关于医学人文教学几个问题的认识

文化素质教育与人文教育有联系,但也有区别;对人文精神的理解,存在东方与西方、传统与现在的差异;人文精神的核心是人是一切的根本,人的生命、思想、理想应当受到关爱和尊重;人文精神或人文主义包括理念层次和实践层次;人文精神是一种普世价值而主要不是意识形态;人文知识不等于人文素养,医学人文教育的目标是提升学生对生命的尊重与关爱;医学人文教育应当渗透到医学专业教育之中。     

证候存在的逻辑回答

认为存在的就是客观的,包含了自然客观、思维客观和理性客观;把疾病现象和疾病本质划等号,在症状层面规范证候标准,抛弃中医辨证思维,就等于否定中医。物质不能等于客观,不能取代存在。证候属于理性客观,发生于中医学,是中医“阴阳神气”观念临床实在化(还原)的必然。     

Introducing the concept of spirit injury in education‐to‐work transitions

This paper introduces the topic of spiritual injury and the possible influences and relationships it might share with education‐to‐work transitions of young adults. Students of both dominant and minority cultural backgrounds were interviewed to gain a detailed understanding of how perceptions of transitions came about. Further, I sought to understand what role spirituality and experiences of spirit injury have in the decision‐making processes.     

God as Spirit—and Natural Science

The biblical sentence "God is Spirit" (John 4:24) occasioned the development of the Christian doctrine about God as Spirit. But since patristic times "spirit" was interpreted in the sense of Nus, which rather means "intellect." The biblical concept of spirit (pneuma), however, has its root meaning in referring to "air in movement," as in breath or storm. The similar concept of pneuma in Stoic philosophy has become the "immediate precursor" (Max Jammer) of the field concept in modern physics, so that the conclusion is suggested that God is spirit as something like a field of force rather than as intellect. This essay argues for such a conception by relating the divine eternity and immensity to the concepts of space and time, the basic requirements of any physical field. God's eternity and immensity are interpreted in terms of undivided infinite space (and time) which is presupposed in all concepts of parts of space or time (or space-time), therefore in all mathematical and physical measurement.     

Internal objects' or ‘chimerical monsters’?: the demonic ‘third forms’ of the internal world

The concept of 'object' whether internal or external, is a hold-over from the Enlightenment and from the positivistic certainty of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century science, Its use in current psychoanalytic theory and practice is now obsolete because of the contributions of post-modernism and their emphasis on subjectivity and relativity. In plate of the word 'object', the author favors a return to pre-Enlightenment psychology in order to address the presence and clinical manifestation of what the term 'object' screened, i.e., demons, monsters, chimerae, ghosts, spirits, etc. In terms of external 'objects', he favors such terms as 'persons' or 'subjects', which also reflects an adjustment to the post-modem emphasis on the ineffability of the Other.     

传承与融通--《老子》与《周易》中民族精神比较研究

<老子>与<周易>是中国传统文化中的两部经典,是中国古代社会的智慧结晶.其中所凝聚的民族精神影响着中国人民的性格与情操,影响着中国几千年的文化传统和思维特质.<老子>上承<易经>之风,下启<易传>之理,以其独特的哲学思维方式,构建了与其"道"哲学相符合的民族精神,这种民族精神在<易传>中得到传承与融通,两者互补互进,共同缔造了中国民族精神的灵魂,推动着中国文化和文明的发展和积淀.这些民族精神则表现为"刚柔同构"的进取精神、"宽厚相得"的道德情怀、"中和为用"的和谐观念以及"重生利物并重"的人文理想,其中以"天人合一"的思维模式贯穿始终,突出了中国民族精神最一般的特质与深刻内涵.     

