Negotiating Apostasy: Applying to “Leave Islam” in Malaysia

In Malaysia, freedom of religion has clear limitations, especially regarding Muslims wishing to leave Islam, who may currently find it difficult to secure legal acceptance. However, such applications are received under a Sharia legal provision in Negeri Sembilan – the only state in Malaysia that allows a Muslim to change his religion for reasonable cause. The application is made at the Sharia High Court, and is then forwarded to the Mufti's Department, which in turn arranges a consultation for the applicant to reconsider his decision. This article critically reviews this process of application to leave Islam and also provides a clear mapping of principal court decisions and an analysis of the legal rationale for accepting some applications and refusing others. The paper is critical of the disproportionate discretion afforded to Muslim bureaucrats in the Mufti's Department with regard to determining an individual's religious rights and argues that, in Malaysia, the power to legally determine or classify religion should be confined to the Sharia Court. Finally, the article evaluates how “applications to leave Islam” are reconciled with and distinguished from the Islamic prohibition of “apostasy” and so is relevant to Islamic countries beyond Malaysia.     

Islam and Gender in the Thought of a Critical-Progressive Muslim Scholar-Activist: Ziba Mir-Hosseini

This article highlights the scholarly contribution of the Iranian-born Muslim scholar-activist Ziba Mir-Hosseini to the academic field of gender and Islam. In the first part, Mir-Hosseini's thought is positioned within the larger processes of the shifting loci of authority and normativity in contemporary Islamic discourses, particularly with reference to the emergence of what will here be termed critical-progressive Muslim scholar-activists. There follows a brief justification as to why a study of Mir-Hosseini's thought in relation to gender and Islam warrants examination. Mir-Hosseini's personal journey in the field of gender and Islam is then outlined and her major contributions to the field are noted. This is followed by a discussion of the support Mir-Hosseini finds for her ideas in the hermeneutical theories employed by reformist male Muslim scholars, and then an examination of her views on the relationship between Islamic feminism discourses and (neo-)traditional expressions of Islam. Mir-Hosseini's deconstruction of the assumptions governing classical Muslim family law and ethics that have been re-appropriated and legally enforced by some contemporary Muslim majority nation states is presented next, followed by a discussion of her proposals for the reform of Muslim family law and ethics. The final section discusses Mir Hosseini's activism with special reference to her involvement with Musawah, the global movement for equality in Muslim family law based in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.     

La « préparation magistrale » en droit français : un lot exclusif par patient ?

Outpatient pharmaceutical needs are not always met by industrial products and do not necessarily justify hospitals activation. Preparing in advance and storing a batch of compounded drugs for one or more patients with identical/recurrent needs – as part of compound outsourcing in ambulatory sector – raises issues. While the french law does not expressly provide (and according to prevailing interpretations excludes) this hypothesis, it seems to us to be possible – in contrast to the prominent french judicial and administrative courts, as well as to the European Court of justice. We here propose to reset the debate within both the existing laws and a systemic perspective, and call for a normative clarification.     

Following the law because it’s the law: obedience,bootstrapping, and practical reason

Voluntarists in the early modern period speak of an agent’s following the law because she was ordered to do so or because it’s the law. Contemporary philosophers tend either to ignore or to dismiss the possibility of justified obedience of this sort – that is, they ignore or dismiss the possibility that something’s being the law could in itself constitute a good reason to act. In this paper, I suggest that this view isn’t taken seriously because of certain widespread beliefs about practical reason – in particular, it’s due to the belief that it’s impossible for reasons to be “bootstrapped” into existence. I argue, though, that a plausible account of practical reasoning should allow that reasons can be bootstrapped into existence, and so there’s no reason to be suspicious about the possibility of a person’s being justified in following the law because it’s the law. I end by suggesting that this conclusion opens up important new avenues of inquiry for philosophers working on topics related to legal obedience.     

Reformation Humanism: Reading the Classics in the New Theology

Scholarly discussions on what constitutes Christian humanism in the Renaissance and Reformation periods have typically concentrated on its manifestations before 1536, when Erasmus died. In this period, the old arguments for the reading of the Classics once set out by Basil and Augustine still predominated. Calvin’s teaching on the Fall and the noetic effects of sin, however, provided another basis for the incorporation of pagan thought into Christian learning. Christians who followed Calvin benefited from his precise and comprehensive theological position on the place of worldly knowledge in God’s original creation as a means for justifying their study of the Classics.     

La force normative du contrôle ordinal des contrats conclus par les médecins

Professional contracts concluded by physicians are specific. Indeed, these contracts must be compliant with ethical standards of the profession. As a professional authority, the College of physicians introduces obligations under which professionals have to stipulate several specific clauses and transmit their written contracts to the College, which controls their conformity. However, the normative power of these obligations is weak. To ensure the respect of ethical standards in professional contracts, soft law is more and more used by the College.     

Maya Moral and Ritual Discourse: Dialogical Groundings for Consuetudinary Law

Toward the end of the twentieth century, Highland Maya intellectuals and activists in Guatemala began to argue for the recognition of indigenous customary law, rooted in traditional Maya moral and ritual discourse. Such law is often in tension with the Western notion of rights (grounded in the idea of universal reason) that undergirds national and international treatises regarding indigenous peoples. This essay identifies three distinct but mutually engaged pairs of moral concepts—hot/cold, left/right (or positive/negative), and favorable/not favorable—articulated through K'iche' Maya quotidian and ceremonial practices and speech. It also identifies the extent to which they do not necessarily align with Western (Abrahamic and religious) notions of good and bad. These three pairs of moral terms, specifically as conserved through the high‐register of Maya discourse used by traditional ceremonial specialists, illustrate a normative means by which Highland Maya discern understandings of justice, and ground their advocacy for restorative (rather than retributive or punitive) justice.     

Response to Critics

In this “Response to Critics,” Cathleen Kaveny continues the conversation in the JRE symposium centered on her recent book, Prophecy without Contempt: Religious Discourse in the Public Square. The book's central argument is that adequate discussion of contention in the contemporary public square requires attending to matters of rhetoric, particularly the rhetoric of prophetic indictment. Kaveny engages the comments of four interlocutors: Alda Balthrop‐Lewis, James Childress, William Hart, and Martin Kavka. The first section, “Overarching Goals,” summarizes the objectives of the book. The second section, “Methodology,” engages critics regarding methodological issues, highlighting Kaveny's commitment to a version of MacIntyre's tradition theory and her indebtedness to her legal training. The third section, “Structure,” responds to particular questions her interlocutors raise about the four parts of the book. The fourth section, “Larger Questions,” ponders the next stages of the academic and political discussion about contention in the public square.