额叶与非额叶脑肿瘤患者分心记忆和符号数字作业的比较研究

本文以95例额叶、颞叶和顶枕叶脑肿瘤患者为被试,探讨了脑肿瘤部位同分心记忆和符号数字的关系。结果表明,额叶患者的故事意义分的分心消耗值显著高于正常人,其词的分心回忆和分心消耗值显著差于颞叶组,表明额叶在分心作业中较颞叶参与较多。右顶叶也有涉及分心注意较多的趋势,提示大脑前部可能与分心注意关系较密切。“符号数字”作业中,则“写”的作业有颞叶组好于额叶组,“说”的作业颞叶组好于顶枕组的趋势。     

Newborns discriminate utterance-level prosodic contours

Prosody is the fundamental organizing principle of spoken language, carrying lexical, morphosyntactic, and pragmatic information. It, therefore, provides highly relevant input for language development. Are infants sensitive to this important aspect of spoken language early on? In this study, we asked whether infants are able to discriminate well-formed utterance-level prosodic contours from ill-formed, backward prosodic contours at birth. This deviant prosodic contour was obtained by time-reversing the original one, and super-imposing it on the otherwise intact segmental information. The resulting backward prosodic contour was thus unfamiliar to the infants and ill-formed in French. We used near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS) in 1-3-day-old French newborns (n = 25) to measure their brain responses to well-formed contours as standards and their backward prosody counterparts as deviants in the frontal, temporal, and parietal areas bilaterally. A cluster-based permutation test revealed greater responses to the Deviant than to the Standard condition in right temporal areas. These results suggest that newborns are already capable of detecting utterance-level prosodic violations at birth, a key ability for breaking into the native language, and that this ability is supported by brain areas similar to those in adults.

Research Highlights

• At birth, infants have sophisticated speech perception abilities.
• Prosody may be particularly important for early language development.
• We show that newborns are already capable of discriminating utterance-level prosodic contours.
• This discrimination can be localized to the right hemisphere of the neonate brain.

     

Legal and Ethical Considerations for Requiring Consent for Apnea Testing in Brain Death Determination

Abstract

The past decade has witnessed escalating legal and ethical challenges to the diagnosis of death by neurologic criteria (DNC). The legal tactic of demanding consent for the apnea test, if successful, can halt the DNC. However, US law is currently unsettled and inconsistent in this matter. Consent has been required in several trial cases in Montana and Kansas but not in Virginia and Nevada. In this paper, we analyze and evaluate the legal and ethical bases for requiring consent before apnea testing and defend such a requirement by appealing to ethical and legal principles of informed consent and battery and the right to refuse medical treatment. We conclude by considering and rebutting two major objections to a consent requirement for apnea testing: (1) a justice-based objection to allocate scarce resources fairly and (2) a social utility objection that halting the diagnosis of brain death will reduce the number of organ donors.     

The End: Thoughts on Humanism and Death

Extending earlier work on a nontheistic theology, in this article I explore a humanist framing of death. I begin with a critique of theistic framings of death as a matter of isolation and transition to a greater situation. In place of theistic understandings of death, here I argue that humanist theology, drawing insights from literature and Albert Camus' moralism, provides a way to “naturalize” death, to understand death as already and always a dimension of life.     

Embracing integration and complexity: placing emotion within a science of brain and behaviour

ABSTRACT

The present paper addresses conceptual issues that are central to emotion research. What is emotion? What are its defining characteristics? The field struggles with questions like these almost constantly. I argue that definitions, and deciding what is the proper status of emotion, are not a requirement for scientific progress – in fact, they can hinder it. Therefore, “emotion” researchers should strive to develop a science of complex behaviours, and worry less about their exact nature. But for interesting behaviours, is most of the explaining that is needed present at the level of isolated systems (perception, cognition, etc.) or at the level of interactions between them? I suggest that the level of interactions is where most of the work is needed. Accordingly, I advocate that it is important to embrace integration, and not to strive to necessarily disentangle the multiple contributions underlying behaviours. More generally, it is argued that we need to revise models of causation adopted when reasoning about the mind and brain. Instead, a “complex systems” approach is required where the interactions between multiple components lead to system-level – emergent – properties that cannot be isolated or attributed to more elementary parts.