What is learned from experience in a probabilistic environment?

Three experiments explored what is learned from experience in a probabilistic environment. The task was a simulated medical decision‐making task with each patient having one of two test results and one of two diseases. The test result was highly predictive of the disease for all participants. The base rate of the test result was varied between participants to produce different inverse conditional probabilities of the test result given the disease across conditions. Participants trained using feedback to predict a patient's disease from a test result showed the classic confusion of the inverse error, substituting the forward conditional probability for the inverse conditional probability when tested on it. Additional training on the base rate of the test result did little to improve performance. Training on the joint probabilities, however, produced good performance on either conditional probability. The pattern of results demonstrated that experience with the environment is not always sufficient for good performance. That natural sampling leads to good performance was not supported. Further, because participants not trained on joint probabilities did, however, know them but still committed the confusion of the inverse error, the hypothesis that having joint probabilities would facilitate performance was not supported. The pattern of results supported the conclusion that people learn all the necessary information from experience in a probabilistic environment, but depending upon what the experience was, it may interfere with their ability to recall to memory the appropriate sample set necessary for estimating or using the inverse conditional probability. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rationality and bounded information in repeated games, with application to the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Actions in a repeated game can in principle depend on all previous outcomes. Given this vast policy space, human players may often be forced to use heuristics that base actions on incomplete information, such as the outcomes of only the most recent trials. Here it is proven that such bounded rationality is often fully rational, in that the optimal policy based on some limited information about the game's history will be universally optimal (i.e., within the full policy space), provided that one's opponents are restricted to using this same information. It is then shown how this result allows explicit calculation of subgame-perfect equilibria (SPEs) for any repeated or stochastic game. The technique is applied to the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma for the case of 1-back memory. Two classes of SPEs are derived, which exhibit varying degrees of (individually rational) cooperation as a result of repeated interaction.     

The Pursuit of Epistemic Good

Pace Zagzebski, there is no route from the value of knowledge to a non–reliabilist virtue–theoretic epistemology. Her discussion of the value problem is marred by an uncritical and confused employment of the notion of a "state" of knowledge, an uncritical acceptance of a "knowledge–belief" identity thesis, and an incoherent presumption that the widely held thought that knowledge is more valuable than true belief amounts to the view that knowledge is a state of true belief having an intrinsic property which a state of 'mere" true belief lacks. Her arguments against a "machine–product" conception of knowledge are undermined by these flaws, while the alternative "agent–act" model she recommends is unattractive, at odds with the knowledge–belief identity thesis she favours, and no solution to the problem of the value of knowledge she poses. I end with the observation that her version of virtue–theoretic epistemology points in the direction of cognitive decision–theoretic norms, and I briefly discuss the bearing of this fact upon her viewpoint.     

The role of affect in the WTA/WTP disparity

Four studies demonstrated robust within‐ and between‐subject differences in willingness‐to‐pay (WTP) and willingness‐to‐accept (WTA) measures of the value of lottery tickets. Buyers and sellers attended to different numerical cues and interpreted the same numbers differently when setting these two kinds of monetary values. Affective influences appeared to guide the valuation process. Buyers with stronger positive feelings about owning a ticket were willing to pay more for a ticket; sellers with stronger negative feelings about no longer having a ticket required a greater minimum payment in exchange for their ticket. In addition, the WTA/WTP disparity tended to be greater for more affectively‐laden lottery tickets. The results suggest that WTA and WTP prices are constructed using salient numerical cues and affective feelings. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of valence and framing in decision making II: Estimating subjective weighting1

