Weak coherence,no theory of mind,or executive dysfunction? Solving the puzzle of pragmatic language disorders

Deficits in pragmatic language ability are common to a number of clinical populations, for example, right-hemisphere damage (RHD), Autism and traumatic brain injury (TBI). In these individuals the basic structural components of language may be intact, but the ability to use language to engage socially is impaired. Despite the nature of these difficulties being well documented, exactly what causes these difficulties is less clear. Furthermore, the current status of causal explanations for pragmatic difficulties across these populations is divergent and sometimes contradictory. This paper explores the empirical validity of three theories that attempt to explain pragmatic language impairment. It is recommended that a new, more convergent approach to investigating the causes of pragmatic language disability be adopted.     

The Metaethical Paradox of Just War Theory

The traditional requirements upon the waging of a just war are ostensibly independent, but in actual practice each tenet is subject ultimately to the interpretation of a legitimate authority, whose declaration becomes the necessary and sufficient condition. While just war theory presupposes that some acts are absolutely wrong, it also implies that the killing of innocents can be rendered permissible through human decree. Nations are conventionally delimited, and leaders are conventionally appointed. Any group of people could band together to form a nation, and any person could, in principle, be appointed the leader of any nation. Because the just war approach assumes absolutism while implying relativism, the stance is paradoxical and hence rationally untenable.     

On matters of mind and body: regarding Descartes

In this paper the author considers Descartes’ place in current thinking about the mind‐body dilemma. The premise here is that in the history of ideas, the questions posed can be as significant as the answers acquired. Descartes’ paramount question was ‘How do we determine certainty?’ and his pursuit of an answer led to cogito ergo sum. His discovery simultaneously raised the question whether mind is separate from or unified with the body. Some who currently hold that brain and subjectivity are unified contend that the philosopher ‘split’ mind from body and refer to ‘Descartes’ error’. This paper puts forward that Descartes’ detractors fail to recognise Descartes’ contribution to Western thought, which was to introduce the Enlightenment and to give a place to human subjectivity. Added to this, evidence from Descartes’ correspondence with Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia supports the conclusion that Descartes did in fact believe in the unity of mind and body although he could not reconcile this rationally with the certainty from personal experience that they were separate substances. In this Descartes was engaged in just the same dilemma as that of current thinkers and researchers, a conflict which still is yet to be resolved.     

The psychological neuroscience of depression: implications for understanding effects of deep brain stimulation

In this article it is suggested that current psychological theories of depression presuppose that this condition will develop as a result of a vicious circle involving negatively biased communication between systems of emotional stress-/alarm-signaling, executive functions and mood regulation. These systems may from a neuroanatomical point of view be located in the limbic system, the orbitofrontal and lateral prefrontal cortex and the hypothalamus-pituitary-adrenal (HPA-) axis respectively. The theoretical and practical implications of this model for the understanding of pharmacological treatments of depression are briefly discussed and this theory is related to the catecholamine hypothesis of depression. The model is furthermore discussed in relation to deep brain stimulation (DBS) of treatment resistant major depression. Similarities and differences between this perspective and the one advocated by the "homeostatic theory" of depression are discussed. It is concluded that a topographical psychological theory may offer a useful heuristic in thinking about depression and that it offers several testable predictions about treatments of the disorder.     

Modulation of N400 in chronic non-fluent aphasia using low frequency Repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (rTMS)

Low frequency Repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (rTMS) has previously been applied to language homologues in non-fluent populations of persons with aphasia yielding significant improvements in behavioral language function up to 43 months post stimulation. The present study aimed to investigate the electrophysiological correlates associated with the application of rTMS through measurement of the semantic based N400 Event-related brain potentials (ERP) component. Low frequency (1 Hz) rTMS was applied to the anterior portion of the homologue to Broca’s area (pars triangularis), for 20 min per day for 10 days, using a stereotactic neuronavigational system. Twelve non-fluent persons with aphasia, 2-6 years post stroke were stimulated. Six participants were randomly assigned to receive real stimulation and six participants were randomly assigned to receive a blind sham control condition. ERP measures were recorded at baseline, 1 week and 2 months subsequent to stimulation. The findings demonstrate treatment related changes observed in the stimulation group when compared to the placebo control group at 2 months post stimulation indicating neuromodulation of N400 as a result of rTMS. No treatment related changes were identified in the stimulation group, when compared to the sham group from baseline to 1 week post stimulation. The electrophysiological results represent the capacity of rTMS to modulate neural language networks and measures of lexical-semantic function in participants with non-fluent aphasia and suggest that time may be an important factor in brain reorganization subsequent to rTMS.     

Liberal bias mediates emotion recognition deficits in frontal traumatic brain injury

It is well-known that patients having sustained frontal-lobe traumatic brain injury (TBI) are severely impaired on tests of emotion recognition. Indeed, these patients have significant difficulty recognizing facial expressions of emotion, and such deficits are often associated with decreased social functioning and poor quality of life. As of yet, no studies have examined the response patterns which underlie facial emotion recognition impairment in TBI and which may lend clarity to the interpretation of deficits. Therefore, the present study aimed to characterize response patterns in facial emotion recognition in 14 patients with frontal TBI compared to 22 matched control subjects, using a task which required participants to rate the intensity of each emotion (happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, surprise and fear) of a series of photographs of emotional and neutral faces. Results first confirmed the presence of facial emotion recognition impairment in TBI, and further revealed that patients displayed a liberal bias when rating facial expressions, leading them to associate intense ratings of incorrect emotional labels to sad, disgusted, surprised and fearful facial expressions. These findings are generally in line with prior studies which also report important facial affect recognition deficits in TBI patients, particularly for negative emotions.     

For the greater goods? Ownership rights and utilitarian moral judgment

People often judge it unacceptable to directly harm a person, even when this is necessary to produce an overall positive outcome, such as saving five other lives. We demonstrate that similar judgments arise when people consider damage to owned objects. In two experiments, participants considered dilemmas where saving five inanimate objects required destroying one. Participants judged this unacceptable when it required violating another’s ownership rights, but not otherwise. They also judged that sacrificing another’s object was less acceptable as a means than as a side-effect; judgments did not depend on whether property damage involved personal force. These findings inform theories of moral decision-making. They show that utilitarian judgment can be decreased without physical harm to persons, and without personal force. The findings also show that the distinction between means and side-effects influences the acceptability of damaging objects, and that ownership impacts utilitarian moral judgment.