民主的概念

The core elements of modern democracy are citizens who share equally in mutually-compatible basic rights, serve as the final decision-makers on the community’s constitution, and choose whom to be entrusted with legislative and executive powers, while at the same time wielding final veto power over the present government. The rule of the majority in modern democracy is no longer a fundamental principle, but rather a derivative principle the validity of which is based on the above-mentioned core elements. Translated by Hu Jinglei from Tianjin Shehui Kexue 天津社会科学 (Tianjin Social Sciences), 2007, (5): 7–12     

Soul in the world: symbolic culture as the medium for psyche

Whilst the loss of a sense of living connection with the material world is mainly associated with the scientific revolution in seventeenth century Europe, it can be traced back to Plato's introduction of a hierarchy between soul and body. Jung's attempted solution to this – esse in anima – is ingenious but maintains the Cartesian split by which the aliveness of the world is reduced to a projection of psychic forces (the archetypes). An alternative approach is proposed, rooted in the Aristotelean emphasis on practical activity that sees the soul as a function of our way of being in the world. Human cognition is extended and distributed by our social and material engagement with the world, especially via collective representations whose symbolic character is constitutive of the reality of the world in which we live. Despite the dominance of ‘scientific Cartesian’ representations in the modern Western world, there remain numerous instances of participation mystique that cannot be captured by the Cartesian notion of projection. These indicate an opening to ways of being in the world that may lead us out of the impasse of the Cartesian matrix.     

A Defence of Jury Nullification

In both Great Britain and the United States there has been a growing debate about the modern acceptability of jury nullification. Properly understood, juries do not have any constitutional right to ignore the law, but they do have the power to do so nevertheless. Juries that nullify may be motivated by a variety of concerns: too harsh sentences, improper government action, racism, etc. In this article, I shall attempt to defend jury nullification on a number of grounds. First, I discuss the use of general verdicts and reject their replacement in criminal trials by special verdicts. Second, I examine verdicts based upon mistakes and racial prejudice, turning my attention to perverse verdicts and the question of whether or not juries are guilty of legislating when nullifying the law. Finally, I look at the problem of the awarding of excessive damages by juries. My goal will be to provide a sound theoretical defence of the practice of jury nullification.R. Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, American Law Review 44 (1910),18.The term jury nullification is synonymous with jury equity. The use of jury nullification has been suspected of playing a role in the infamous trials of O. J. Simpson and Rodney King in the last decade. See People v Simpson, No. BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1995); People v Powell, No. BA035498 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1991).     

Judicial Responses to Civil Disobedience: A Comparative Approach

In this paper, I compare the extent of Anglo-American judicial engagement in response to civil disobedience with that of the French judiciary. I begin by examining what the civil disobedient can realistically expect to achieve in a court of law. I shall argue that his priority should be to require the judge, acting as a mouthpiece for the law, to respond to his complaints. To do this, the civil disobedient must be able to deny liability for the offence he has allegedly committed by urging a different interpretation of the law on the basis of an alternative -- but plausible -- reading of constitutional or human rights. If the civil disobedient can do this, he can claim a victory of sorts, even if his claims are ultimately unsuccessful. But legal culture can present a further barrier. Judges have different roles in different jurisdictions and therein lie further difficulties for the French civil disobedient.     

On medicine, culture, and children's basic interests: a reply to three critics

Margaret Mohrmann, Paul Lauritzen, and Sumner Twiss raise questions about my account of basic interests, liberal theory, and the challenges of multiculturalism as developed in Children, Ethics, and Modern Medicine. Their questions point to foundational issues regarding the justification and limitation of parental authority to make decisions on behalf of children in medical and other contexts. One of the central questions in that regard is whether adults' decisions deserve to be respected, especially when they seem contrary to a child's or adolescent's basic interests. Questions about respect, in turn, focus attention on other's decisions about what seems good for families and children, decisions that may be paternalistic or utilitarian. Such decisions are further complicated by a child's or adolescent's budding autonomy and need for respect and recognition. Pediatric bioethics grounded in an account of a child's basic interests produces a theory of negative and positive rights for assessing adults' actions in relation to children, especially (but not only) when adults demand respect in their expressions of care.     

The Embryo Rescue Case

In the debate regarding the moral status of human embryos, the Embryo Rescue Case has been used to suggest that embryos are not rightholders. This case is premised on the idea that in a situation where one has a choice between saving some number of embryos or a child, it seems wrong to save the embryos and not the child. If so, it seems that embryos cannot be rightholders. In this paper, I argue that the Embryo Rescue Case does not independently show that embryos are not rightholders.     

Modernization,Rights, and Democratic Society: The Limits of Habermas’s Democratic Theory

Jürgen Habermas’s discourse-theoretic reconstruction of the normative foundations of democracy assumes the formal separation of democratic political practice from the economic system. Democratic autonomy presupposes a vital public sphere protected by a complex schedule of individual rights. These rights are supposed to secure the formal and material conditions for democratic freedom. However, because Habermas argues that the economy must be left to function according to endogenous market dynamics, he accepts as a condition of democracy (the formal separation of spheres) a social structure that is in fact anti-democratic. The value of self-determination that Habermas’s theory of democracy presupposes is contradicted by the actual operations of capitalist markets. Further democratic development demands that the steering mechanisms of the capitalist market be challenged by self-organizing civic movements.     

The role of athlete as contributor to peer status in school-age and adolescent females in the United States: From pre-title IX to 2000 and beyond

Despite its importance for males, athleticism has been considered inconsequential as a predictor of peer status for females. In the United States, however, female sports have seen dramatic increases in participation, sport type variety, and role models since the passage of Title IX. An extensive literature review was conducted to determine if athletic variables have become more significant predictors of peer status for school-age (ages 7–13) and adolescent (ages 14–18) females in the United States over the past 30 years. An integration of findings suggested that the relation between athletic variables and peer status remained relatively stable across age groups. Review of literature addressing the internal perceptions of female athletes allowed for speculation regarding the increases in participation despite the lack of peer status benefits.     

Gender,Employment Status,and Abortion: A Longitudinal Analysis

Building upon extant literature, we examine the influence gender and employment status exert on abortion attitudes among the mass public. Specifically, we assess if men, employed women, and homemaker women view the abortion issue differently and if the same factors account for variation in each group's attitudes toward abortion. Analysis of General Social Survey data from 1973 to 2000 indicates that although homemaker women tend to be more pro-life than do men or working women, the attitudes of all 3 groups exhibit similar changes over time. In addition, our results suggest that the same variables account for variation in abortion attitudes for all 3 groups. Our results suggest that the causes and effects of abortion attitudes do not appear to be gender-specific, but rather are relatively uniform across genders and employment statuses.