Agent causation as a solution to the problem of action

My primary aim is to defend a nonreductive solution to the problem of action. I argue that when you are performing an overt bodily action, you are playing an irreducible causal role in bringing about, sustaining, and controlling the movements of your body, a causal role best understood as an instance of agent causation. Thus, the solution that I defend employs a notion of agent causation, though emphatically not in defence of an account of free will, as most theories of agent causation are. Rather, I argue that the notion of agent causation introduced here best explains how it is that you are making your body move during an action, thereby providing a satisfactory solution to the problem of action.     

A mechanistic perspective on canonical neural computation

Although it has been argued that mechanistic explanation is compatible with abstraction (i.e., that there are abstract mechanistic models), there are still doubts about whether mechanism can account for the explanatory power of significant abstract models in computational neuroscience. Chirimuuta has recently claimed that models describing canonical neural computations (CNCs) must be evaluated using a non-mechanistic framework. I defend two claims regarding these models. First, I argue that their prevailing neurocognitive interpretation is mechanistic. Additionally, a criterion recently proposed by Levy and Bechtel to legitimize mechanistic abstract models, and also a criterion proposed by Chirimuuta herself aimed to distinguish between causal and non-causal explanation, can be employed to show why these models are explanatory only under this interpretation (as opposed to a purely mathematical or non-causal interpretation). Second, I argue that mechanism is able to account for the special epistemic achievement implied by CNC models. Canonical neural components contribute to an integrated understanding of different cognitive functions. They make it possible for us to explain these functions by describing different mechanisms constituted by common basic components arranged in different ways.     

Reconciling Compensatory and Noncompensatory Strategies of Cue Weighting: A Causal Model Approach

When forming a judgment about any unknown item, people must draw inferences from information that is already known. This paper examines causal relationships between cues as a relevant factor influencing how people determine the amount of weight to place on each piece of available evidence. We propose that people draw from their beliefs about specific causal relationships between cues when determining how much weight to place on those cues, and that understanding this process can help reconcile differences between predictions of compensatory and lexicographic heuristic strategies. As causal relationships change, different cues become more or less important. Across three experiments, we find support for the use of causal models in determining cue weights, but leave open the possibility that they work in concert with other strategies as well. We conclude by discussing relative strengths and weaknesses of the causal model approach relative to existing models, and suggest areas for future research. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

De‐escalation after repeated negative feedback: emergent expectations of failure

Research on willingness to make marginal investments (e.g., the escalation and sunk cost literatures) has often focused on project completion decisions, such as the “radar‐blank plane.” This paper discusses a fundamentally different type of marginal investment decision, that of couples deciding whether to continue infertility treatment in the face of repeated failures. Two experiments based on this context show that when people face multiple independent chances to achieve a valued goal but are unsure about chances of success, premature quitting or “de‐escalation” is the norm. Repeated negative feedback appears to induce individuals to see each successive failure as more and more diagnostic. As a result, even a short series of failed attempts evokes beliefs that future attempts will also fail. These emergent expectations of failure, generated by causal attribution processes, associative learning, and/or discounting of ambiguous information, appear very compelling and induce people to forgo profitable marginal investments. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

学习障碍儿童社会技能缺失成因假说

研究者一直试图探讨学习障碍与社会技能缺失之间的联系,从而揭示导致学习障碍儿童社会技能缺失的原因。这一研究领域出现了四种假说：因果假说、共存假说、相关假说和同病率假说。     

用不同外部表征方式集中呈现信息条件下的因果力判断

在分别用文字陈述、表格和图形三种外部表征方式集中呈现因果信息的条件下,用直接估计因果力大小的实验范式考察单一因果关系因果力估计的特点,检验概率对比模型,效力PC理论和pCI规则。让287名大学生被试估计不同化学药物影响动物基因变异的能力。结果发现,对单一因果关系因果力估计具有以下4个特点：⑴不对称性：在预防原因条件下的因果力估计较多符合效力PC理论,而在产生原因条件下的因果力估计一般符合概率对比模型;⑵文字陈述、表格和图形三种信息外部表征方式,不影响产生原因条件下的因果力估计,但影响预防原因条件下的因果力估计。在预防原因条件下,与文字陈述和表格表征相比,图形表征会促使更多被试按效力PC理论来做因果力估计;⑶没有被试使用pCI规则;⑷被试估计因果力所使用的规则存在明显的个体差异。     

学前儿童朴素生物学理论及其获得机制

学前儿童朴素生物学理论发展的研究近20年来一直是儿童认知发展研究的热点。Carey等主张学前儿童的生物概念系统是从心理概念系统中分离出来的由一个系统到另一个系统的根本性概念转变,儿童还没有一个包含动植物的整合的生物系统。但另一些研究主张学前儿童能够对生物现象进行本体区分并形成内在一致的生物学因果解释,拥有朴素生物学理论,该理论是在一个概念系统（生物学概念系统）中逐渐的连续性变化过程。目前整合的观点认为儿童朴素生物学理论在童年早期就独立于心理学理论,但在分离一开始的一段时间里还要受心理学的影响。     

论《易经》的英译与世界传播

翻译是人类交流与传播史上最古老最复杂的文化现象,从17世纪以来,世界上各种语言和风格的不同<易经>翻译版本就层出不穷.<易经>英语翻译对世界影响重大,但长期以来存在多方面的有待解决的问题.本论旨在通过探讨<易经>英译的相关问题以寻找在新世纪全球化语境下<易经>翻译的改进与<易经>世界传播的新思路.     

Where science starts: spontaneous experiments in preschoolers' exploratory play

Probabilistic models of expected information gain require integrating prior knowledge about causal hypotheses with knowledge about possible actions that might generate data relevant to those hypotheses. Here we looked at whether preschoolers (mean: 54 months) recognize “action possibilities” (affordances) in the environment that allow them to isolate variables when there is information to be gained. By manipulating the physical properties of the stimuli, we were able to affect the degree to which candidate variables could be isolated; by manipulating the base rate of candidate causes, we were able to affect the potential for information gain. Children’s exploratory play was sensitive to both manipulations: given unambiguous evidence children played indiscriminately and rarely tried to isolate candidate causes; given ambiguous evidence, children both selected (Experiment 1) and designed (Experiment 2) informative interventions.