Dev E-R: A computational model of early cognitive development as a creative process

This paper describes a computational model named Dev E-R (Developmental Engagement-Reflection) that, inspired by Piaget’s theory, simulates the assimilation-accommodation adaptation process. It is implemented with a new extended version of the computational model of creativity known as Engagement-Reflection. That is, this model simulates adaptation as a creative activity. We introduce here the implementation of our model on an agent that is initialized with basic reflex conducts and that through the interaction with a 3D virtual world, it is able to build new behaviors autonomously. The new acquired skills, according to Piaget’s theory, are typically observed in children that have reached the second substage of the sensorimotor period.     

Including Both Voices: A New Bidirectional Framework for Understanding and Improving Intergroup Relations

Methods: If successful intergroup harmony is to be achieved between two groups, then both groups' voices must be heard. Despite this, 60 years of social psychological “intergroup” prejudice research has tended to adopt a solely majority‐centric perspective, with the majority group portrayed as the active agent of prejudice, and the minority group as passive targets. Objective: This paper critically reviews relevant literature, highlighting this unidirectional imbalance, and proposes a new, two‐stage bidirectional framework, where we encourage researchers and educators to first understand how minority and majority groups' intergroup attitudes and emotions impact intergroup dynamics, before tailoring and implementing contact and recategorisation strategies to improve intergroup relations, nationally and internationally. Conclusion: We argue that the interactive nature of the intergroup dynamic needs to be better understood, and each group's voice heard, before prejudice can be effectively reduced. Lastly, we describe an Australian study, the Dual Identity and Electronic‐contact (DIEC) programme, that has been conducted and has successfully applied this bidirectional framework.     

Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value

A conspicuous oversight in recent debates about the vexed problem of the value of knowledge has been the value of knowledge-how. This would not be surprising if knowledge-how were, as Gilbert Ryle [1945, 1949 Ryle, Gilbert 1949. The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson's University Library.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]] famously thought, fundamentally different from knowledge-that. However, reductive intellectualists [e.g. Stanley and Williamson 2001 Ryle, Gilbert 1949. The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson's University Library.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]; Brogaard 2008, 2009 Brogaard, Berit 2009. What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-Wh, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78/2: 439–67.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2011 Brogaard, Berit 2011. Knowledge-How: A Unified Account, in Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, ed. John Bengson and Marc A. Moffett, New York: Oxford University Press: 136–60. [Google Scholar]; Stanley 2011a Stanley, Jason 2011a. Knowing (How), Noûs 45/2: 207–38.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2011b Stanley, Jason 2011b. Know How, Oxford: Oxford University Press.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]] maintain that knowledge-how just is a kind of knowledge-that. Accordingly, reductive intellectualists must predict that the value problems facing propositional knowledge will equally apply to knowledge-how. We show, however, that this is not the case. Accordingly, we highlight a value-driven argument for thinking (contra reductive intellectualism) that knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart.     

A general proof of consistency of heuristic classification for cognitive diagnosis models

The Asymptotic Classification Theory of Cognitive Diagnosis (Chiu et al., 2009, Psychometrika, 74, 633–665) determined the conditions that cognitive diagnosis models must satisfy so that the correct assignment of examinees to proficiency classes is guaranteed when non‐parametric classification methods are used. These conditions have only been proven for the Deterministic Input Noisy Output AND gate model. For other cognitive diagnosis models, no theoretical legitimization exists for using non‐parametric classification techniques for assigning examinees to proficiency classes. The specific statistical properties of different cognitive diagnosis models require tailored proofs of the conditions of the Asymptotic Classification Theory of Cognitive Diagnosis for each individual model – a tedious undertaking in light of the numerous models presented in the literature. In this paper a different way is presented to address this task. The unified mathematical framework of general cognitive diagnosis models is used as a theoretical basis for a general proof that under mild regularity conditions any cognitive diagnosis model is covered by the Asymptotic Classification Theory of Cognitive Diagnosis.     

The own‐age face recognition bias is task dependent

The own‐age bias (OAB) in face recognition (more accurate recognition of own‐age than other‐age faces) is robust among young adults but not older adults. We investigated the OAB under two different task conditions. In Experiment 1 young and older adults (who reported more recent experience with own than other‐age faces) completed a match‐to‐sample task with young and older adult faces; only young adults showed an OAB. In Experiment 2 young and older adults completed an identity detection task in which we manipulated the identity strength of target and distracter identities by morphing each face with an average face in 20% steps. Accuracy increased with identity strength and facial age influenced older adults' (but not younger adults') strategy, but there was no evidence of an OAB. Collectively, these results suggest that the OAB depends on task demands and may be absent when searching for one identity.     

Pseudoneglect: evidence for both perceptual and attentional factors

When neurologically normal individuals bisect a horizontal line as accurately as possible, they reliably show a slight leftward error. This leftward inaccuracy is called pseudoneglect because errors made by neurologically normal individuals are directionally opposite to those made by persons with visuospatial neglect (Jewell & McCourt, 2000). In the current study, normal right-handed observers bisected horizontal lines that were altered to bias line length judgments either toward the right or the left side of the line. Non-target dots were placed on or near the line stimuli using principles derived from a theory of visual illusions of length called centroid extraction (Morgan, Hole, & Glennerster, 1990). This theory argues that the position of a visual target is calculated as the mean position of all stimuli in close proximity to the target stimulus. We predicted that perceptual alterations that shifted the direction of centroid extraction would also shift the direction of line bisection errors. Our findings confirmed this prediction and support the idea that both perceptual and attentional factors contribute to the pseudoneglect effect.