A Cross-Sectional Examination of International Competency Standards

The evaluation of competency in the field of psychology has gained international attention in recent years. Focusing on international competencies can promote high standards of care and identify common values of the profession. However, there is little research regarding international perceptions of competency. Examining ethics codes from different countries can highlight international standards of competent practice, as ethics codes outline professional expectations of the field. The current study compared the ethics standards found in 47 codes of ethics representing 51 countries. Seventeen competency standards emerged after ethics codes were analyzed. Implications for the international practice of psychology are discussed.     

Xunzi: A Paradigm of Rationalistic Virtue Ethics in Early Confucianism

Against the background of modern academic study, this article consciously uses Aristotle’s virtue ethics as a tool to theoretically analyze Xunzi’s ethical philosophy. This article tries to briefly analyze the basic structure of Xunzi’s moral philosophy and to reveal its unique rationalist theoretical character by exploring the following three topics: “the understanding of human beings,” “the establishment of a moral foundation,” and “the accomplishment of virtue in practice.” From the perspective of comparative philosophy, this article can also be viewed as a model for bringing about communication and synthesis between two philosophical traditions, namely Confucian ethics and Western virtue ethics.     

War in Christ's World: Bonhoeffer and Just Peacemaking on War and Christology

Abstract : In this paper, I apply Dietrich Bonhoeffer's exposition of the nature of war as found in his unfinished magnum opus, Ethics, to the contemporary peacemaking movement known as “just peacemaking.” Using Bonhoeffer, I argue that the just‐peacemaking approach accomplishes tactical peace, but only by undermining its stated purposes of bringing theology to bear on war. By assuming theological reasoning as secondary to historical conditions, just peacemaking has, by Bonhoeffer's logic, already abandoned the world to itself and severed it from theological resources.     

Developing an outcome-based assessment for family therapy training: the Rochester Objective Structured Clinical Evaluation (ROSCE)

This paper addresses a growing need for cost-effective, outcome-based assessment in family therapy training. We describe the ROSCE, a structured, evidence-informed, learner-centered approach to the assessment of clinical skills developed at the University of Rochester Medical Center. The ROSCE emphasizes direct observation of trainees demonstrating clinical competencies. The format integrates both formative and summative assessment methods. It can readily be adapted to a wide variety of educational and training settings.     

Some thoughts on the diffusion of psychoanalysis: the group dimension, ethics and the sense of identity

In this paper the author questions some of the ways in which psychoanalysis is passed on to the wider public, one of which is sometimes evocative of the sales promotion of a consumer product in contemporary society. This methodology does not give sufficiently deep prior thought to the eventual consequences of side effects. The detailed exposition of clinical cases, for example, raises sensitive ethical issues, even when anonymity is preserved. Although it is true that making information about Freud's theories more widely available may indeed encourage people to think about training as psychoanalysts, it is noticeable that this process is sometimes considered to be a form of training in itself. Some participants feel that acquiring a psychoanalytical vocabulary and reading clinical reports form a sufficient basis for practising thereafter as psychotherapists, both in institutional contexts and in private practice. The absence of group work on the part of the organizers might explain why closer study is not made of the methodologies of transmission and the different levels that it involves. This is sometimes due to the absence of a common object, formed within and by the group, and to the emergence of manic defences in the group.     

KORSGAARD'S REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM

Abstract: In her recent book Self‐Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity, Christine Korsgaard does a wonderful job developing her Kantian account of normativity and the rational necessity of morality. Korsgaard's account of normativity, however, has received its fair share of attention. In this discussion, the focus is on the resulting moral theory and, in particular, on Korsgaard's reason for rejecting consequentialist moral theories. The article suggests that we assume that Korsgaard's vindication of Kantian rationalism is successful and ask whether, nonetheless, her account is consistent with consequentialism. It suggests further that we grant that moral reasons are not based on substantive principles, and that they must instead emerge from the purely formal principles of practical reason. Can consequentialist principles nonetheless emerge from the formal constraints of practical reason? Why can't a consequentialist embrace Korsgaard's account of self‐constitution and normativity?     

Justified ethicality: Observing desired counterfactuals modifies ethical perceptions and behavior

Employing a die-under-cup paradigm, we study the extent to which people lie when it is transparently clear they cannot be caught. We asked participants to report the outcome of a private die roll and gain money according to their reports. Results suggest that the degree of lying depends on the extent to which self-justifications are available. Specifically, when people are allowed to roll the die three times to ensure its legitimacy, but only the first roll is supposed to “count,” we find evidence that the highest outcome of the three rolls is reported. Eliminating the ability to observe more than one roll reduces lying. Additional results suggest that observing desired counterfactuals, in the form of additional rolls not meant to determine pay, attenuates the degree to which people perceive lies as unethical. People seem to derive value from self-justifications allowing them to lie for money while feeling honest.     

The invasion of reality (or of negotiation): The psychoanalytic ethic and extinction anxiety

Extinction anxiety is the expression used to describe a pervasive and ever more realistic sense of futurelessness. A group emotion characterized by terror of the extinction of the human race, the family, or professional or shared cultural group, it grips the individual with a sense of desperation and impotence through the internal groups present in the mind of every individual. The contribution presented here aims to demonstrate how extinction anxiety has also infected psychoanalysts and psychoanalytic institutions, thereby seriously weakening the ethics of psychoanalysis. The term ethics here should not be confused with morals, but is intended as the happiness that is derived from the capacity to be responsible for one's self and one's own professional identity. The contagion of extinction anxiety has, in fact, accentuated the crisis of psychoanalysts and their faith in psychoanalysis. The author relates a particularly tormented clinical experience in order to show how only the relationship with psychoanalysis and its capacity to interpret the manifestations of the unconscious, enables the recognition of the effects of what he defines as a true invasion of reality, thus restoring to thought the power to establish a deep, transformative, and fecund relationship between internal and external reality.     

Kant on the motive of (imperfect) duty

This paper argues that Kantians face a little discussed problem in accounting for how actions that fulfill imperfect duties can be morally motivated. It is widely agreed that actions that are performed from the motive of duty are performed through a recognition of the objective necessity of the action. It is also generally held that the objective necessity of an action consists in its rational non-optionality. Many actions that fulfill imperfect duties, however, are rationally optional. Given these constraints, it is impossible that such rationally optional actions (including, for instance, many acts of benevolence) could be performed from the motive of duty. After presenting the problem as one that Kantians should find genuinely pressing, this paper offers a solution by advancing an alternative to the conception of rational necessity widely shared by Kantians. On the alternative view presented here, an action is rationally necessary if and only if the justifying reasons that speak in favor of performing the action do not depend on any empirical and therefore contingent motivational source on the part of an agent. Such actions may well be rationally optional. Moral motivation is therefore possible even in the case of rationally optional actions. Abbreviations: The following abbreviations are used for Kant’s works. All translations are from Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Citations are given by the abbreviation, the volume, and the page number from Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter deGruyter & Co., 1900–). G. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals).

KpV Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (Critique of Practical Reason).

MS Die Metaphysik der Sitten (The Metaphysics of Morals).

     

Rejoinder to Wall

Edmund Wall's criticism of the author's earlier analysis of Hare's consequentialism and Kantian ethics claims that the author overlooked Hare's commitment to preference satisfaction as an “ultimate good.” This rejoinder points out that Hare never uses the phrase in question, nor any equivalent phrase or concept, in presenting his own arguments and refers only to the standard of “universalizability” as ultimate, in contexts that support the author's original argument. Hence Wall has only given us yet another example of how Hare's views can be misunderstood by philosophers who fail to attend to the details of Hare's approach.