What Influences Subjective Well-Being in Russia?

The relationship between subjective well-being and domain satisfactions is studied in this paper. In the past, different models have been specified. The most commonly used model is the bottom-up model where domain satisfactions affect subjective well-being. The more recent top-down model suggests a reversed relationship. Finally, there is the suggestion that the correlations between these variables can be spurious due to the effect of personality characteristics. Empirical research has shown that different models fit different domains. All three possibilities are evaluated for three domains on the basis of data from the Russet panel. The relationships found are quite different from those found in other studies, thus we conclude that the models may not only vary by domain, but also by country. This result is in line with the idea of a hierarchy of values suggested in older literature.     

A Propensity Score Adjustment for Multiple Group Structural Equation Modeling

In the behavioral and social sciences, quasi-experimental and observational studies are used due to the difficulty achieving a random assignment. However, the estimation of differences between groups in observational studies frequently suffers from bias due to differences in the distributions of covariates. To estimate average treatment effects when the treatment variable is binary, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983a) proposed adjustment methods for pretreatment variables using the propensity score. However, these studies were interested only in estimating the average causal effect and/or marginal means. In the behavioral and social sciences, a general estimation method is required to estimate parameters in multiple group structural equation modeling where the differences of covariates are adjusted. We show that a Horvitz–Thompson-type estimator, propensity score weighted M estimator (PWME) is consistent, even when we use estimated propensity scores, and the asymptotic variance of the PWME is shown to be less than that with true propensity scores. Furthermore, we show that the asymptotic distribution of the propensity score weighted statistic under a null hypothesis is a weighted sum of independent χ² ₁ variables. We show the method can compare latent variable means with covariates adjusted using propensity scores, which was not feasible by previous methods. We also apply the proposed method for correlated longitudinal binary responses with informative dropout using data from the Longitudinal Study of Aging (LSOA). The results of a simulation study indicate that the proposed estimation method is more robust than the maximum likelihood (ML) estimation method, in that PWME does not require the knowledge of the relationships among dependent variables and covariates.     

其它可能原因的呈现方式在因果判断中的作用

研究使用不同方式呈现了其它可能原因,研究了这种不同的呈现方式对被试使用共变信息和经验信息进行因果判断的影响。研究结果表明:(1)其它可能原因的呈现方式对于因果判断有着一定的影响。当这一信息在待判断原因与结果的共变中出现、且永远存在时,被试会排除这一其它可能原因的作用,从而增强判断的信心;(2)当其它可能原因出现于待判断原因与结果的共变中、且永远存在时,被试会在一定程度上忽视经验信息的作用,更多地依赖共变信息做出判断。     

Differentiating explanations of attitude-consistent behavior: the role of perspectives and mode of perspective taking

We examined whether participants could differentiate between explanations of attitude-consistent behavior related to EU membership given from two perspectives (EU supporter and EU opponent) by means of three perspective taking modes (the explainer's own perspective, imagined in-group members' perspective, and imagined out-group members' perspective). Participants were presented with explanations provided from different perspectives and perspective taking modes, and they were asked to judge the extent to which they agreed with each explanation, to guess the attitude of the provider of each explanation, and to rate the quality of each explanation in various respects. Participants could not differentiate between explanations given by in-group members and out-group members who imagined the same perspective. They responded more favorably to explanations given from own perspective than from the imagined perspectives. The results suggest that there exists a shared understanding about how both sides should explain attitude-consistent behavior, but this understanding is measurably different from the actual explanations.     

How do 8‐month‐old infants recognize causality in object motion and that in human action?1

Abstract: In Experiment 1, 8‐month‐old infants were first habituated to the event in which a moving object collided with another behind an occluder, then they were shown the two test events with no occluder: the contact event, in which the two objects actually collided, and the non‐contact event, in which the second object started to move without contact with the first. The infants looked at both events for an equal amount of time. In Experiment 2, in which the first object was a human actor, however, infants looked at the non‐contact event reliably longer than the contact event. In Experiment 3, in which both objects were human actors stood face‐to‐back, infants looked at the non‐contact event longer, whereas in Experiment 4, in which human actors faced toward each other, infants looked at both events equally. In Experiment 5, in which the first actor told the second to go, 10‐month‐old infants looked at both events for an equal amount of time. These results suggest that 8‐ and 10‐month‐old infants appreciate different causal principles between objects and humans, and that, in doing this, they may acknowledge the possibility of communication between humans.     

COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION AND FOLK THEISTIC BELIEF

Cognitive scientists of religion promise to lay bare the cognitive mechanisms that generate religious beliefs in human beings. Defenders of the debunking argument believe that the cognitive mechanisms studied in this field pose a threat to folk theism. A number of influential responses to the debunking argument rely on making two sets of distinctions: (1) proximate/ultimate explanations and (2) specific/general religious beliefs. I argue, however, that such responses have drawbacks and do not make room for folk theism. I suggest that a detour through the literature in the philosophy of mind regarding the problem of mental causation regarding nonreductive physicalism can provide a way for preserving folk theism without doing violence to the way cognitive science of religion is being practiced today. More specifically, I believe there is a way of responding to the debunking argument that does not require a rejection of the causal premise.     

初中数学学习中教师归因与学生自我归因的比较研究

本文研究了初中数学学习中教师的信念与归因．学生自我的信念与归因以及师生归因的比较,得出如下几点结论：(1)在教师和学生的信念中男生在数学学习中更占优势。但在归因领域里却没有发现显著的性别差异。(2)对最好的学生,教师倾向于努力归因;对最差的学生,教师倾向于基础归囚。(3)最好的学生自我归因时倾向于基础和方法归因,最差的学生倾向于努力和方法归因。(4)师生归因维度上的一般趋势：造成数学学习成功的原因比较稳定、内源、可控;造成数学学习失败的原因也倾向于内源,但比较不稳定,不可控。(5)师生特定归因中的差异广泛存在,建议采取相应的教育对策。     

The Logic of Causal Explanation An Axiomatization

Three-valued (strong-Kleene) modal logic provides the foundation for a new approach to formalizing causal explanation as a relation between partial situations. The approach makes fine-grained distinctions between aspects of events, even between aspects that are equivalent in classical logic. The framework can accommodate a variety of ontologies concerning the relata of causal explanation. I argue, however, for a tripartite ontology of objects corresponding to sentential nominals: facts, tropes (or facta or states of affairs), and situations (or events). I axiomatize the relations and use canonical models to demonstrate completeness.     

How Causal is Downward Causation?

Summary  The purpose of this paper is to lay bare the major problems underlying the concept of downward causation as discussed within the perspective of the present interest for phenomena that are characterized by self-organization.In our discussion of the literature, we have focussed on two questions: (1) What sorts of things are said to be, respectively, causing and caused within the context of downward causation? And (2) What is the meaning of ‘causing’ in downward causation? We have concluded that the concept of ‘downward causation’ is muddled with regard to the meaning of causation and fuzzy with regard to the nature of the causes and the effects. Moreover, we have concluded that ‘causation’ in respect of ‘downward causation’ is usually understood in terms of explanation and determination rather than in terms of causation in the sense of ‘bringing about’. Thus, the term ‘downward causation’ is badly chosen.