P3 amplitude (p = 0.005), as well as with delayed N2 latency (p < 0.001). Visuomotor slowing in Digit Symbol was also related to delayed P3 latency (p = 0.030) and decreased P3 amplitude (p = 0.014). In contrast, mild cognitive impairment, short- and long-term memory, and concentrating or sharing attention with high working memory demands were not related to P3. The results suggest that P3 is linked to attentional performance with low working memory demands rather than to effortful working memory updating, retrieval from memory stores, or mild cognitive impairment.     

Cognitive distance of stairways: a multi-stairway investigation

The present study had two major purposes. First it sought to determine to what extent in an earlier study of distance estimation in stairways (Hanyu & Itsukushima, 1995) would generalize to other types of stairway. Second, it sought to examine which hypothesis, information storage or effort, better explain the earlier results, in which people overestimated distance and traversed time estimates. We obtained four distance and time measures: distance estimate, traversal time estimate, mental walking time and actual traversal time. To measure information, we had participants rate each stairway for complexity (simple-complex) and effort (effortless-effortful) before and after the distance and time measurement tasks. The results revealed that the earlier findings (Hanyu & Itsukushima, 1995) did not fully generalize. The results also did not support either the information storage or the effort hypothesis.     

Cognitive Load and the Equality Heuristic: A Two-Stage Model of Resource Overconsumption in Small Groups

Two studies were conducted to test a two-stage model of the psychological mechanisms underlying the overconsumption of scarce resources in small groups. The model proposes that members of groups sharing resources first anchor their consumption choices on an “equal-division” heuristic and then, given sufficient cognitive capacity, adjust their choices in a self-serving direction. The results from both studies support the model. The first study found that when faced with a common resource pool almost all group members expressed thoughts regarding equality; however, individuals with sufficient cognitive capacity requested more from the pool and expressed more task-relevant thoughts than individuals lacking the necessary cognitive resources. The second study provided additional support for the two-stage model by demonstrating that group members' cognitions occur in the order predicted by the model and by demonstrating that an individual difference, social value orientation, affects thought processes only when individuals are not experiencing high cognitive loads. Implications are discussed.     

关于自闭症的临床、实验心理学的研究

最近,国际上的临床心理学、实验心理学对自闭症的诊断、分类、发生率以及教育与治疗等,从各个角度展示了许多新的研究结果。实验心理学的调查结果表明,自闭症儿童的注意力异常,对视、听、触等感觉反应处理样式,不同于弱智儿童和正常儿童。语言障碍是自闭症儿童发展障碍中的核心症侯,这与自闭症在社会性和人际关系上存在障碍有着密切的关系。进入９０年代以后,对自闭症“心的理论”的各种实验研究,引起各国研究者的注目和争论     

Expressivism, Logic, Consistency, and Moral Dilemmas

On an expressivist view, ethical claims are understood as expressions of our attitudes, desires, and feelings. A famous puzzle for this view concerns the use of logic in ethical reasoning, and two standard treatments try to solve the puzzle by explaining logical inconsistency in terms of conflicting attitudes. I argue, however, that this general strategy fails: because we can reason effectively even in the presence of conflicting moral attitudes – in cases of moral dilemmas – avoiding these conflicts cannot be a ground for correct moral reasoning. The result is a dilemma for expressivists: if they take all kinds of attitudes to be under consideration, then conflict cannot play the required role, since attitudes can fail to be compatible in cases of moral conflict. If they restrict attention to ‘all-in attitudes’ or to intentions or plans, then there is an important notion of obligation, used in standard arguments – one for which conflicts are allowed – that they fail to capture. I explain why expressivists should be especially tolerant of conflicting attitudes, and I conclude that they should pursue a different strategy for grounding logical normativity.

Timing in cognition and EEG brain dynamics: discreteness versus continuity

This article provides an overview of recent developments in solving the timing problem (discreteness vs. continuity) in cognitive neuroscience. Both theoretical and empirical studies have been considered, with an emphasis on the framework of operational architectonics (OA) of brain functioning (Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts in Brain Mind 2:291-29, 2001; Neurosci Biobehav Rev 28:827-836, 2005). This framework explores the temporal structure of information flow and interarea interactions within the network of functional neuronal populations by examining topographic sharp transition processes in the scalp EEG, on the millisecond scale. We conclude, based on the OA framework, that brain functioning is best conceptualized in terms of continuity-discreteness unity which is also the characteristic property of cognition. At the end we emphasize where one might productively proceed for the future research.     

Ethics and the Science of Animal Minds

Ethicists have commonly appealed to science to bolster their arguments for elevating the moral status of nonhuman animals. I describe a framework within which I take many ethicists to be making such appeals. I focus on an apparent gap in this framework between those properties of animals that are part of the scientific consensus, and those to which ethicists typically appeal in their arguments. I will describe two different ways of diminishing the appearance of the gap, and argue that both of them present challenges to ethicists seeking a firm scientific basis for their claims about the moral status of animals. I argue that more clarity about the role of appeals to science by applied ethicists leads to questions about the effectiveness of such appeals, and that these questions might best be pursued empirically.