A Davidsonian Reconciliation of Internalism, Objectivity, and the Belief-desire Theory

This paper argues that Donald Davidson's account ofassertions of evaluative judgments contains ahere-to-fore unappreciated strategy forreconciling the meta-ethical ``inconsistenttriad.' The inconsistency is thought to resultbecause within the framework of thebelief-desire theory assertions of moraljudgments must have conceptual connections withboth desires and beliefs. The connection withdesires is necessary to account for theinternal connection between such judgments andmotivation to act, while the connection withbeliefs is necessary to account for theapparent objectivity of such judgments.Arguments abound that no class of utterancescan coherently be understood as having suchconceptual connections to attitudes of bothsorts, hence that an inconsistency results. Buton Davidson's account assertions of evaluativejudgments have just such connections to boththe relevant desire and a belief concerning anevaluative matter of fact. I argue that thisaccount has the resources to respond tostandard objections, and at least meritsconsideration as one among other plausiblealternatives.     

Questions of Athletic Excellence and Justice in Sport

This essay delineates and analyzes two kinds of questions that sport ethicists tend to ask: (1) questions about athletic excellence and (2) questions about justice. To pass ethical judgements when delving into questions concerning athletic excellence, sportspeople rely largely on a sport’s internal values, primary skills, or sport-specific athletic excellences. In contrast, questions about justice do not and should not include the reference or application of principles derived from the nature of a sport. Instead, sportspeople must refer to general theories, most often based on the rights and obligations of fellow citizens. There are multiple benefits to pointing out this distinction. First, it can help sportspeople and sport philosophers recognize the normative standards most appropriate within specific debates. Second, the distinction may explain why some disputes in sport philosophy remained unresolved. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, an awareness of the differences between these types of questions enables us to pose a further query. To which of the two discourses about sport ethics should sport philosophers lend the majority of their efforts? By adopting Susan Okin’s analysis of the role of morality in families, this paper suggests that questions about justice in sport carry greater moral import and should be resolved prior to questions of athletic excellence.     

Primeness, Internalism and Explanatory Generality

Williamson (2000) [Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press] argues that attempts to substitute narrow mental states or narrow/environmental composites for broad and factive mental states will result in poorer explanations of behavior. I resist Williamson’s arguments and use Twin-Earth style cases to argue for the causal inertness of broad mental states.     

Rethinking Neuroethics in the Light of the Extended Mind Thesis

The extended mind thesis is the claim that mental states extend beyond the skulls of the agents whose states they are. This seemingly obscure and bizarre claim has far-reaching implications for neuroethics, I argue. In the first half of this article, I sketch the extended mind thesis and defend it against criticisms. In the second half, I turn to its neuroethical implications. I argue that the extended mind thesis entails the falsity of the claim that interventions into the brain are especially problematic just because they are internal interventions, but that many objections to such interventions rely, at least in part, on this claim. Further, I argue that the thesis alters the focus of neuroethics, away from the question of whether we ought to allow interventions into the mind, and toward the question of which interventions we ought to allow and under what conditions. The extended mind thesis dramatically expands the scope of neuroethics: because interventions into the environment of agents can count as interventions into their minds, decisions concerning such interventions become questions for neuroethics.     

“Sport,Habermas, and the Moral Sphere: A Response to Lopez Frias”

I argue that several recent criticisms Lopez Frias has made against my conventionalist version of broad internalism fail to hit their mark. I further argue that the author's use of Habermas's account of discourse ethics to make his criticisms also misfires because Habermas expressly warned against using his account to resolve normative conflicts that arise from the often conflicting ways different communities order their ethical lives, to include their athletic lives. My main aim in responding to Lopez Frias was to bring critical attention to the normative difficulties that result when we cannot agree on how sport should be done because we cannot agree on what is/are the purpose(s) of sport.     

Discrimination of sea-bird sounds vs. garden-bird songs: Do Scottish and German-Saxon infants show the same preferential looking behaviour as adults?

