Causal attributions of obese men and women in genetic testing: Implications of genetic/biological attributions1

The present study sought to investigate genetic/biological attributions of obesity, their associations with a predisposition to obesity and their crossectional and longitudinal implications for weight regulation in obese individuals presenting for genetic testing and counselling. A total of 421 obese men and women underwent psychological and anthropometric assessment and a mutation screen of the melanocortin-4 receptor gene. At study entry, women revealed more genetic/biological attributions than men on the Revised Illness Perception Questionnaire adapted to obesity (86.2% versus 59.7%). Genetic/biological attributions of obesity were associated in both sexes with a family history of obesity, assessed through Stunkard's Figure Rating Scale. In both sexes, genetic/biological attributions were unrelated to weight regulation beliefs and behaviour (i.e. self-efficacy, controllability beliefs, restrained eating and physical activity), assessed through standardised questionnaires or interview at baseline and at six-month follow-up. In addition, causal attributions and weight regulation beliefs and behaviour were not predictive of body mass index at six-month follow-up. Overall, the results indicate that causal attributions of obesity to genetic/biological factors in obese individuals presenting for genetic screening and counselling are crossectionally and longitudinally unrelated to weight regulation and longer-term weight outcome. Those who attribute their obesity to genetic/biological factors likely have a familial obesity risk.     

Teaching Early Modern Philosophy as a Bridge between Causal or Naturalistic and Conceptual Thought

It is a challenge in teaching early modern philosophy to balance historical faithfulness to the arguments and concerns of early modern philosophers and interpreting them as relevant to the kinds of thinking that contemporary undergraduate students find plausible. Early modern philosophy is unique, however, in applying modern scientific method directly to problems concerning nonphysical aspects of reality that our contemporary scientific thought, and with it mainstream contemporary culture, no longer find amenable in their own, independent right to reliable reasoned approaches. At the same time, early modern philosophy often also takes seriously purely conceptual or logically consequential thought in the investigation of these topics, as our mainstream contemporary culture does not. This kind of thought, we argue, is distinctive of philosophy in general and appropriate to nonphysical aspects of reality. Early modern philosophy, then, offers a bridge between the kind of reasoned, objective thought our mainstream culture finds plausible and thought about nonphysical reality or, in general, the thought that characterizes philosophy.     

基于语境的预期推理构建的实验研究

两个实验用移动视窗技术,用目标句阅读时间和命名探测词两种指标来考察当文本中有两个情境模型时,读者是否会即时进行预期推理。结果表明,如果在支持性语境与引发推理的信息之间插入一个与支持性语境所描述的情境模型不同的,且与主人公目标有关的因果链上的情境模型的信息,则不管这个插入的情境模型在文本中的位置如何,也不管干扰信息的干扰水平高低,都会降低因果性预期推理在阅读中产生的可能性。     

Responsibility and Manipulation

I address various critiques of the approach to moral responsibility sketched in previous work by Ravizza and Fischer. I especially focus on the key issues pertaining to manipulation. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Con-reasons and the causal theory of action

A con-reason is a reason which plays a role in motivating and explaining an agent's behaviour, but which the agent takes to count against the course of action taken. Most accounts of motivating reasons in the philosophy of action do not allow such things to exist. In this essay, I pursue two aims. First, I argue that, whatever metaphysical story we tell about the relation between motivating reasons and action, con-reasons need to be acknowledged, as they play an explanatory role not played by pro-reasons (the reason the agent takes to count in favour of the action taken). Second, I respond to an argument recently developed by David-Hillel Ruben to the effect that a causal theory of action – still known as ‘the standard story’ – cannot account for con-reasons. His argument attempts to show that a fundamental principle of the causal theory cannot be reconciled with the role con-reasons play in a certain kind of imagined case. I first argue that a causal theorist is not, in fact, committed to the problematic principle; this argument has an added benefit, since the principle has been taken by many to show that the causal theory generates a puzzle about the possibility of weak-willed action. I then argue that a causal theorist has good reason to reject the possibility of Ruben's imagined cases. If successful, my arguments make clearer the commitments of the causal theory and show that it can accommodate con-reasons in the way I think they ought to be accommodated.     

