Causation in a New Old Key

I argue (1) that it is not philosophically significant whether causation is linguistically represented by a predicate or by a sentence connective; (2) that there is no philosophically significant distinction between event- and states-of-affairs-causation; (3) that there is indeed a philosophically significant distinction between agent- and event-causation, and that event-causation must be regarded as an analog of agent-causation. Developing this point, I argue that event-causation's being in the image of agent-causation requires, mainly, (a) that the cause is temporally prior to the effect, (b) that the cause necessitates (is sufficient with necessity) for the effect. Causal necessity is explained as a derivative of nomological necessity, and finally, via a definition of the causal sentence connective, the logic of event-causation is shown to be a part of temporal modal logic.     

Intralevel mental causation

This paper identifies and critiques a theory of mental causation defended by some proponents of nonredutive physicalism that I call “intralevelism.” Intralevelist theories differ in their details. On all versions, the causal outcome of the manifestation of physical properties is physical and the causal outcome of the manifestation of mental properties is mental. Thus, mental causation on this view is intralevel mental to mental causation. This characterization of mental causation as intralevel is taken to insulate nonreductive physicalism from some objections to nonreductive physicalism, including versions of the exclusion argument. This paper examines some features of three recent versions of intralevelism defended by John Gibbons, Markus Schlosser, and Amie Thomasson. This paper shows that the distinctive problems faced by these three representative versions of intralevelism suggest that the intralevelist strategy does not provide a viable solution to the exclusion problem.     

动作的主动控制感与因果关系的主动控制感：主动动作时间压缩效应的产生机制

主动动作的时间压缩效应指主动动作到动作结果之间存在时间上的主观压缩。基于动作的主动控制感和因果关系的主动控制感是该效应的两种理论解释。本文首先分别介绍动作的主动控制感和因果关系的主动控制感, 并从行为和脑机制角度提供相应的证据解释时间压缩效应的机制。同时, 本文提出了在主动动作时间压缩效应中动作的主动控制感与因果关系的主动控制感之间可能存在的序列加工和平行加工的关系。     

Causes and Counterparts

It follows from David Lewis's counterpart-theoretic analysis of modality and his counterfactual theory of causation that causal claims are relativized to a set of counterpart relations. Call this Shlewis's view. I show how Shlewis's view can provide attractively unified solutions to similar modal and causal puzzles. I then argue that Shlewis's view is better motivated, by his own lights, than the view Lewis actually held, and also better motivated than a similar approach which relativizes causal claims to sets of ‘contrast events’.     

The Idea of Power and Locke's Taxonomy of Ideas

Locke's account of the idea of power is thought to be seriously problematic. Commentators allege (1) that the idea of power causes problems for Locke's taxonomy of ideas, (2) that it is defined circularly, and (3) that, contrary to Locke's claims, it cannot be acquired in experience. This paper defends Locke's account. Previous commentators have assumed that there is only one idea of power. But close attention to Locke's text, combined with background features of his theory of ideas, supports the drawing of a distinction between four different ideas of power. The paper describes each idea and its role in the Essay. It then argues that this distinction can help Locke to avoid the traditional criticisms.     

Interactionism,haecceities, and the pairing argument

Interactionists hold that non-spatial objects (e.g. minds) causally interact with physical objects. Interactionists have traditionally grappled with the puzzle of how such interaction is possible. More recently, Jaegwon Kim has presented interactionists with a more daunting threat: the pairing argument, which purports to refute interactionism by showing that non-spatial objects cannot stand in causal relations. After reviewing that argument, I develop a challenge to it on behalf of the interactionist. The challenge poses a dilemma: roughly, either haecceities exist or they do not. I argue that the pairing argument fails in either case. While the challenge does not explain exactly how the pairing argument goes wrong, it shows that the argument fails. The challenge also explains the difficulty in pinpointing the pairing argument’s failure: exactly how the pairing argument fails depends on difficult issues concerning the nature of objects.     

Identifying effects of driving and secondary task demands,passenger presence,and driver characteristics on driving errors and traffic violations – Using naturalistic driving data segments preceding both safety critical events and matched baselines

Researchers have identified various factors that likely affect aberrant driving behaviors and therefore crash risk. However, it remains unclear which of these factors poses the greatest risk for committing either errors or violations under naturalistic driving conditions. This study investigated important variables contributing to driving errors and traffic violations based on naturalistic driving data from the second Strategic Highway Research Program (SHRP 2). The analyzed driving segments preceded both safety critical events and matched baselines. Results showed that intersection influence, high-risk visually distracting secondary tasks, and the severities of the safety critical events were the main factors associated with driving errors. The primary factors linked to violations were intersection influence, persistent individual differences in driver behavior, and the severities of the safety critical events. Furthermore, the number of aberrant driving behaviors in trip segments preceding crashes was higher than in the matched segments unrelated to safety critical events. However, the most common aberrant driving behavior types in the respective segment groups appeared to resemble each other. This suggests that crashes became more likely due to drivers committing more violations and errors overall as opposed to drivers making one certain type of error or violation.     

SOME CORRELATIONS BETWEEN METHODS OF KNOWING AND THEOLOGICAL CONCEPTS IN ARTHUR PEACOCKE'S PERSONALISTIC PANENTHEISM AND NONPERSONAL NATURALISTIC THEISM

Differences in methods of knowing correlate with differences in concepts about what is known. This is an underlying issue in science and religion. It is seen, first, in Arthur Peacocke's reasoning about God as transcendent and personal, is based on an assumption of correlative thinking that like causes like. This contrasts with a notion of causation in empirical science, which explains the emergence of new phenomena as originating from temporally prior phenomena quite unlike that which emerges. The scientific understanding of causation is compatible with a naturalistic theism that holds a nonpersonal model of God as the creative process. However, focusing on the immanence of God, there is a second correlation between methods of knowing and concepts of God. Classical empiricism, used by science, correlates with God understood nonpersonally as the creative process. Radical empiricism, in which feelings and not only sense perceptions have cognitive import, opens up the possibility that one can experience Peacocke's personal, panentheistic God as pattern‐forming influence. I illustrate this second method‐concept correlation with a personal experience.     

MINDING QUANTA AND COSMOLOGY

The revolution in science inaugurated by quantum physics has made us aware of the role of observation in the construction of data. Eugene Wigner remarked that in quantum physics we no longer have observables (invariants), only observations. Tongue in cheek, I asked him whether that meant that quantum physics is really psychology, expecting a gruff reply to my sassiness. Instead, Wigner beamed understanding and replied "Yes, yes, that's exactly correct." David Bohm pointed out that were we to look at the cosmos without the lenses of our telescopes we would see a hologram. I extend Bohm's insight to the lens in the optics of the eye. The receptor processes of the ear and skin work in a similar fashion. Without these lenses and lenslike operations all of our perceptions would be entangled as in a hologram. Furthermore, the retina absorbs quanta of radiation so that quantum physics uses the very perceptions that become formed by it. In turn, higher-order brain systems send signals to the sensory receptors so that what we perceive is often as much a result of earlier rather than just immediate experience. This influence from inside out becomes especially relevant to our interpretation of how we experience the contents and bounds of cosmology that come to us by way of radiation.