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排序方式: 共有268条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
71.
Jonathan D. Payton 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(1):20-33
A con-reason is a reason which plays a role in motivating and explaining an agent's behaviour, but which the agent takes to count against the course of action taken. Most accounts of motivating reasons in the philosophy of action do not allow such things to exist. In this essay, I pursue two aims. First, I argue that, whatever metaphysical story we tell about the relation between motivating reasons and action, con-reasons need to be acknowledged, as they play an explanatory role not played by pro-reasons (the reason the agent takes to count in favour of the action taken). Second, I respond to an argument recently developed by David-Hillel Ruben to the effect that a causal theory of action – still known as ‘the standard story’ – cannot account for con-reasons. His argument attempts to show that a fundamental principle of the causal theory cannot be reconciled with the role con-reasons play in a certain kind of imagined case. I first argue that a causal theorist is not, in fact, committed to the problematic principle; this argument has an added benefit, since the principle has been taken by many to show that the causal theory generates a puzzle about the possibility of weak-willed action. I then argue that a causal theorist has good reason to reject the possibility of Ruben's imagined cases. If successful, my arguments make clearer the commitments of the causal theory and show that it can accommodate con-reasons in the way I think they ought to be accommodated. 相似文献
72.
Robert Howell 《Metaphilosophy》2013,44(1-2):42-47
This article notes six advances in recent analytic Kant research: (1) Strawson's interpretation, which, together with work by Bennett, Sellars, and others, brought renewed attention to Kant through its account of space, time, objects, and the Transcendental Deduction and its sharp criticisms of Kant on causality and idealism; (2) the subsequent investigations of Kantian topics ranging from cognitive science and philosophy of science to mathematics; (3) the detailed work, by a number of scholars, on the Transcendental Deduction; (4) the clearer understanding of transcendental idealism sparked by reactions to Allison's epistemic account; (5) the resulting need—prompted also by new studies of the thing in itself—to face up to the old question of the philosophical defensibility of such idealism; and (6) the active engagement with Kant's ethics and political philosophy that derives from Rawls's and others' work. 相似文献
73.
《Journal of couple & relationship therapy》2013,12(2-3):195-213
SUMMARY Differentiation and infidelity have been theoretically related. However, few studies have tested whether the concepts in differentiation are statistically related to infidelity. One hundred nineteen participants in the present study completed two inventories assessing their level of differentiation and engaging in infidelity. Two-step structural equation modeling is used to determine the degree to which differentiation relates to infidelity. Results indicated that, though differentiation may be part of a plausible model of infidelity behavior, there are potentially other models that may be relevant in engaging in infidelity. The findings and implications are discussed. 相似文献
74.
Dwayne Moore 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2017,47(1):20-42
According to proponents of the causal exclusion problem, there cannot be a sufficient physical cause and a distinct mental cause of the same piece of behaviour. Increasingly, the causal exclusion problem is circumvented via this compatibilist reasoning: a sufficient physical cause of the behavioural effect necessitates the mental cause of the behavioural effect, so the effect has a sufficient physical cause and a mental cause as well. In this paper, I argue that this compatibilist reply fails to resolve the causal exclusion problem. 相似文献
75.
Jonas Jervell Indregard 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2017,95(4):627-643
Are the pure intuitions of space and time, for Kant, dependent upon the understanding's activity? This paper defends the recently popular Self-Affection Thesis (SAT): namely, that the pure intuitions require an activity of self-affection—an influence of the understanding on the inner sense. Two systematic objections to this thesis have been raised: The Independence objection claims that SAT undermines the independence of sensibility; the Compatibility objection claims that certain features of space and time are incompatible with being the products of the understanding's activity. I show that the resources to rebut these objections can be found in Kant's account of causal influence. 相似文献
76.
Pat Lewtas 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2017,95(3):475-487
This paper argues that emergent conscious properties can't bestow emergent causal powers. It supports this conclusion by way of a dilemma. Necessarily, an (allegedly efficacious) emergent conscious property brings about its effects actively or other than actively (in senses explained in the paper). If actively, then, the paper argues, the emergent conscious property can't have causal powers at all. And if other than actively, then, the paper argues, the emergentist finds himself committed to incompatible accounts of causation. 相似文献
77.
因果模型在类比推理中的作用 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
通过操纵因果模型的特征维度及推理方向, 探讨因果模型在类比推理中的作用。实验一探讨了当结果特征未知时进行类比推理的情况, 发现在一果多因时, 被试采用因果模型进行类比推理, 而在一因多果时, 被试同时采用因果模型和计算模型进行类比推理。实验二探讨当原因特征未知时进行类比推理的情况, 发现在一果多因和一因多果时, 被试均采用因果模型进行类比推理。结果表明:(1)当结果特征未知时, 人们会建构因果模型进行类比推理。且当因果模型和计算模型处于冲突情境时, 人们会采用因果模型进行类比推理; 但当因果模型和计算模型处于非冲突情境时, 人们会同时采用因果模型和计算模型。(2)当原因特征未知时, 即按照因果模型推理的难度增加时, 人们仍会建构因果模型进行类比推理。 相似文献
78.
Alexander Rueger 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2006,37(1):77-97
Summary A combination of process and counterfactual theories of causation is proposed with the aim of preserving the strengths of each of the approaches while avoiding their shortcomings. The basis for the combination, or hybrid, view is the need, common to both accounts, of imposing a stability requirement on the causal relation. 相似文献
79.
School Subjects as Social Categorisations 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
The present study set out to examine school subjects in terms of social categorisations of a child’s educability. A group
of academically educated (N = 180) and vocationally educated parents (N = 249) with a child in the third grade of comprehensive school were asked to indicate their child’s strongest and weakest
school subject and to give reasons for their choices. The parents’ most frequent choices for both the strongest and the weakest
subject turned out to be mathematics and Finnish, which substantiates the pivotal role of the cognitive-verbal competencies
in defining the child’s educability. The choices were guided by the child’s gender, so that mathematics was typically regarded
as the strongest subject of boys and the weakest subject of girls and conversely, Finnish was regarded as the strongest subject
of girls and the weakest subject of boys. The parent’s educational position organised the reasons given for the subject choices
so that self-serving attribution was stronger among the academically educated than the vocationally educated parents, suggesting
that the parents’ education relates to the trust they place on their child’s educational potential. 相似文献
80.
The “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches have been thought to exhaust the possibilities for doing cognitive neuroscience. We argue that neither approach is likely to succeed in providing a theory that enables us to understand how cognition is achieved in biological creatures like ourselves. We consider a promising third way of doing cognitive neuroscience, what might be called the “neural dynamic systems” approach, that construes cognitive neuroscience as an autonomous explanatory endeavor, aiming to characterize in its own terms the states and processes responsible for brain-based cognition. We sketch the basic motivation for the approach, describe a particular version of the approach, so-called ‘Dynamic Causal Modeling’ (DCM), and consider a concrete example of DCM. This third way, we argue, has the potential to avoid the problems that afflict the other two approaches. 相似文献