Kant and Kantian Themes in Recent Analytic Philosophy

This article notes six advances in recent analytic Kant research: (1) Strawson's interpretation, which, together with work by Bennett, Sellars, and others, brought renewed attention to Kant through its account of space, time, objects, and the Transcendental Deduction and its sharp criticisms of Kant on causality and idealism; (2) the subsequent investigations of Kantian topics ranging from cognitive science and philosophy of science to mathematics; (3) the detailed work, by a number of scholars, on the Transcendental Deduction; (4) the clearer understanding of transcendental idealism sparked by reactions to Allison's epistemic account; (5) the resulting need—prompted also by new studies of the thing in itself—to face up to the old question of the philosophical defensibility of such idealism; and (6) the active engagement with Kant's ethics and political philosophy that derives from Rawls's and others' work.     

Is Putnam's Causal Theory of Meaning Compatible with Internal Realism?

Putnam originally developed his causal theory of meaning in order to support scientific realism and reject the notion of incommensurability. Later he gave up this position and adopted instead what he called ‘internal realism’, but apparently without changing his mind on topics related to his former philosophy of language. The question must arise whether internal realism, which actually is a species of antirealism, is compatible with the causal theory of meaning. In giving an answer I begin with an analysis of the content and metaphysical background of scientific realism. I show that it presupposes metaphysical realism and that Putnam's philosophical conversion is due to his becoming aware of the latter's incoherence. After giving a brief sketch of internal realism I conclude by arguing that within this new theoretical framework the causal theory of meaning loses its force as a weapon against incommensurability. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Doubly Robust-Type Estimation for Covariate Adjustment in Latent Variable Modeling

Due to the difficulty in achieving a random assignment, a quasi-experimental or observational study design is frequently used in the behavioral and social sciences. If a nonrandom assignment depends on the covariates, multiple group structural equation modeling, that includes the regression function of the dependent variables on the covariates that determine the assignment, can provide reasonable estimates under the condition of correct specification of the regression function. However, it is usually difficult to specify the correct regression function because the dimensions of the dependent variables and covariates are typically large. Therefore, the propensity score adjustment methods have been proposed, since they do not require the specification of the regression function and have been applied to several applied studies. However, these methods produce biased estimates if the assignment mechanism is incorrectly specified. In order to make a more robust inference, it would be more useful to develop an estimation method that integrates the regression approach with the propensity score methodology. In this study we propose a doubly robust-type estimation method for marginal multiple group structural equation modeling. This method provides a consistent estimator if either the regression function or the assignment mechanism is correctly specified. A simulation study indicates that the proposed estimation method is more robust than the existing methods. This research was partially supported by the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture, Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B), 187-30406.     

样例学习条件下的因果力估计

在逐个呈现因果样例的条件下,考察单一因果关系因果力估计的特点,同时检验联想解释,概率对比模型,权重DP模型,效力PC理论和pCI规则。实验让65名大学生被试估计不同化学药物影响动物基因变异的能力。实验结果表明：（1）对产生原因的因果力估计符合权重DP模型;（2）对预防原因的因果力估计较多符合效力PC理论;（3）因果力估计具有复杂多样性,难以用统一的模式加以描述和概括。     

因果与权重：决策的眼动模型

结合眼动注视的漂移扩散模型可较好描述个体的决策行为,但尚存两个问题未得解决：注视与决策的因果关系以及决策过程中累积证据的权重问题。本研究采用基于注视的操纵范式考察了基于价值的决策中注视与决策的关系,发现操纵被试对选项的注视时间可影响其选择,注视操纵主要影响决策后期时程,且模型参数估计结果更支持近因模型。研究结果支持了漂移扩散模型的近因假设,为今后的模型发展指明了新方向。