Self-Esteem and Performance on Word Tasks

Abstract

The authors investigated word-task performance of 192 postgraduate Indian women, grouped according to high or low self-esteem, after different causal attributions for failure. The subsequent performance of the low-self-esteem (LSE) participants improved after reattribution training. When the LSE participants were induced to attribute their prior failure to external causes, the external attribution not only reduced their natural tendency toward self-blame but also broke the self-defeating cycle, thereby enabling them to improve their subsequent performance.     

Causal uncertainty during initial interactions

Causal uncertainty (CU) refers to persistent doubts people have about their ability to understand causes of social events. Although such confusion about social dynamics should affect social exchanges, previous research has been limited to the realm of social cognition (i.e., computer‐based studies exploring perceptions of hypothetical others). In three studies, we explored CU effects during real‐time social interactions with unacquainted conversational partners. We found that high CU participants perceived their conversations and conversational partners more negatively than did low CU participants and that these negative social perceptions stemmed from an inability to sufficiently reduce their cognitive uncertainty. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

关于知觉干扰效应的ERP研究

利用ERP技术,采用知觉干扰效应的经典实验范式,首次从神经生理水平上探究知觉干扰效应的内部机制。结果发现,递进条件和标准条件均诱发了P2,P3,N400和晚期正成分LPC。在P2,P3和LPC成分上,标准条件的波幅均显著大于递进条件;在N400成分上,递进条件比标准条件波幅更负,潜伏期更长。此外,对递进条件下靶字各模糊水平（Level 1～Level 5）的ERPs进行比较分析表明,N400成分的波幅在各模糊水平间的差异均不显著。基本支持失匹配理论及词汇自动加工理论。     

Non-bayesian inference: causal structure trumps correlation

The study tests the hypothesis that conditional probability judgments can be influenced by causal links between the target event and the evidence even when the statistical relations among variables are held constant. Three experiments varied the causal structure relating three variables and found that (a) the target event was perceived as more probable when it was linked to evidence by a causal chain than when both variables shared a common cause; (b) predictive chains in which evidence is a cause of the hypothesis gave rise to higher judgments than diagnostic chains in which evidence is an effect of the hypothesis; and (c) direct chains gave rise to higher judgments than indirect chains. A Bayesian learning model was applied to our data but failed to explain them. An explanation-based hypothesis stating that statistical information will affect judgments only to the extent that it changes beliefs about causal structure is consistent with the results.     

Side-effect actions,acting for a reason,and acting intentionally

What is the relation between acting intentionally and acting for a reason? While this question has generated a considerable amount of debate in the philosophy of action, on one point there has been a virtual consensus: actions performed for a reason are necessarily intentional. Recently, this consensus has been challenged by Joshua Knobe and Sean Kelly, who argue against it on the basis of empirical evidence concerning the ways in which ordinary speakers of the English language describe and explain certain side-effect actions. Knobe and Kelly's argument is of interest not only because it challenges a widely accepted philosophical thesis on the basis of experimental evidence, but also because it indirectly raises an important and largely neglected question, the question of whether or in what sense an agent can perform a side-effect action for a reason. In this article, I address this question and provide a positive answer to it. Specifically, I argue that agents act for a reason whenever they perform side-effect actions as trade-offs. Thus, I claim that there are three distinct types of rational action: actions performed as ends in themselves, actions performed as means to further ends, and side-effect actions performed as trade-offs. Given this multiplicity of types of rational action, the question of whether or not actions performed for a reason are necessarily intentional is in need of refinement. The more specific question that lies at the heart of this article is whether or not side-effect actions performed as trade-offs are necessarily intentional. I conclude that, contrary to what Knobe and Kelly suggest, the question remains open.     