Abstract: In comparison between choice options, judgments of “How much better is a preferred option?” and “How much worse is a less preferred option?” may differ in their magnitudes. Such discrepancies are called “valence effects.” Previously, Yamagishi and Miyamoto (1996) observed systematic positive valence effects (“Better” exceeding “Worse”) in the domain of gains and systematic negative valence effects (“Worse” exceeding “Better”) in the domain of losses. The current experiment used the directions of valence effects as a tool to assess the decision maker's interpretation of choice tasks under the “framing effect” ( Tversky & Kahneman, 1986 ). Preferences under the framing effect switch from certain options in the domain of gains to uncertain options in the domain of losses. This study examined whether preferences for certain options were associated with positive valence effects, whereas preferences for uncertain options were associated with negative valence effects. Moreover, conditions under which preference reversals under the framing manipulations ceased to occur were examined. The effects of valence showed that framing effects ceased to occur when decision makers maintained consistent task interpretations as pertaining to gains or to losses. Most importantly, the pattern of subjective weighting under the valence effects was consistent with previous explanation of valence effects ( Yamagishi & Miyamoto, 1996 ). Possibilities for extending the current findings to understanding related psychological phenomena are discussed.     

Expatriate career intentions: Links to career adaptability and cultural intelligence

Given the increasing rate of global mobility, it is important to have a greater understanding of the factors that influence intentions for expatriate careers. Guided by the Career Construction Theory and Intelligence Theory, this study takes the view that self-initiated expatriation as a form of global mobility is an adaptive vocational behavior driven by an individual's self-regulatory capacity to thrive in another country and work to build one's career. This study posits that individuals who want to work overseas rely mainly on their adaptive resources to develop their careers. Additionally, career adaptability, as a self-regulatory competency, is posited to be reinforced by an individual's intercultural capability (i.e., cultural intelligence). To test these assertions, data were collected in a sample of university students (n = 514) in the Philippines, a country reported to have high rates of overseas migration for economic and career-related reasons. Career adaptability was found to be positively and significantly related to overseas career intentions. In addition, cultural intelligence was found to moderate the said relationship. These results offer the groundwork for understanding the earlier stages of expatriate careers and, in particular, how the intention to have a career in another country is developed and influenced by the interaction between the self-regulatory characteristics and intercultural capability of individuals.     

An application of the prototype willingness model to drivers' speeding behaviour

We tested the prototype willingness model (PWM). The participants (N = 198) completed online questionnaire measures of PWM constructs (Time 1) and subsequent speeding behaviour (Time 2). Path analyses showed that the PWM accounted for 89% of the variance in subsequent (self‐reported) speeding behaviour. This significantly exceeded the variance accounted for by the theory of planned behaviour. In line with the PWM, both behavioural intention and behavioural willingness had direct effects on behaviour. Behavioural willingness had a significantly larger effect. Attitude and subjective norm both had indirect effects on behaviour through both behavioural intention and behavioural willingness. Prototype (similarity) perceptions had indirect effects on behaviour through behavioural willingness only. The findings support the notion that driving is governed by reactive decision‐making (willingness), underpinned by prototype perceptions, attitudes and subjective norms, to a greater extent than it is deliberative decision‐making (intentions), underpinned by attitudes and subjective norms. The implications for safety interventions are discussed.     

愤怒和悲伤情绪对助人决策的影响:人际责任归因的作用

基于具体情绪理论——评价倾向框架理论(ATF),采用两项研究考察负性情绪愤怒和悲伤对助人决策的影响,并探究人际责任归因在这一关系中的作用。两项研究均采用自传体情绪记忆任务诱发情绪,研究一中自变量情绪为组间变量,包括愤怒、悲伤和中性三个水平,因变量助人决策操作为为他人花费时间;研究二中自变量1为组间变量情绪,包括愤怒和悲伤,自变量2为组内变量人际责任归因,操作为模糊归因、不可控的情景归因、可控的自我归因三种情境,因变量助人决策操作为为他人花费金钱。结果发现:(1)与愤怒情绪相比,悲伤情绪下个体为他人花费的时间和捐助的金钱更多;(2)在模糊的人际责任归因条件下,悲伤个体会比愤怒个体捐助更多的钱。研究表明:同为负性情绪的愤怒和悲伤在助人决策上的作用不同,悲伤个体比愤怒个体做出更多的助人决策;人际责任性归因会影响附带情绪和助人决策的关系。研究结论有助于理解附带情绪对助人决策的影响,进一步丰富并延伸ATF理论的证据和领域,对发挥情境中人际责任归因在助人决策中的作用具有一定的现实意义。