Neuropsychological identification of motor problems: Can we learn something from the feet and legs that hands and arms will not tell us?

The degree of structural and functional specialization that differentiates between upper and lower limb use in humans is quite unparalleled among primates. It is argued that less neural resources are devoted to leg and foot control than to arm and hand control, and that this aspect of lower limb innervation, together with the uniquely restricted use of the lower limb, renders lower limb function more sensitive to general neural insult. In addition, the status of leg and foot control differs from that of arm and hand control both early in life and during the later years of decline.     

BIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON FALL AND ORIGINAL SIN

Abstract. The paper consists of an argument that goes as follows. Symbols and their elaboration into myths constitute Homo sapiens 's most primitive reading of the world and the relation of humans to that world. They are, in other words, primordial units of cultural information, emerging very early in human history, representing a significant achievement in the evolution of human self-consciousness and reflection. The classic myths of Fall and Original Sin, as well as the doctrines to which they gave rise, are further interpretations of this primordial information. The doctrinal traditions of the first four centuries of Christianity are surveyed. Three sets of data as interpreted by the biological sciences are offered as resources for understanding the biogenetic grounds of the experience that the symbols, myths, and doctrines of Fall and Original Sin seek to interpret. The conclusions to be drawn are that (1) the symbolic material is indeed commensurate with the scientific understandings, and (2) the scientific interpretations deepen our understanding of the symbols, while (3) the conversation between the symbols and the science once again raises certain perennial questions about human existence.     

ON THE "USE" OF NEOPRAGMATISM

Abstract. The present article continues an earlier critique of Robbins's and Rorty's neopragmatism. Their skepticism about the traditional concept of correspondence and about the criteria for truth are both unjustified, and their own assertion of meaning as usefulness either presupposes a prior notion of linguistic reference or fails to qualify as a sufficient criterion for knowledge. The difficulties with neopragmatism have implications for two other areas of the religion/science discussion, postmodernism and empirical Theology. Postmodernism shares neopragmatism's mistakes regarding the philosophy of language and can be rejected without endangering one's empiricism, humanism, or naturalism. By contrast, the strengths of empirical Theology, and of religious empiricism in general, can be preserved without Robbins's proposed ban on metaphysics.     

On the processing of arguments

This paper is concerned with the processing of informal arguments, that is, arguments involving probable truth. A model of informal argument processing is presented that is based upon Hample's (1977) expansion of Toulmin's (1958) model of argument structure. The model postulates that a claim activates an attitude, the two components forming a complex that in turn activates reasons. Furthermore, the model holds occurrence of the reason, or possibly the claim and the reason, activates values. Three experiments are described that provide support for the model.This research was supported by the Mellon Foundation and by the Office of Educational Research and Improvement of the Department of Education via an award for the Center for the Study of Learning to the Learning Research and Development Center. The contents of the paper are not necessarily the position of any of these organizations.     

Being unreasonable: Perelman and the problem of fallacies

Most work on fallacies continues to conceptualize fallacious reasoning as involving a breach of a formal or quasi-formal rule. Chaim Perelman's theory of argumentation provides a way to conceptualize fallacies in a completely different way. His approach depends on an understanding of standards of rationality as essentially connected with conceptions of universality. Such an approach allows one to get beyond some of the basic problems of fallacy theory, and turns informal logic toward substantive philosophical questions. I show this by reinterpreting three so-called fallacies - theargumentum ad baculum, equivocation and composition/division - in the light of Perelman's account.     

Linking qualitative and quantitative methods in cross-cultural survey research: Techniques from cognitive science

Survey research with diverse cultural and ethnic minority groups is a complex and challenging endeavor that confronts the researcher with problems related to linguistic and conceptual equivalence and measurement as well as problems related to difficulties that respondents have with the sociocultural dimensions of the survey/interview process. One way to improve the quality of cross-cultural surveys and to insure that the findings are culturally relevant and accurate is to combine qualitative and quantitative methods. This paper proposes that certain qualitative techniques from cognitive science, specifically cognitive anthropology and cognitive psychology, are particularly well suited to being combined with survey research. These techniques provide information corresponding to the underlying thought processes of respondents and enable researchers to better understand how different cultural and ethnic groups construe the world. The information obtained can be used improve the formulation of survey questions, design and structure questionnaire formats to coincide with the way particular groups organize concepts, and help researchers understand difficulties respondents may have with the survey/interview process. In addition, the techniques produce data that are easily codifiable and more manageable than traditional qualitative techniques including participant observation and in-depth interviews.     

The myth of science education

It is argued that the manner in which we teach science in the high schools represents an outdated positivistic conception of science. The standard presentation of a year of each of chemistry, biology and physics should be replaced by an integrated science plus history, philosophy, and sociology of science which would take a total of three years to complete. A proper appreciation for the true nature of science is essential to the continued health of the scientific enterprise.