The sudden inability to recognize individual faces following brain damage was first reported in a scientific journal 150 years ago and termed ‘prosopagnosia’ 70 years ago. While the term originally identified a face‐selective neurological condition, it is now obscured by a sequence of imprecisions. First, prosopagnosia is routinely used to define symptoms of individual face recognition (IFR) difficulties in the context of visual object agnosia or other neurological conditions, or even in the normal population. Second, this over‐expansive definition has lent support to a long‐standing within‐category recognition account of prosopagnosia, that is, that the impairment of IFR reflects a general impairment in recognizing within‐category objects. However, stringent experimental studies of classical cases of prosopagnosia following brain damage show that their core impairment is not in recognizing physically similar exemplars within non‐face object categories. Instead, the impairment presents specifically for recognizing exemplars of the category of faces. Moreover, compared to typical observers, the impairment appears even more severe for recognizing individual faces against physically dissimilar than similar distractors. Here, I argue that we need to limit accordingly our definition of prosopagnosia to a clinical (i.e., neurological) condition in which there is no basic‐level object recognition impairment. Other criteria for prosopagnosia are proposed, with the hope that this conservative definition enables the study of human IFR processes in isolation, and supports progress in understanding the nature of these processes. 相似文献
Atypical items of their semantic category yield more generalisation than their typical members when relearning in connectionist networks (Plaut, D. C. (1996). Relearning after damage in connectionist networks: toward a theory of rehabilitation. Brain and Language, 52(1), 25–82) and in empirical studies (Kiran, S., & Thompson, C. K. (2003). The role of semantic complexity in treatment of naming deficits: Training semantic categories in fluent aphasia by controlling exemplar typicality. Journal of Speech, Language, and Hearing Research, 46(4), 773–787). It seems therefore that atypical words provide more information about the overall structure of the semantic category due to their specific and shared features. In this view, atypical primes could strongly facilitate the processing of targets compared to typical primes, because typical primes contain little information about the variation between members within a category. In contrast, three semantic priming experiments in visual word recognition showed an advantage with the typical context, but not with the atypical one. These findings were observed in a variety of tasks, including lexical decision, categorisation and semantic judgment. Our results do not support the findings about generalisation in relearning and suggest that typicality effects in semantic priming mostly come from the activation of representative features of categories. 相似文献
Many philosophers and medical scientists assume thatdisease categories or entities used to classify concrete cases ofdisease, are often defined by disease mechanisms or causalprocesses. Others suggest that diseases should always be definedin this manner. This paper discusses these standpoints criticallyand concludes that they are untenable, not only when `diseasemechanism' refers to an objective mechanism, but also when`mechanism' refers to a pragmatically demarcated part of thetotal ``objective' causal structure of diseases. As an alternativeto principles that use the concept of disease mechanism oranalogous concepts, a pragmatic approach is suggested anddescribed. This approach has been suggested before, but inproblematic or inadequate versions. This paper proposes a versioncompiled of two ``pragmatic principles' and shows that they aremuch more adequate than the principle of disease mechanism. Withreference to a case study of a still ongoing internationaldiscussion of various candidates for a classification system formalignant lymphomas, including REAL (Revised European–AmericanClassification of Lymphoid Neoplasms) in which the concept ofdisease mechanism or analogous concepts plays a very small part,it is shown just how pivotal these two pragmatic principles canbe in actual discussions of definitions of diseases. Finally, itis pointed out that with regard to modern philosophy of languageit may, at least in some cases, be problematic to distinguishbetween the two pragmatic principles as they stand. 相似文献