Birdsong and human speech share some genetic origins (Haesler, Rochefort, Georgi, Licznerski, Osten, & Scharff, 2007 Haesler, S., Rochefort, C., Georgi, B., Licznerski, P., Osten, P. and Scharff, C. 2007. Incomplete and inaccurate vocal imitation after knockdown of FoxP2 in songbird basal ganglia nucleus area X. PLOS Biology, 5: e312–e321.  [Google Scholar]; Vargha-Khadem, Gadian, Copp, & Mishkin, 2005 Vargha-Khadem, F., Gadian, D. G., Copp, A. and Mishkin, M. 2005. FoxP2 and the neuroanatomy of speech and language. Nature Review of Neuroscience, 6: 131–138. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). In two studies (N = 67 infants and N = 28 adults) in Scotland (UK) and Saxony (Germany), perceptual discrimination of innate, repetitive, lower frequency sea-bird sounds vs. learned, melodic, higher frequency garden-bird songs was tested in infants in their first year as well as in adults, using the conditioned head-turn procedure (CHTP; e.g., Jusczyk, Friederici, Wessels, Svernkerud, & Jusczyk, 1993 Jusczyk, P. W. and Krumhansl, C. L. 1993. Pitch and rhythmic patterns affecting infants' sensitivity to musical phrase structure. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 19: 627–640.  [Google Scholar]). Infants and adults reliably distinguished between the two types of sounds. Independently of environment, infants paid more attention to sea-bird sounds than to garden-bird songs, while adults showed the reverse preference. Further analysis revealed additional insights into the underlying processes.     

Barry Taylor

I respond to an argument made by Gunnar Björnsson and Ragnar Francén Olinder against motivational internalism. Björnsson and Olinder present a hypothesis in which all of us are selfishly motivated to act in accordance with our moral judgments. The conceivability of such a possibility, they argue, rules out motivational internalism. I argue that this is not the case, and that, according to one dominant view about moral judgments, the agents in the hypothesis do not make genuine moral judgments. One therefore cannot argue decisively against motivational internalism without arguing against this view about moral judgments.     

How is Recalcitrant Emotion Possible?

A recalcitrant emotion is an emotion that we experience despite a judgment that seems to conflict with it. Having been bitten by a dog in her childhood, Jane cannot shake her fear of dogs, including Fido, the cute little puppy that she knows to be in no way dangerous. There is something puzzling about recalcitrant emotions, which appear to defy the putatively robust connection between emotions and judgments. If Jane really believes that Fido cannot harm her, what is she afraid of? This article seeks to show how recalcitrant emotion is possible. I argue that reductive theories that identify emotions with judgments, desires, or some combination thereof, cannot explain the possibility of emotional irrationality without contradiction. I then show that the appeal to sui generis attitudes also fails to solve the puzzle of recalcitrant emotions, and diagnose this failure as stemming from a misleading analogy between emotions and perceptions, and in particular, between recalcitrant emotions and perceptual illusions. The solution can be found in a different analogy: between emotions and actions; more specifically, between recalcitrant emotions and weakness of the will, akrasia. Like akratic actions, recalcitrant emotions entail responding to reasons, but to inferior reasons. Irrational but non-contradictory emotions are possible just as weakness of will is possible.     

Observed Personality in Childhood: Psychometric and Behavioural Genetic Evidence of Two Broad Personality Factors

We examined broad dimensions of children's personalities (total n = 1056; age = 3.5 to 12 years) based on observers' perceptions following a few hours of structured interaction. Siblings' behaviours during a 2‐hour cognitive assessment in the home were rated separately by two different observers. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses clearly revealed a two‐factor solution in three different samples. There was correspondence between parent‐rated temperament and observer‐rated factors. Cross‐sectional analyses indicated lower Plasticity among older children and higher Stability among older children. Sex differences were negligible. Plasticity and Stability were correlated in the .2 to .3 range. Most of the sibling similarity in the Plasticity was due to additive genetic influences, whereas most sibling similarity in Stability was attributable to shared environmental influences. The findings implicate a biometric factor structure to childhood personality that fits well with emerging biosocial theories of personality development. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.