Freud and Jung: an incomplete encounter

The author discusses the bases of the close, personal and professional relationship between Freud and Jung, and conjectures that the eventual schism between them was the result of the different profound psychological needs that each had for the other. Because of his identification with the psychoanalytic enquiry, particularly as it was based in large measure on his own self analysis, Freud looked to Jung as a collaborator who would not deviate from the principles at the basis of psychoanalysis, seeking psychoanalysis' acceptance within the established scientific community. From Jung's point of view, Freud fulfilled the role of a respected father figure who, Jung hoped, would grant him the autonomy and freedom to pursue his own scientific enquiry, based on Freud's ideas, but which he would revise according to his own researches. These led Jung to certain revisions and additions, such as the nature and function of the libido, the broadening of the idea of the complex (as in the Oedipus complex) to include a number of universal, archetypal themes, and the elaboration of the concept of the self. During the years of their relationship, they shared a mutual psychological support which was deeply important to each, based on reciprocal love and respect but also on a fantasy that each would be able to supply to the other a key capacity that the other lacked. Jung was able to offer important scientific verifications of a number of psychoanalytic notions via the Word Association Test, such as the concept of repression, of the complex, including the Oedipus complex, and the proof of the existence of the unconscious. However, neither could supply to the other what each looked for in the other at the psychological level. The final breakdown and rupture in their relationship was caused by their theoretical differences and by the fact that they became bitter competitors in a race to publish treatises on the nature and origins of spirituality and religion. It has left in its wake the implicit traces of discord and misapprehension which have characterized much of subsequent professional relationships between the two traditions.     

In the Name of the Spirits -- A Reading of Solov'ëv's Justification of the Good

In this contribution, the author analyzes Vladimir Solov'ëv's intention to study the idea of the Good as something relatively independent from religion and metaphysics. Some implications of Solov'ëv's definition of moral philosophy in The Justification of the Good are investigated, and illustrated with his applied ethics of war in chapter 18 of this book. It appears that Solov'ëv's moral philosophy and his account of war must be understood in connection with the central place of the cult of ancestors in his ethics. The idea of the Good and the idea of God spring from a religious origin and appear in our efforts to conjure up and exorcize the spirits of our forefathers. The author explains this ethics by referring to Solov'ëv's article China and Europe. There, Solov'ëv assumes that the Christian mind is treatened by the danger of a cultural order in which the cult of ancestors is most purely preserved. In the future war against China, however, Christian civilization must show itself superior to its enemy without betraying its loyalty to its own ancestors. The author concludes that in Solov'ëv's ethics, the moral subject is divided between the confirmation of its own autonomy and its being haunted by the spirits of its forefathers, a haunt which results in relentless wars against others     

Book reviews

Shamdasani, Sonu. Cult Fictions: C. G. Jung and the Founding of Analytical Psychology
Shamdasani, Sonu. Cult Fictions: C.G. Jung and the Founding of Analytical Psychology
Sandner, Donald F. & Wong, Steven H. (eds.). The Sacred Heritage: The Influence of Shamanism on Analytical Psychology
Bion, W. R. War Memoirs 1917–1919
Mitrani, Theodore, Mitrani, Judith et al. (eds.). Encounters with Autistic States
Spensley, Sheila. Frances Tustin
Symington, Neville. The Making of a Psychotherapist.
Killick, Katherine & Schaverien, Joy (eds.). Art, Psychotherapy and Psychosis.     

Nietzsche on Nobility and the Affirmation of Life

In this paper I explore Nietzsche's thinking on the notions of nobility and the affirmation of life and I subject his reflections on these to criticism. I argue that we can find at least two understandings of these notions in Nietzsche's work which I call a 'worldly' and an 'inward' conception and I explain what I mean by each of these. Drawing on Homer and Dostoyevsky, the work of both of whom was crucial for Nietzsche in developing and exploring his notion of worldly nobility and affirmation, I then go on to argue that Nietzsche provides us with no concrete examples of worldly nobles and that, given his historicism, he cannot. Thus Nietzsche's thinking here is broken-backed. I turn, therefore, to explore the inward notions of nobility and affirmation. Discussing Montaigne and Napoleon in the context of Nietzsche's philosophy, I argue that we can make good sense in Nietzschean terms of someone's affirming his own life in an inward sense. This, however, opens up the difference between someone's affirming his own life and his affirming life überhaupt, and I argue that Nietzsche needs to be able to make sense not just of the former but also of the latter. Referring once again to Dostoyevsky, I suggest that Nietzsche can only do so by accepting the idea that all human beings possess dignity qua human beings. This thought is, however, one that he rejects. Thus Nietzsche's reflections in this area cannot be rendered finally plausible since they depend upon something which can find no room in his philosophy.