La evaluación de la evidencia en la toma de decisiones complejas

Resumen

En esta investigación se analiza el papel de cómo se representa la evidencia en el proceso de decisión de un miembro de un jurado. Se presenta asimismo un modelo que incorpora una primera etapa inicial de procesamiento en la que se generan ciertas representaciones cognitivas de la evidencia bajo la forma de una historia. Esta etapa inicial viene seguida del cálculo de la decisión evaluando la bondad de ajuste de la representación de la evidencia (la historia) a los distintos tipos de veredicto. Cada uno de los sujetos, extraídos de listas de jurados, proporcionaba su veredicto sobre un juicio de asesinato que se presentaba filmado. A través de una entrevista en profundidad con cada uno de los jurados se obtenían los datos necesarios para el análisis de sus representaciones cognitivas de la evidencia del caso, de los tipos de veredicto presentados en las instrucciones del juez, y de los procedimientos que hubieron de seguir de acuerdo con la ley para llegar a un veredicto final. De acuerdo con nuestra hipótesis, hallamos que la evidencia del juicio se representaba bajo la forma de una historia. Además, las diferencias que se obtuvieron entre jurados respecto de sus representaciones cognitivas se correlacionaron con sus veredictos, aunque otros aspectos del proceso de decisión se correlacionaran (las representaciones de los distintos tipos de veredicto, y la aplicación de las instrucciones respecto del procedimiento para la evaluación de las pruebas). Terminamos concluyendo que una teoría apropiada de la toma de decisiones debe prestar atención a aquellos aspectos cognitivos de la tarea, como por ejemplo los que afectan a la representación de la evidencia.     

La influencia de las creencias causales en la construcción de inferencias predictivas y diagnósticas

Resumen

En este artículo se investiga la habilidad de los sujetos para evaluar el impacto de los datos dentro de un contexto causal. Las investigacion es realizadas sobre el razonamiento humano han mostrado que las teorías causales que las personas poseen sesgan con frecuencia su evaluación de la evidencia. En este experimento se analizan los juicios que emiten los sujetos sobre datos cuando tienen un esquema de razonamiento causal implícito (Cheng y Holyoak, 1985; Kuhn, Amsel y O'Loughlin, 1988) en contextos predictivos y diagnósticos (o abductivos). Para ello, se manipuló el tipo de información presentada a los sujetos, presentá ndole, a un grupo, datos consistentes con sus creencias causales previas y, a otro, datos inconsistentes con sus creencias causales. Los resultados obtenidos señalan que las teorías implícitas de los sujetos no fueron substancialmente modificadas por las condiciones experimentales, aunque sí fueron sensibles a la evidencia. Se discuten estos resultados desde un modelo de interacción creencias causales y datos en el ámbito de las inferencias predictivas y diagnósticas.     

行为决策中的基线比例忽略：心理机制与影响因素

基线比例忽略是指个体进行决策和判断时不能充分利用或者忽略基线比例而偏好新信息的现象。该现象普遍存在于日常行为与决策的许多领域,尤其显著表现在临床医疗领域,因此对这一现象的研究具有重要的应用价值。目前,基线比例忽略的心理机制主要有双加工理论和因果贝叶斯框架等。基线比例忽略的影响因素主要包括认知能力、年龄、基线比例的表述形式等。未来的研究需要从基线比例忽略的神经机制、影响因素以及应用研究的拓展等方面着手。     

Emergentism and supervenience physicalism

I argue that it is intuitive and useful to think about composition in the light of the familiar functionalist distinction between role and occupant. This involves factoring the standard notion of parthood into two related notions: being a parthood slot and occupying a parthood slot. One thing is part of another just in case it fills one of that thing's parthood slots. This move opens room to rethink mereology in various ways, and, in particular, to see the mereological structure of a composite as potentially outreaching the individual entities that are its parts. I sketch one formal system that allows things to have individual entities as parts multiple times over. This is particularly useful to David Armstrong, given Lewis's charge that his structural universals must do exactly that. I close by reflecting upon the nature and point of formal mereology.     

Intentional action first

The paper motivates a novel research programme in the philosophy of action parallel to the ‘Knowledge First’ programme in epistemology. It is argued that much of the grounds for abandoning the quest for a reductive analysis of knowledge in favour of the Knowledge First alternative is mirrored in the case of intentional action, inviting the hypothesis that intentional action is also, like knowledge, metaphysically basic. The paper goes on to demonstrate the sort of explanatory contribution that intentional action can make once it is no longer taken to be a target for reductive analysis, in explaining other, non-intentional kinds of action and voluntariness.