Nonmonotonic conditionals that behave like conditional probabilities above a threshold

I'll describe a range of systems for nonmonotonic conditionals that behave like conditional probabilities above a threshold. The rules that govern each system are probabilistically sound in that each rule holds when the conditionals are interpreted as conditional probabilities above a threshold level specific to that system. The well-known preferential and rational consequence relations turn out to be special cases in which the threshold level is 1. I'll describe systems that employ weaker rules appropriate to thresholds lower than 1, and compare them to these two standard systems.     

Finite Reasons Without Foundations

This article develops a theory of reasons that has strong similarities to Peter Klein's infinitism. The view it develops, Framework Reasons, upholds Klein's principles of avoiding arbitrariness (PAA) and avoiding circularity (PAC) without requiring an infinite regress of reasons. A view of reasons that holds that the “reason for” relation is constrained by PAA and that PAC can avoid an infinite regress if the “reason for” relation is contextual. Moreover, such a view of reasons can maintain that skepticism is false by the maintaining that there is more to epistemic justification than can be expressed in any reasoning session. One crucial argument for Framework Reasons is that justification depends on a background of plausibility considerations. The final section of the article applies this view of reasons to Michael Bergmann's argument that any nonskeptical epistemology must embrace epistemic circularity.     

Theoretical frameworks for working with harder to reach families: lines,curlicues, and spirals: comment on Donovan and Pocock

This article comments on the Donovan and Pocock articles appearing in this issue, both of which address the evolution of theory and practice in family therapy. An emphasis is placed on the importance of integration and a shared philosophy of theory and practice in our current political and economic managed care climate, in which it is critically important to embrace the integrated and chaotic whole of what is happening in theory and in practice.     

Addressing Consent Issues in Donation After Circulatory Determination of Death

Given the widening gap between the number of individuals on transplant waiting lists and the availability of donated organs, as well as the recent plateau in donations based on neurological criteria (i.e., brain death), there has been a growing interest in expanding donation after circulatory determination of death. While the prevalence of this form of organ donation continues to increase, many thorny ethical issues remain, often creating moral distress in both clinicians and families. In this article, we address one of these issues, namely, the challenges surrounding patient and surrogate informed consent for donation after circulatory determination of death. First we discuss several general concerns regarding consent related to this form of organ donation, and then we address additional issues that are unique to three different patient categories: adult patients with medical decision-making capacity or potential capacity, adult patients who lack capacity, and pediatric patients.     

On Wittgenstein's Kantian solution of the problem of philosophy

In 1931 Wittgenstein wrote: ‘the limit of language manifests itself in the impossibility of describing the fact that corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the sentence’. Here, Wittgenstein claims, ‘we are involved?…?with the Kantian solution of the problem of philosophy’. This paper shows how this remark fits with Wittgenstein's early account of the substance of the world, his account of logic, and ultimately his view of philosophy. By contrast to the currently influential resolute reading of the Tractatus, the paper argues that the early Wittgenstein did not aim at destroying the idea of a limit of language, but that the notion lies at the very heart of Wittgenstein's early view. In doing so, the paper employs and defends the Kantian interpretation of Wittgenstein's early philosophy.     

Psychological availability and work engagement: The moderating role of sex and race

This study sought to determine the relationship of sex and race as moderators of psychological availability on work engagement in various South African organisations. Participants were 1 059 employees predominantly from the corporate sector in Gauteng province (females = 61%, blacks = 36%). Cross-sectional survey data were collected from the employees using the Psychological Conditions Scale and the Utrecht Work Engagement Scale (UWES). Moderated hierarchical regression analyses tested the prediction of work engagement from psychological availability, while controlling for the sex and race of employees. Psychological availability increased the level of work engagement for both men and women, the relationship, however, was stronger for women as compared to men. White employees were less work engaged compared to other race group members. Psychological availability was higher for the black, Indian, and coloured employees compared to white employees. The results confirmed the positive relationship of psychological availability on work engagement, and that sex and race differences exist for employees in a developing country.     

如何克服边界条件：来自记忆强度影响记忆去稳定的分子机制的启示

长时记忆在激活后首先会变得不稳定(去稳定过程), 继而会经历一个再巩固过程重新稳定下来以维持记忆的关联性。在再巩固期间给予电击、药理或行为训练以干预记忆再巩固, 可以更改原有记忆的强度或内容。这有望成为临床上治疗病理性记忆的一种方法。然而, 一些边界条件(记忆痕迹强、时间久远等)导致记忆在简单激活后不能去稳定, 不会经历再巩固过程, 使干预再巩固的方法无法发挥作用。动物实验表明, 通过药理学地调控参与记忆去稳定的分子的活动以促进记忆去稳定, 可以成功克服边界条件。可见, 边界条件不是绝对的。未来研究可进一步探索更多、更优的促进记忆去稳定并克服边界条件的方法, 提升干预记忆再巩固疗法的临床应用潜能。     

Stable Causal Relationships Are Better Causal Relationships

We report three experiments investigating whether people's judgments about causal relationships are sensitive to the robustness or stability of such relationships across a range of background circumstances. In Experiment 1, we demonstrate that people are more willing to endorse causal and explanatory claims based on stable (as opposed to unstable) relationships, even when the overall causal strength of the relationship is held constant. In Experiment 2, we show that this effect is not driven by a causal generalization's actual scope of application. In Experiment 3, we offer evidence that stable causal relationships may be seen as better guides to action. Collectively, these experiments document a previously underappreciated factor that shapes people's causal reasoning: the stability of the causal relationship.     

Does Semantics Need Normativity? Comments on Allan Gibbard,Meaning and Normativity

In the book Gibbard proposes, first, that statements about meaning are normative statements and, second, that they can be given an expressivist treatment, along the lines of Gibbard’s preferred metaethics. In my paper, I examine the first step: The claim that meaning statements are to be construed as being normative, as involving ‘oughts’. Gibbard distinguishes two versions of the normativity of meaning thesis – a weak version, according to which every means implies an ought, and a strong version, according to which for every means, there is an ought that implies it. I argue that neither thesis withstands scrutiny. The weak thesis depends on assumptions about the notion of semantic correctness that the anti-normativist rejects, and the strong thesis does not solve the problems Gibbard wants it to solve: the problems of indeterminacy and meaning skepticism. I conclude that semantics does not need normativity.