Dev E-R: A computational model of early cognitive development as a creative process

This paper describes a computational model named Dev E-R (Developmental Engagement-Reflection) that, inspired by Piaget’s theory, simulates the assimilation-accommodation adaptation process. It is implemented with a new extended version of the computational model of creativity known as Engagement-Reflection. That is, this model simulates adaptation as a creative activity. We introduce here the implementation of our model on an agent that is initialized with basic reflex conducts and that through the interaction with a 3D virtual world, it is able to build new behaviors autonomously. The new acquired skills, according to Piaget’s theory, are typically observed in children that have reached the second substage of the sensorimotor period.     

Including Both Voices: A New Bidirectional Framework for Understanding and Improving Intergroup Relations

Methods: If successful intergroup harmony is to be achieved between two groups, then both groups' voices must be heard. Despite this, 60 years of social psychological “intergroup” prejudice research has tended to adopt a solely majority‐centric perspective, with the majority group portrayed as the active agent of prejudice, and the minority group as passive targets. Objective: This paper critically reviews relevant literature, highlighting this unidirectional imbalance, and proposes a new, two‐stage bidirectional framework, where we encourage researchers and educators to first understand how minority and majority groups' intergroup attitudes and emotions impact intergroup dynamics, before tailoring and implementing contact and recategorisation strategies to improve intergroup relations, nationally and internationally. Conclusion: We argue that the interactive nature of the intergroup dynamic needs to be better understood, and each group's voice heard, before prejudice can be effectively reduced. Lastly, we describe an Australian study, the Dual Identity and Electronic‐contact (DIEC) programme, that has been conducted and has successfully applied this bidirectional framework.     

Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value

A conspicuous oversight in recent debates about the vexed problem of the value of knowledge has been the value of knowledge-how. This would not be surprising if knowledge-how were, as Gilbert Ryle [1945, 1949 Ryle, Gilbert 1949. The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson's University Library.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]] famously thought, fundamentally different from knowledge-that. However, reductive intellectualists [e.g. Stanley and Williamson 2001 Ryle, Gilbert 1949. The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson's University Library.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]; Brogaard 2008, 2009 Brogaard, Berit 2009. What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-Wh, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78/2: 439–67.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2011 Brogaard, Berit 2011. Knowledge-How: A Unified Account, in Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, ed. John Bengson and Marc A. Moffett, New York: Oxford University Press: 136–60. [Google Scholar]; Stanley 2011a Stanley, Jason 2011a. Knowing (How), Noûs 45/2: 207–38.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2011b Stanley, Jason 2011b. Know How, Oxford: Oxford University Press.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]] maintain that knowledge-how just is a kind of knowledge-that. Accordingly, reductive intellectualists must predict that the value problems facing propositional knowledge will equally apply to knowledge-how. We show, however, that this is not the case. Accordingly, we highlight a value-driven argument for thinking (contra reductive intellectualism) that knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart.     

A general proof of consistency of heuristic classification for cognitive diagnosis models

The Asymptotic Classification Theory of Cognitive Diagnosis (Chiu et al., 2009, Psychometrika, 74, 633–665) determined the conditions that cognitive diagnosis models must satisfy so that the correct assignment of examinees to proficiency classes is guaranteed when non‐parametric classification methods are used. These conditions have only been proven for the Deterministic Input Noisy Output AND gate model. For other cognitive diagnosis models, no theoretical legitimization exists for using non‐parametric classification techniques for assigning examinees to proficiency classes. The specific statistical properties of different cognitive diagnosis models require tailored proofs of the conditions of the Asymptotic Classification Theory of Cognitive Diagnosis for each individual model – a tedious undertaking in light of the numerous models presented in the literature. In this paper a different way is presented to address this task. The unified mathematical framework of general cognitive diagnosis models is used as a theoretical basis for a general proof that under mild regularity conditions any cognitive diagnosis model is covered by the Asymptotic Classification Theory of Cognitive Diagnosis.     

社会快感缺失认知过程的跨诊断研究进展

社会快感缺失具有广泛的跨诊断和亚临床特征,包括孤独感、内向性、社交焦虑和社会功能受损等。传统医学模型聚焦于社会快感缺失相关疾病的诊断和神经生理机制,促进了社会快感缺失药物和神经靶向治疗。然而社会快感缺失广泛地存在于健康人群和亚临床人群中,只有寻找有效的心理咨询和治疗方案,才会对亚临床人群社会快感缺失的缓解和社会功能的提升提供帮助。认知过程模型聚焦于积极效价系统,强调对积极奖赏刺激注意、记忆、心理意象等认知过程的提升,该模型将是社会快感缺失心理咨询与治疗的有效途径。