This study compared the perceptions of 376 Japanese and 191 Canadian consumers concerning the importance of different product attributes for categories of products at various stages of globalization. There was less multivariate statistical difference between the two countries for those products at a more advanced stage of globalization (consumer electronics and clothing vs. food). The joint effects of the degree of familiarity with the category of product and the country of the respondent on the importance of the product attributes were tested. The effect of familiarity was found to result in a significant statistical multivariate difference for the clothing category only. The observed statistical power of the effect of country of respondent confirmed that more statistical difference was apparent for the least globalized product. No multivariate significant statistical interaction was found between familiarity and country of respondent. Using a multi-attribute model, the evaluation of the three categories of product was computed for seven different countries of manufacture. Comparison of the total scores of each country for each product category for the Japanese and the Canadian samples confirmed that the most globalized product showed least difference in its evaluation between countries of manufacture. A well-known strong bias toward domestic products was, however, observed in both samples. 相似文献
Relational structure is important for various cognitive tasks, such as analogical transfer, but its role in learning of new relational concepts is poorly understood. This article reports two experiments testing people’s ability to learn new relational categories as a function of their relational structure. In Experiment 1, each stimulus consisted of 4 objects varying on 2 dimensions. Each category was defined by two binary relations between pairs of objects. The manner in which the relations were linked (i.e., by operating on shared objects) varied between subjects, producing 3 logically different conditions. In Experiment 2, each stimulus consisted of 4 objects varying on 3 dimensions. Categories were defined by three binary relations, leading to six logically different conditions. Various learning models were compared to the behavioral data, based on the theory of schema refinement. The results highlight several shortcomings of schema refinement as a model of relational learning: (1) it can make unreasonable demands on working memory, (2) it does not allow schemas to grow in complexity, and (3) it incorrectly predicts learning is insensitive to relational structure. We propose schema elaboration as an additional mechanism that provides a more complete account, and we relate this mechanism to previous proposals regarding interactions between analogy and representation construction. The current findings may advance understanding of the cognitive mechanisms involved in learning and representing relational concepts. 相似文献
Assuming religious education to be the same as other subject areas of a Catholic school’s curriculum by, for example, applying the outcomes based philosophy and language of other subject areas to religious education renders a category mistake. A prominent notion in the work of metaphysical philosopher Gilbert Ryle, a category mistake arises when facts of one kind are presented as if they belong to another. This is significant. When Australian Catholic diocesan syllabus documents treat and describe religious education as being like other subjects comprising the curriculum, a category mistake is made, the effects of which may be damaging for student learning. Following an examination of relevant Church documents to describe its purpose, a brief analysis of contemporary Australian Catholic diocesan religious education syllabi (cases in point) indicates that a series of category mistakes have been made. These findings have significance in informing the development and refinement of theory, policy and practice in religious education. 相似文献
Cultural identity refers to the psychological connection between an individual's self and a culture. In this paper, we identify three components that make up an individual's cultural identity – cultural knowledge, category label, and social connections. The cultural knowledge component connects an individual with a culture through the individual's direct endorsement of what are widely known to be the culture's central characteristics. The category label component connects an individual with a culture through the individual's depersonalized membership in a cultural collective. The social connections component connects an individual with a culture through networks of specific social relationships. The three components are conceptually distinct, and yet may have interconnections in influencing the development of cultural identity. We examine the implications of the three components on cultural identification processes in the context of multiculturalism and global cultural contact. 相似文献
The world, its many subsystems and all their theories, starting with logic, can be reduced to two related functions: a combinatorial system generator and a hamiltonian system organizer. These can be derived, in turn, from an Axiom of Lawfulness, the expansion being guided by pseudo‐category and pseudo‐functor analysis to produce an axiomatic theory of the world or general theory of evolution. Specifically, world evolution is generated by a constrained combinatorial world generator, F:G(X), deduced from two related axioms: I. The Axiom of World Lawfulness and II. The Axiom of World Constraint Constants, c = c1, c2, of primordial physical combinatee (substance), c1, and physical combinator (motion), c2. Axiom I postulates a lawful analysis by an analyzer adhering to appropriate