Counterfactual thinking as an issue between language and pretend play / El pensamiento contrafactual como un problema entre el lenguaje y el juego de simulación

Discussions on counterfactual thinking (CT) have been focused on whether it is a language skill or it emerges spontaneously before language acquisition. This paper surveys the most compelling arguments regarding these frameworks: (1) the approach ‘CT as a language skill’; (2) those who claim that pretending shows that children have CT; (3) those who consider pretend play is a rehearsal for cognitive dispositions. I shall point out that the three approaches on CT are incomplete: (1) neglects pretend play (which prelinguistic children perform) as an instantiation of the CT; (2) puts too much emphasis on the linguistic dimension of pretense; (3) is highly demanding on the cognitive architecture that we ought to have by nature — the so-called children as scientists.     

Can Robert Adams Survive Moral Twin Earth?

Richard Boyd and Robert Adams have both developed semantic accounts of moral terms based on Hilary Putnam's causal regulation theory for natural kind terms, according to which the terms in question refer to the properties which predominantly causally regulated the terms. However, Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have mounted an objection to Boyd's semantics—their Moral Twin Earth argument. If this argument is successful against Boyd then it might be thought that it should also be successful against Adams, given the similarity between their semantic accounts. I will argue in this essay that Adams's semantics is sufficiently different from Boyd's to enable him to survive Moral Twin Earth, but that he is vulnerable to a modified version of Moral Twin Earth that I describe.