基于语境的预期推理构建的实验研究

两个实验用移动视窗技术,用目标句阅读时间和命名探测词两种指标来考察当文本中有两个情境模型时,读者是否会即时进行预期推理。结果表明,如果在支持性语境与引发推理的信息之间插入一个与支持性语境所描述的情境模型不同的,且与主人公目标有关的因果链上的情境模型的信息,则不管这个插入的情境模型在文本中的位置如何,也不管干扰信息的干扰水平高低,都会降低因果性预期推理在阅读中产生的可能性。     

Responsibility and Manipulation

I address various critiques of the approach to moral responsibility sketched in previous work by Ravizza and Fischer. I especially focus on the key issues pertaining to manipulation. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Is Putnam's Causal Theory of Meaning Compatible with Internal Realism?

Putnam originally developed his causal theory of meaning in order to support scientific realism and reject the notion of incommensurability. Later he gave up this position and adopted instead what he called ‘internal realism’, but apparently without changing his mind on topics related to his former philosophy of language. The question must arise whether internal realism, which actually is a species of antirealism, is compatible with the causal theory of meaning. In giving an answer I begin with an analysis of the content and metaphysical background of scientific realism. I show that it presupposes metaphysical realism and that Putnam's philosophical conversion is due to his becoming aware of the latter's incoherence. After giving a brief sketch of internal realism I conclude by arguing that within this new theoretical framework the causal theory of meaning loses its force as a weapon against incommensurability. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

归因是怎样影响假设思维的

考察了归因这一外力对假设思维的影响。研究发现归因对假设思维的影响与选择原因大小成正比与事件后果严重程度成反比。当选择原因相对后果而言足够大时,假设思维将不服从“特例－常规”规律。在此基础上,根据是否存在外力将事件分为被迫事件和自由事件,并提出“特例－常规”规律（或是“做－不做”规律）只适合自由事件而不是所有事件。这一结果部分地解释了长期存在于实验研究与现场研究中的假设思维所表现出的差异。     

样例学习条件下的因果力估计

在逐个呈现因果样例的条件下,考察单一因果关系因果力估计的特点,同时检验联想解释,概率对比模型,权重DP模型,效力PC理论和pCI规则。实验让65名大学生被试估计不同化学药物影响动物基因变异的能力。实验结果表明：（1）对产生原因的因果力估计符合权重DP模型;（2）对预防原因的因果力估计较多符合效力PC理论;（3）因果力估计具有复杂多样性,难以用统一的模式加以描述和概括。     

Children's and adults' understanding of the impact of nutrition on biological and psychological processes

Four studies examined children's and adults' beliefs about the impact of nutrition on growth and mood states. In Studies 1 and 2, 271 participants (preschoolers through adults) judged the impact of healthy and unhealthy nutrition on height and weight. In Studies 3 and 4, 267 participants judged the impact of healthy and unhealthy nutrition on positive and negative mood states. The results suggest that young children demonstrate a co‐existence of an ontologically distinct theory of biology as well as a theory of cross‐domain interaction when reasoning about the impact of food on biological and psychological processes.     

基于语境的因果性预期推理的构建的实验研究

实验一探讨对因果性预期推理的支持程度不同的语境对因果性预期推理的即时构建的影响。结果表明,如果文本信息有支持预期结果的语境,读者会即时进行因果性预期推理。实验二探讨当文本描述了两个不能整合的情境模型时因果性预期推理的即时构建情况。结果表明,在这种条件下,因果性预期推理不会即时产生。本研究结果表明,文本的语境对因果性结果的支持程度对因果性预期推理的即时构建有决定性的影响作用。     

归因过程“背景效应假设”的初步实验研究

通过两个实验考证了归因过程的“背景效应假设”：实验1表明,当要求活动者和观察者采用同样的背景事件时．他们之间的归因差异消失了;实验2表明,当有其它的背景信息可供参考时,被试就不再完全按照Kelley所假定的一致性和区别性信息进行归因推断。     

Alternatives to Randomized Experiments

ABSTRACT— Randomized experiments are preferred for making inferences about causality when they can be implemented and their assumptions are met. Yet assumptions can fail (e.g., attrition, treatment noncompliance) or randomization may be unethical or infeasible. I describe alternative design and statistical approaches that permit testing causal hypotheses and present current empirical evidence related to alternative designs. Alternative designs permit a wider range of research questions to be answered and permit more direct generalization of causal effects; however, when using such designs, estimates of the magnitude of the causal effect may be more uncertain.     

The Impossibility of Emergent Conscious Causal Powers

This paper argues that emergent conscious properties can't bestow emergent causal powers. It supports this conclusion by way of a dilemma. Necessarily, an (allegedly efficacious) emergent conscious property brings about its effects actively or other than actively (in senses explained in the paper). If actively, then, the paper argues, the emergent conscious property can't have causal powers at all. And if other than actively, then, the paper argues, the emergentist finds himself committed to incompatible accounts of causation.