Executive functioning by 18‐24‐month‐old children: effects of inhibition,working memory demands and narrative in a novel detour‐reaching task

Infants can inhibit a prepotent but wrong action towards a goal in order to perform a causal means‐action. It is not clear, however, whether infants can perform an arbitrary means‐action while inhibiting a prepotent response. In four experiments, we explore this executive functioning in 18–24‐month‐old children. The working memory and inhibition demands in a novel means‐end problem were systematically varied in terms of the type and combination of means‐action(s) (causal or arbitrary) contained within the task, the number of means‐actions (1 or 2), the goal visual availability and whether the task was accompanied by a narrative. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that children performed tasks that contained causal as opposed to arbitrary information more accurately; accuracy was also higher in tasks containing only one step. Experiment 2 also demonstrated that performance in the arbitrary task improved significantly when all sources of prepotency were removed. In Experiment 3, task performance improved when the two means‐actions were intelligibly linked to the task goal. Experiment 4 demonstrated that the use of a narrative that provided a meaningful (non‐causal) link between the two means‐actions also improved children's performance by assisting their working memory in the generation of a rationale. Findings provide an initial account of executive functioning in the months that bring the end of infancy. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

THE BLURRED LINE BETWEEN THEISTIC EVOLUTION AND INTELLIGENT DESIGN

It is often assumed that there is a hard line between theistic evolution (TE) and intelligent design (ID). Many theistic evolutionists subscribe to the idea that God only acts through natural processes, as opposed to the ID assertion that God, at certain points in natural history, has acted in a direct manner; directly causing particular features of the world. In this article, I argue that theistic evolutionists subscribe to what might be called Natural Divine Causation (NDC). NDC does not merely provide a nonsupernaturalist and noninterventionist model of divine action, it provides a line of demarcation between TE and ID. I make the critique that NDC is philosophically untenable and argue, consequently, that the line between TE and ID is blurred.     

Hume on the Problem of Other Minds

Hume is not often cited as a philosopher who posited a solution to the Problem of Other Minds. He instead seems to assume the belief in other minds in his moral philosophy without justification. However, Hume needs to explain how we experience and respond to others’ affections, and hence generate moral sentiments, given how central the latter are to his moral theory. Two recent interpretations of Hume’s solution to the Problem are the Wittgensteinian Interpretation, and the Simulation Theory Interpretation. Both focus on the concept of sympathy as a solution to the Problem, claiming that, for Hume, sympathy produces the belief in other minds. This paper critically examines these two interpretations and offers an alternative called ‘the Analogical Argument Interpretation’, which reconstructs Hume’s version of an analogical argument carried out not by our rational faculty of mind but by custom and imagination. On this interpretation, Hume does not think that sympathy generates the belief in other minds, but rather, sympathy presupposes that belief.     

Consciousness in a multilevel architecture: What causes the lateralization of effective connectivity under resting state?

Here we present our answers to a critical commentary by Elkhonon Goldberg on our recent publication (Velichkovsky et al., 2018). To avoid discussions about novelty effects in the human brain activity and memory processes, we narrowed down this response to a reanalysis of our data along the lines proposed in the commentary, namely to comparing the effective links between symmetrical brain structures during the first and the last parts of a prolonged resting-state fMRI experiment. We also tested for sex differences in our results and checked for a stability of top-down interactions during the course of experiment because learning is often expressed in the weakening of upper level control over low-level mechanisms. Our attempts to test the predictions based on the novelty hypothesis has led to mixed results suggesting that the discovered right-to-left dominance of causal connections at rest may have a deeper origin than supposed in the Goldberg’s commentary.     

Naïve Realism,Hallucination, and Causation: A New Response to the Screening Off Problem

This paper sets out a novel response to the ‘screening off’ problem for naïve realism. The aim is to resist the claim (which many naïve realists accept) that the kind of experience involved in hallucinating also occurs during perception, by arguing that there are causal constraints that must be met if an hallucinatory experience is to occur, ones that are never met in perceptual cases. Notably, given this response, it turns out that, contra current orthodoxy, naïve realists need not adopt any particular view about the psychological nature of hallucinatory experience to handle the screening off problem. Consequently, room opens up for naïve realists to endorse whatever theory of hallucinatory experience seems to best capture the distinctive nature of such episodes.     

