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121.
XU Xiangdong 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2019,14(2):303
This paper is aimed to show how the libertarian conception of free choice is mistaken or misleading by focusing on Robert Kane’s attempt to solve the problem of luck, which arguably constitutes the most serious challenge to libertarianism about free will. I will argue that either Kane’s solution to the problem of luck falls into some inconsistency or he must introduce the requirement of contrastive explanation into his account of plural voluntary control. Either way, Kane fails to show how his emphasis on the requirement of plural voluntary control is made consistent with his unswerving commitment to the requirement of the libertarian free will for a metaphysical indeterminism. 相似文献
122.
Matthew Silverstein 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2017,95(3):517-528
We are agents: we can deliberate about what to do, and then act on the basis of that deliberation. We are also capable of normative self-governance: we can identify and respond to reasons as reasons. Many theorists believe that these two capacities are intimately connected. On the basis of this connection they conclude that practical reasoning must be carried out under the guise of a justification. This paper explores two strategies for avoiding that conclusion. The first, which just denies the connection between agency and normative self-governance, is rejected as too costly, since it leaves the normative significance of agency unexplained. The second, which suggests that we can respond to a consideration as a reason without representing it as a reason, seems more promising, but it requires a reductive account of reasons for action. The upshot is that metaethics and action theory are entwined in ways that few have recognized. 相似文献
123.
Victor M. Verdejo 《Metaphilosophy》2017,48(3):355-369
There is an unresolved conflict concerning the normative nature of desire. Some authors take rational desire to differ from rational belief in being a normatively unconstrained attitude. Others insist that rational desire seems plausibly subject to several consistency norms. This article argues that the correct analysis of this conflict of conative normativity leads us to acknowledge intrinsic and extrinsic reasons to desire. If sound, this point helps us to unveil a fundamental aspect of desire, namely, that we cannot desire at will. Unlike belief, however, desire can unproblematically accommodate a notion of instrumental attitude. 相似文献
124.
Five studies examined cultural differences in reasons for advice‐seeking behaviors. Content analyses in Study 1A and self‐ratings in Study 1B consistently revealed that Euro‐Canadians were more likely than East Asians (mainly Chinese) to seek advice for informational reasons, whereas East Asians were more likely than Euro‐Canadians to seek advice for relational reasons. Study 2A showed that Chinese displayed a higher level of relationship concern than Euro‐Canadians in deciding from whom to seek advice in a decision dilemma. Study 2B found that, although Chinese and Euro‐Canadians did not differ from each other on willingness to pay for informational advice, Chinese were willing to pay more for building a relationship with the advisor through advice seeking than Euro‐Canadians were. Study 3 explored how the advice giver might perceive an advice seeker in terms of their competence and the closeness of their relationship after advice was sought for various reasons. We found that relationally oriented advice seeking increased the perceived competence of the advice seeker among Chinese more than among Euro‐Canadians. Information‐oriented advice seeking increased the perceived closeness between the advice seeker and advice giver among Chinese more than among Euro‐Canadians. Implications for other aspects of advice exchange are discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
125.
126.
Andrew Reisner 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(1):17-27
In this paper I argue that we can give a plausible account of how to compare pragmatic and evidential normative reasons for
belief. The account I offer is given in the form of a ‘defeasing function’. This function allows for a sophisticated comparison
of the two types of reasons without assigning complex features to the logical structures of either type of reason.
I would like to thank John Broome, Stewart Cohen, Roger Crisp, Jonathan Dancy, Brie Gertler, and Iwao Hirose for their comments
on earlier versions of this material. A number of revisions have also been made as a result of helpful questions raised during
presentations of this paper at Arizona State University, McGill University, and the University of Virginia. 相似文献
127.
Adam Leite 《Synthese》2008,161(3):419-441
Is it coherent to suppose that in order to hold a belief responsibly, one must recognize something else as a reason for it? This paper addresses this question by focusing on so-called “Inferential Internalist” principles, that is principles of the following form: in order for one to have positive epistemic status Ø in virtue of believing P on the basis of R, one must believe that R evidentially supports P, and one must have positive epistemic status Ø in relation to that latter belief as well. While such principles and their close relatives figure centrally in a wide variety of recent epistemological discussions, there is confusion in the literature about what, precisely, Inferential Internalism commits one to and whether it is so much as coherent. This paper (1) articulates a broader framework for understanding the notion of epistemic responsibility, (2) motivates Inferential Internalism on the basis of considerations about the basing relation, epistemic responsibility, and parallels with practical deliberation, (3) defends Inferential Internalism against charges of incoherence leveled by James Van Cleve and Paul Boghossian, and (4) shows that contrary to a currently widespread view, Inferential Internalism is coherent even if foundationalism and the a priori are rejected. The paper closes with a preliminary argument for an affirmative answer to the initiating question about the requirements of epistemic responsibility. 相似文献
128.
Christopher Woodard 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(3):247-261
We best understand Rule Consequentialism as a theory of pattern-based reasons, since it claims that we have reasons to perform
some action because of the goodness of the pattern consisting of widespread performance of the same type of action in the
same type of circumstances. Plausible forms of Rule Consequentialism are also pluralist, in the sense that, alongside pattern-based
reasons, they recognise ordinary act-based reasons, based on the goodness of individual actions. However, Rule Consequentialist
theories are distinguished from other pluralist theories of pattern-based reasons by implausible claims about the relative
importance of act-based and pattern-based reasons in different cases. Rule Consequentialists should give up these claims.
They should either embrace some other pluralist pattern-based view, or reject pattern-based reasons altogether. Note, though,
that these arguments apply only to compliance-based, rather than acceptance-based, versions of Rule Consequentialism. This
suggests that these two kinds of theory are more different from each other than we might previously have realised.
相似文献
Christopher WoodardEmail: |
129.
Dionysis Christias 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2019,27(3):448-473
ABSTRACTSellars’s relationship with Hegel is complex and itself ‘dialectical‘ in interesting ways. Sellars follows Hegel in recognizing that the normativity essential to intentionality and conceptuality is a social phenomenon. But Sellars criticizes Hegel for his inability to independently explain the emergence and function of this essential group phenomenon. I shall argue that Sellars’s critique of Hegel on this count is part of a larger, metaphysically ambitious and rigorously realistic position, which, though turning Hegel’s ontology on its head, shares with Hegel the methodological ambition of arriving at a position which is globally explanatorily closed. Further, it will be suggested that although Sellars would surely have been critical of the ontological reification of Hegel’s dialectical method, he nonetheless reserves an important role for conceptual dialectical development right at the heart of his system, namely in his understanding of the conceptual evolution that leads from the manifest to the scientific image. Finally, I shall argue that Sellars thereby aspires to provide nothing less than a materialist aufhebung of idealist Hegelian dialectics. 相似文献
130.
This essay presents an account of what it takes to live a philosophical way of life: practitioners must be committed to a worldview, structure their lives around it, and engage in truth-directed practices. Contra John Cooper, it does not require that one’s life be solely guided by reason. Religious or tradition-based ways of life count as truth directed as long as their practices are reasons responsive and would be truth directed if the claims made by their way of life are correct. The essay argues that these three conditions can be met by progressors as well as sages. Making progress in how one acts in the world, and improving one’s understanding and direction through being part of a community is living a philosophical way of life. The offered view acknowledges more ways to develop the art of living and enables a broader range of people to count as living philosophically. 相似文献