Impact of genetic testing on causal models of heart disease and arthritis: An analogue study

Abstract

An analogue study investigated the impact of genetic testing on perceptions of disease. Using a 2 × 2 design, participants (n = 212) imagined receiving the information that they were at increased risk for either heart disease or arthritis. The type of risk information was either genetic or unspecified. Presentation of genetic risk information resulted in the condition being perceived as less preventable. Causal models of disease where investigated using principal components analysis. When hem disease was the stimulus condition, attributions to genes and chance were positively associated following unspecified risk information, and negatively associated following genetic risk information. When arthritis was the stimulus condition, presentation of genetic risk information was associated with attributions to genes becoming separated from the other attributions. One explanation for this is that providing genetic risk information may decrease perceptions of a sense of randomness or uncertainty in disease causation. The extent to which these effects occur in clinical populations. and their behavioural consequences. needs to be established.     

Depression and Self-Esteem in Boys with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder: Associations with Comorbid Aggression and Explanatory Attributional Mechanisms

It was tested whether boys with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), subgrouped by aggressive status, would show higher rates of depressive symptomatology and lower levels of self-esteem than would comparison boys and, in a subsample, explored attributional mechanisms that may be related to such internalizing features. Study 1 utilized 114 boys with ADHD (all prior recipients of stimulant medication) and 87 comparison boys, aged 7–12 years. Aggressive boys with ADHD reported more symptoms of depression than did nonaggressive boys with ADHD, who, in turn, reported more depression than did comparison boys. Effect sizes were moderate to large and did not vary with a depression rating scale uncontaminated by ADHD-related items. For self-esteem, the most pronounced effect was that aggressive boys with ADHD showed lower levels than did nonaggressive ADHD or comparison boys; effects were again moderate to large. Study 2 participants were a subsample of boys with ADHD from Study 1 (N = 27). We probed causal attributions in ADHD-related domains through responses to hypothetical vignettes, in which the protagonist's medication status (medicated, not medicated) was crossed with type of outcome (good, bad). Medication-related attributions were frequent. In describing the protagonist's success in relation to medication treatment, the sample showed significant associations between (a) medication-related attributions and (b) increased depressive symptomatology as well as decreased self-esteem. We discuss attributional processes that may help to explain the variation in internalizing symptoms among children with ADHD.     

Where science starts: spontaneous experiments in preschoolers' exploratory play

Probabilistic models of expected information gain require integrating prior knowledge about causal hypotheses with knowledge about possible actions that might generate data relevant to those hypotheses. Here we looked at whether preschoolers (mean: 54 months) recognize “action possibilities” (affordances) in the environment that allow them to isolate variables when there is information to be gained. By manipulating the physical properties of the stimuli, we were able to affect the degree to which candidate variables could be isolated; by manipulating the base rate of candidate causes, we were able to affect the potential for information gain. Children’s exploratory play was sensitive to both manipulations: given unambiguous evidence children played indiscriminately and rarely tried to isolate candidate causes; given ambiguous evidence, children both selected (Experiment 1) and designed (Experiment 2) informative interventions.     

10‐month‐old infants’ inference of invisible agent: Distinction in causality between object motion and human action1

Abstract: Two habituation experiments investigated 10‐month‐old infants’ interpretation of events where a stationary object began to move without any visible causes. During habituation, infants saw that an object partly hidden by an occluder began to move away from the occluder. Then, they were tested with three test events without the occluder: the ?rst event showed a hand pushing the object, the second event showed a hand failing to touch the object, and the last event had no agent. The objects were a ball in Experiment 1, and a person in Experiment 2. The test event that the infants looked at for the shortest duration in Experiment 1 was where the hand pushed the ball, whereas they looked at the three test events almost equal amounts of time in Experiment 2. These results indicate that 10‐month‐old infants responded to the events in terms of causality and could infer the presence of the agent behind the occluder only when they saw the habituation event featuring the ball.     

Schizophrenia and indeterminacy: The problem of validity

The paper attempts to account for the confusion over the validity of the concept of schizophrenia in terms of two closely related aspects of conceptual indeterminacy. Firstly, it is identified on the basis of a breakdown in intelligibility, but what constitutes such a breakdown is indeterminate. Secondly, the concept sits between the categories of natural disease or illness on the one hand, and character trait or moral failing or gift on the other. This entails an indeterminacy in attempting to define the role that physiological explanation could have. Light may be thrown on the concept by exploring a distinction between a life story in which the schizophrenic condition emerges as the conclusion of the story and a causal process in which the condition is the end result or final consequence.     

The Argument from Moral Experience

It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and talking about morality, has a certain objective-seeming character to it, and that this supports a presumption in favor of objectivist theories (according to which morality is a realm of facts or truths) and against anti-objectivist theories like Mackie’s error theory (according to which it is not). In this paper, I argue that our experience of morality does not support objectivist moral theories in this way. I begin by arguing that our moral experience does not have the uniformly objective-seeming character it is typically claimed to have. I go on to argue that even if moral experience were to presuppose or display morality as a realm of fact, we would still need a reason for taking that to support theories according to which it is such a realm. I consider what I take to be the four most promising ways of attempting to supply such a reason: (A) inference to the best explanation, (B) epistemic conservatism, (C) the Principle of Credulity, and (D) the method of wide reflective equilibrium. In each case, I argue, the strategy in question does not support a presumption in favor of objectivist moral theories.