When does measurement error in covariates impact causal effect estimates? Analytic derivations of different scenarios and an empirical illustration

The average causal treatment effect (ATE) can be estimated from observational data based on covariate adjustment. Even if all confounding covariates are observed, they might not necessarily be reliably measured and may fail to obtain an unbiased ATE estimate. Instead of fallible covariates, the respective latent covariates can be used for covariate adjustment. But is it always necessary to use latent covariates? How well do analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) or propensity score (PS) methods estimate the ATE when latent covariates are used? We first analytically delineate the conditions under which latent instead of fallible covariates are necessary to obtain the ATE. Then we empirically examine the difference between ATE estimates when adjusting for fallible or latent covariates in an applied example. We discuss the issue of fallible covariates within a stochastic theory of causal effects and analyse data of a within-study comparison with recently developed ANCOVA and PS procedures that allow for latent covariates. We show that fallible covariates do not necessarily bias ATE estimates, but point out different scenarios in which adjusting for latent covariates is required. In our empirical application, we demonstrate how latent covariates can be incorporated for ATE estimation in ANCOVA and in PS analysis.     

Probabilistic Cause and the Thirsty Traveler

In this paper I start by briefly presenting an analysis of token cause and of token causal relevance that I developed elsewhere, and then apply it to the famous thirsty traveler riddle. One general outcome of the analysis of causal relevance employed here is that in preemption cases (early or late) the preempted cause is not a cause since it is causally irrelevant to the effect. I consider several variations of the thirsty traveler riddle. In the first variation the first enemy emptied the canteen and the second enemy threw it away. On this variation, the act of neither enemy comes out, on the analysis employed here, as causally relevant to, and thus not as a cause of, the fact that the traveler died, but the conjunction of the two acts is a cause of it. This version is a case of mutual preemption. I argue that it has the same structure as the voting paradox, which thus has an analogous solution. In the standard version, in which the first enemy added poison to the water in the traveler's canteen, the act of the second enemy (who threw the canteen away) comes out, on the analysis used here, as causally relevant to and as a cause of the fact that the traveler died, but the act of the first enemy comes out as neither. I also make a comparison with Lewis' accounts, and discuss alternative treatments of the puzzle such as those of Hart and Honore and of Gavison, Margalit, and Ullmann-Margalit.     

A Pragma-Dialectical Approach of the Analysis and Evaluation of Pragmatic Argumentation in a Legal Context

This paper answers the question how pragmatic argumentation which occurs in a legal context, can be analyzed and evaluated adequately. First, the author surveys various ideas taken from argumentation theory and legal theory on the analysis and evaluation of pragmatic argumentation. Then, on the basis of these ideas, she develops a pragma-dialectical instrument for analyzing and evaluating pragmatic argumentation in a legal context. Finally she demonstrates how this instrument can be used by giving an exemplary analysis and evaluation of pragmatic argumentation in a decision of the Dutch Supreme Court.     

因果变化模式与因果联结强度在幼儿因果推理中的作用

对93名幼儿进行了五种因果变化模式的因果推理题目的测试。结果表明:(1)在不同的因果变化模式下,被试进行因果推理的成绩存在差异,且在对于这五类题目的掌握上具有一定的顺序。(2)被试在同样因果变化模式题目的表现之间具有较高的相似性,而在因果联结强度相同的题目之间则具有显著的差异。(3)被试对于各题目回答的正确率并不随原因与结果联结次数的增多而提高。(4)即使是在观察到的刺激完全一致的情况下,被试的回答仍会因因果变化模式的差异及主试对于题目解释的不同而存在差别。     

Commentary: Prevention/Intervention Trials and Developmental Theory: Commentary on the Fast Track Special Section

Well-conducted prevention and intervention research has the potential to serve the dual ends of enhancing children's adaptive outcomes and elucidating important developmental processes and mechanisms related to change. Admirably, the Fast Track preventive intervention was conceived in accord with explicit developmental theory related to the development of conduct problems. Herein, I consider how the present reports of grade-3 outcomes allow examination of causal processes and developmental mechanisms related to the effects uncovered, featuring the constructs of prediction, moderation, and particularly mediation. The multifaceted, intensive nature of the Fast Track preventive intervention is at once a clinical strength and a liability in terms of isolating causal processes underlying child change. I also consider issues related to the random assignment of the investigation and to policies that may emerge from the findings. In all, research that aims to identify relevant developmental and causal processes must incorporate both experimental and nonexperimental paradigms that are conceptualized from the outset with explanatory purposes in mind.