Rôle du contexte dans l'extinction du jugement causal : implications pour la thérapie comportementale

The article describes an experimental series on causal judgment showing that the extinction can recover: 1) where the extinction has not been learned; 2) with time following extinction; 3) during a simple exposition to the stimulus not presented during extinction. Bouton's theory (1993, 1994) is referred to account for these three conditions about the recovery of the extinguished response. The aim is to offer an experimental and theoretical framework for the study of relapse following a behavioural therapy based upon extinction.     

Reasons-Responsive Compatibilism and the Consequences of Belief

John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza offer a theory of moral responsibility which makes responsibility dependent upon the way in which moral agents view themselves. According to the theory, agents are responsible for their actions only if they think of themselves as apt candidates for praise and blame; if they come to believe they are not apt candidates for praise and blame, they are ipso facto not morally responsible. In what follows, I show that Fischer and Ravizza’s account of responsibility for consequences is inconsistent with this subjective element of their theory, and that the subjective element may be retained only if they are willing to implausibly restrict their account of responsibility for consequences. I end by discussing the broad significance of the failure of the subjective element for their overall approach to moral responsibility.     

Why there are no good arguments for any interesting version of determinism

This paper considers the empirical evidence that we currently have for various kinds of determinism that might be relevant to the thesis that human beings possess libertarian free will. Libertarianism requires a very strong version of indeterminism, so it can be refuted not just by universal determinism, but by some much weaker theses as well. However, it is argued that at present, we have no good reason to believe even these weak deterministic views and, hence, no good reason—at least from this quarter—to doubt that we are libertarian free. In particular, the paper responds to various arguments for neural and psychological determinism, arguments based on the work of people like Honderich, Tegmark, Libet, Velmans, Wegner, and Festinger.     

有关进化心理学局限性的理论思考

进化心理学是现代西方心理学的新取向之一。这一新取向吸引了众多的追随者,但是它自身的核心假设、方法论和认识论方面却存在着局限性。文章从三个方面分析了这种局限性：第一,进化心理学的核心假设是心理的模块性观点。依据这种观点,心灵由大量功能各异的心理模块组成,但是来自于心理学和生物学的研究都表明这种观点是缺乏科学依据的。第二,进化心理学从过去的角度理解现在,所依据的事实大多是推测性的,更多的是一种历史叙事,从方法论的角度来说,这种研究不具备可证伪性,不符合科学方法论的基本原则。第三,在认识论方面,进化心理学继承了社会生物学的传统,有意或无意地夸大了基因的作用,贬低了个体发展过程中其它因素,现代生命科学的研究已经证明了基因决定论的虚假性     

归因过程“背景效应假设”的初步实验研究

通过两个实验考证了归因过程的“背景效应假设”：实验1表明,当要求活动者和观察者采用同样的背景事件时．他们之间的归因差异消失了;实验2表明,当有其它的背景信息可供参考时,被试就不再完全按照Kelley所假定的一致性和区别性信息进行归因推断。     

初中生考试成绩归因模式研究

在广泛调查初中生对考试成绩的归因和情感反应的基础上,根据Ｗｅｉｎｅｒ的动机和情绪的归因理论,提出了初中生对考试成绩归因的假设模式,然后运用协方差结构模型的统计方法对这个假设模型进行了检验．虽然最初模型经ｘ２拟合度检验被拒绝,但经设定探查产生的最终模型较合适地拟合了数据,并部分支持了Ｗｅｉｎｅｒ的归因理论．按照这个模型,努力归因一内源性维度对初中生的自信心、期望、成就动机产生积极的影响．     

Positive affect as a moderator of liking effects on trust and attraction

Attitude similarity effects on attraction appear to be mediated sequentially by positive affect, inferred attraction, and trust. That is, the first two supposedly distal mediators influence each other in building trust, a mediator proximal to attraction. However, the correlational nature of data reported heretofore precludes definitive conclusions about sequential dependency between the two distal mediators. In the research reported, therefore, the authors manipulated positive affect in the participants (Time 1) and liking of the partner for them (Time 2), and measured trust before attraction. As predicted, liking effects on trust and attraction were stronger when positive affect in the participants was high than when it was low. Importantly, the interaction effect in trust fully mediated the interaction effect in attraction.     

Free Will and Therapeutic Change

Much of psychology has minimized, or disregarded, the notion of free will. However, it remains a critical construct in most theories of behavioral and religious change. This paper briefly examines the free will/determinism debate and the construct of free will from the perspective of postmodern/narrative psychology, as well as integrating recent developments in the field of cognitive neuroscience. Finally, the implications of this analysis on personal responsibility in pastoral psychology are discussed.     

Is Putnam's Causal Theory of Meaning Compatible with Internal Realism?

Putnam originally developed his causal theory of meaning in order to support scientific realism and reject the notion of incommensurability. Later he gave up this position and adopted instead what he called ‘internal realism’, but apparently without changing his mind on topics related to his former philosophy of language. The question must arise whether internal realism, which actually is a species of antirealism, is compatible with the causal theory of meaning. In giving an answer I begin with an analysis of the content and metaphysical background of scientific realism. I show that it presupposes metaphysical realism and that Putnam's philosophical conversion is due to his becoming aware of the latter's incoherence. After giving a brief sketch of internal realism I conclude by arguing that within this new theoretical framework the causal theory of meaning loses its force as a weapon against incommensurability. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

‘So you did what you wanted then’: Discourse analysis,personal agency,and psychotherapy

This paper explores issues concerning personal agency in discursive psychology and discourse analysis, with a particular emphasis on agency in terms of motivational accounts of the person. Issues are discussed in relation to the efficacy, acceptability, and accessibility of discourse analytic research for the practising psychotherapist. We suggest that such an approach may raise problems in four areas. First, we argue that without explicit theorization of the subject as language user, discourse analysis may be vulnerable to the charge of determinism. Second, theorization of the subject as language user may be required to account successfully for individual consistency and continuity of identity. Third, although claiming to critique commonsense notions of subjectivity, implicit dualist assumptions facilitate a reading of discursive psychology that is compatible with a motivational model of the person. Finally, we argue that discursive psychology itself implies a particular model of the strategically motivated language user. We conclude that, although these issues require clarification, discursive psychology and discourse analysis have much to offer psychotherapy research.