Respect,Coercion, and Religious Reasons

It is often assumed that people of faith should not endorse a law for religious reasons, since such an endorsement is considered to be disrespectful. Such a position is increasingly opposed by scholars who argue that such demands unjustifiably force people of faith to compromise their religious ideals. In order to defend their opposition to such demands, some scholars have invoked thought experiments as reductio arguments against the claim that endorsing laws dependent on religious reasons is necessarily disrespectful. I argue that these attempts have failed, and present an alternative thought experiment that demonstrates that such a law is not necessarily disrespectful. Because I conclude that previously proposed principles cannot defend this conclusion, I defend an alternative way of accommodating this intuition; a post‐secular deliberative approach based on the principle of double effect.     

Public reason,non-public reasons,and the accessibility requirement

ABSTRACT

In Liberalism without Perfection, Jonathan Quong develops what is perhaps the most comprehensive defense of the consensus model of public reason – a model which incorporates both a public-reasons-only requirement and an accessibility requirement framed in terms of shared evaluative standards. While the consensus model arguably predominates amongst public reason liberals, it is criticized by convergence theorists who reject both the public-reasons-only requirement and the accessibility requirement. In this paper, I argue that while we have good reason to reject Quong’s call for a public-reasons-only requirement, all public reason liberals should endorse at least some shared evaluative standards and, hence, an accessibility requirement.     

Feeling grateful to God: A qualitative inquiry

There is an expanding literature on the psychological and relationship effects of positive disclosure, whereby people who disclose about good things that happen to them benefit from this disclosure. Extending this research, we focused on what people identify as positive information about themselves and why they disclose this content to others. College students (190 men and 219 women) described what they considered to be a positive experience, feeling, or private aspect of themselves and whether or not they had disclosed this information to close others (mother, father, same-sex friend, and dating/intimate partner). They also described their reasons for disclosing and/or not disclosing to these relationship targets. Based on participants’ open-ended responses, we constructed taxonomies of positive information about the self and the reasons for and against disclosing this content. The research documents how different relationship contexts affect the disclosure of positive information and the reasons for these disclosure decisions.     

Quality of Reasons and Degrees of Responsibility

Traditionally, theories of moral responsibility feature only the minimally sufficient conditions for moral responsibility. While these theories are well-suited to account for the threshold of responsibility, it’s less clear how they can address questions about the degree to which agents are responsible. One feature that intuitively affects the degree to which agents are morally responsible is how difficult performing a given action is for them. Recently, philosophers have begun to develop accounts of scalar moral responsibility that make use of this notion of difficulty [Coates and Swenson 2013; Nelkin 2016]. In this paper, I argue that these accounts, although innovative, are incomplete. The degree to which agents are morally responsible is determined not only by the difficulties that agents face but also by the quality of the reasons for which they act.     

Morality,Inescapable Rational Authority,and a God's Wishes

It is a supposed conceptual truth about moral norms that we have reason to comply with them even if we desire not to. This combination of rational authority and inescapability is thought to be incompatible with instrumentalism about practical reason. This essay argues that there are ways in which norms with inescapable rational authority can exist alongside instrumentalism about practical reason. One way involves positing an afterlife and a powerful supernatural agency—so, a kind of god—who has total control over our welfare in that afterlife. I go on to argue that the attitudes of this god would also provide something answering to our impressions of moral desert.     

Relational motivation and well‐being: A cross‐cultural comparison

Culture plays a crucial role in motivation. Personally autonomous reasons (PARs) for goals reflect the needs, desires, and commitment for oneself, whereas relationally autonomous reasons (RARs) for goals reflect the needs within close relationships. It was hypothesized that PARs are the better predictor of well‐being for Americans, while RARs are the better predictor of well‐being for Japanese. One‐hundred and seventy American and 219 Japanese university students completed well‐being questionnaires and rated seven goals on several attributes. The results confirmed that RARs were a better predictor of well‐being for Japanese than for Americans, but PARs predicted well‐being for both groups. Implications for theories of goal motivation are discussed.     

The Epistemic Regress Problem,the Problem of the Criterion,and the Value of Reasons

There are important similarities between the epistemic regress problem and the problem of the criterion. Each turns on plausible principles stating that epistemic reasons must be supported by epistemic reasons but that having reasons is impossible if that requires having endless regresses of reasons. These principles are incompatible with the possibility of reasons, so each problem is a paradox. Whether there can be an antiskeptical solution to these paradoxes depends upon the kinds of reasons that we need in order to attain our epistemic goals. This article explains the problems and considers the ways in which two different conceptions of human flourishing support the value of different kinds of reasons. One conception requires reasons that allow an easy solution to these paradoxes. The other—rational autonomy—requires reasons that depend upon endless regresses. So we cannot have the kinds of fully transparent reasons required for rational autonomy.     

Do We Decide Intentionally?

In a recent article in this journal, Joshua Shepherd presents and rejects a new argument for the sceptical conclusion that everyday decisions aren't intentional actions. After relating his focal argument to a different argument for the same conclusion that is presented and rejected by Alfred Mele, I defend these arguments from extant criticisms, and develop new objections that shed light on the intentionality of typical decisions.     

Actions and accidents

In acting intentionally, it is no accident that one is doing what one intends to do. In this paper, I ask how to account for this non-accidentality requirement on intentional action. I argue that, for systematic reasons, the currently prevailing view of intentional action – the Causal Theory of Action – is ill-equipped to account for it. I end by proposing an alternative account, according to which an intention is a special kind of cause, one to which it is essential that it represents its effect.