coordinate systems, CS, of a lawful analysand obeying a conservation law, X = X. The analysand consists of a base combinatee (the set and elements), X = {x1, x2,… xn}, and a base combinator, namely, the universal Boolean operator, NOR = NOT + OR. Base combinatee and combinator both have attributes of quantity combinatorially generated by NOR operating on the universal number, 1, and of quality generated by NOR operating on the universal dimensions, MLT (mass, length, time), including the null sets. Axiom II fixes the base constants, c, = c1, c2, thereby converting X to material substance using c1 and NOR to material motion using c2. This comprehensive, quality and quantity‐competent foundational science is called Universal Combinatorics. Its elements comprise the logical alphabet or metavector, A = {c, 1, MLT; X, NOR}, where c is obtained from the remaining terms. These give: (1) the attributive pseudo‐functor, F = P(c,1,MLT), where P is the power set of the indicated attributes, and (2) the logic generator, G(X), where G = NOR(NOR). F then maps G(X) into world evolution, F:G(X) → world evolution, as follows: Expanding the abstract generator, F1:G,(x), with world constants eliminated, i.e., c = 0, generates Universal Grammar consisting of (1) the substantive content of the abstract science chain running from linguistic grammar to mathematics and logic and (2) a comprehensive epistemology equivalent to an explicit theory of the strategic aspects of the scientific method, including a universal hamiltonian theory structure informally related to a mathematical category. The four epistemological theorems are:
I. The Combinatorial System Generator, F:G(X), (read as “The attributive functor, F, maps the logic generator, G(X), into world theory” or “The world is an attributive combinatorial function of logic").
II. The Hamiltonian System Operating Theorem, h (an abstract theory‐category structure).
III. The System Stability Theorem, PI?, where PI is the extremal Performance Index or controlling law.
IV. The Intersystem Abstraction Ranking Theorem given by the Attributive Functor/ Function, F.
F2 admits the world constants, c > 0, to materialize the grammar generator, G(X), to an homologous concrete Euler combinatorial physical wave generator, namely, the superstring equation of quantum theory, E(NI) = A(σ,τ), where E is the permutational function, NI, is the set of nonintegers and the solution is the dual amplitude, σ,τ. Expanding generates the elementary particles of nonadaptive physics and, by inference, the substantive content of Universal Physics consisting of three additional primary systems comprising the world, where a primary system is defined as one having a distinct but derivative extremal controlling law:
I. Nonadaptive physics and chemistry (harmonic hamiltonian wave systems) : Minimize Action, subject to conservation constraints.
II. Adaptive physics or biology (membrane bound duplicating polymer‐copolymer hamiltonian systems) : Maximize Survival, subject to energy constraints.
III. Sentient physics or sociopsychology (neuromatrix hamiltonian systems) : Maximize subjective Happiness, subject to survival constraints and
IV. Representational physics or language (a symbolic combinatorial routine): Maximizes the Information Gain, subject to happiness constraints.
The world can then be viewed as a perpetual superfluid computer implicitly using the epistemology of Axiom I as a world program to process the physical data base, c > 0, of Axiom II into world evolution. After evolving through Systems I and II, mankind, i.e., System III, evolves as an internal metacomputer which makes the combinatorial program explicit and uses it to put all four primary systems in standard hamiltonian theory (pseudo‐category) format and terminology. This can be viewed as a generalization of the Darwinian variation‐and‐selection theme in which combinatorial‐variation is recursively hamiltonian‐selected thereby incrementing world logic and logic constraints on successive primary systems. Because Universal Physics and Universal Grammar are functor‐related homologous concrete and abstract combinatorial pseudocategories, related by a pseudo‐functor, thus, differing only in the presence and absence, respectively, of the World Constants, c ≥ 0, they constitute, ipso facto, Universal Science (Formal Philosophy, World Evolution, World Unification, Explicit Theory of Everything, ETOE, or Axiomatic World Theory). QED: Because intricate verified predictions, ranging from particles to personality types, mental disorders, political parties and the abstract sciences, result from a system which is merely expanding to fill its possibility set, it is concluded that the world is lawful and that this means it is an object deterministic but not fully analytically determinable combinatorial system. In the object domain, the world is system‐number complete at four. Dually, in the analytical codomain, understanding of it is approximately complete, as measured by a world information gain function. Hence, the dualistic, analysand‐analyzer world program is finite and has dualistic completion criteria, as required of an involuted program. 相似文献