Fetuses,corpses and the psychological approach to personal identity

Olson (1997a) tries to refute the Psychological Approach to personal identity with his Fetus Argument, and Mackie (1999) aims to do the same with the Death Argument. With the help of a suggestion made by Baker (1999), the following discussion shows that these arguments fail. In the process of defending the Psychological Approach, it is made clear exactly what one is and is not committed to as a proponent of the theory.     

Rationality and Synchronic Identity

Many requirements of rationality rely for their application on facts about identity at a time. Take the requirement not to have contradictory beliefs. It is irrational if a single agent believes P and believes ～P, but it is not irrational if one agent believes P and another believes ～P. There are puzzle cases, however, in which it is unclear whether we have a single agent, or instead two or more. I consider and reject possible criteria of identity at a time before proposing a pluralist alternative on which there are vastly more agents than we might have thought. This pluralist thesis is analogous to mereological universalism, on which there are all sorts of strange disconnected objects of which we don’t usually take note. I conclude by giving a pragmatic account of which of these rational agents it makes sense to attend to, by appealing the purposes that we have in employing rationally evaluative language.     

New Voices for Expressive Pragmatism: Bridging the Divide between Pragmatism and Perfectionism

This article explores the theme of moral rationality by examining two distinct philosophical approaches, those of perfectionism and pragmatism broadly construed. It does this by comparing Cora Diamond's reading of J. M. Coetzee's novel The Lives of Animals with an imaginary reading of the same novel tuned to a moral sensibility closer to Deweyan pragmatism. By comparing a real account with an imaginary one, the article intends to press Diamond's perfectionist understanding of problematic moral experience into confrontation with a pragmatist account of the same phenomenon. This reading becomes the starting point for a broader confrontation between two larger philosophical conceptions: perfectionism and pragmatism. By this comparison, the article means to extend a dialogue begun more than a century ago, showing in particular that integrating both perspectives within a common moral epistemology provides new insights into our understanding of moral experience. The general claim is that their differences notwithstanding, perfectionism and pragmatism share a common moral sensibility, although they part ways on some decisive issues that the article makes explicit.     

IMAGO DEI AND HUMAN RATIONALITY

There is a pervasive trend in Western theology to identify imago Dei with human intellectual and cognitive capacities. However, several contemporary theologians have criticized this view because, according to the critics, it leads to a truncated view of humanity. In this article, I shall concentrate on the question of rationality, first, through theologies of Thomas Aquinas and contemporary Lutheran Robert Jenson, and second, in some branches of recent cognitive psychology. I will argue that there is a significant overlap between contemporary scientific interpretations of rationality and both a traditional Thomistic view and a contemporary ecumenical interpretation of imago Dei. Consequently, it is possible to give an account of imago Dei which takes structural features as central and which is in accord with contemporary science, without falling prey to the dangers that the critics of structuralism point out.     

Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?

A number of philosophers have claimed that non-evidential considerations cannot play a role in doxastic deliberation as motivating reasons to believe a proposition. This claim, interesting in its own right, naturally lends itself to use in a range of arguments for a wide array of substantive philosophical theses. I argue, by way of a counterexample, that the claim to which all these arguments appeal is false. I then consider, and reply to, seven objections to my counterexample. Finally, as a way of softening the blow, I show how the counterexample itself suggests a plausible diagnosis of why this claim has seemed so plausible to so many.     

有限理性的本质辨析与价值之争

有限理性不是受约束条件下的最优化, 更不能等同于非理性。从本质上说, 它是对迄今为止人类理性进化和发展水平的客观描述, 意味着无论在对待现实的态度上, 还是在认识和改造现实的能力上, 人都是理性的, 但人的理性是有限度的。有限理性观质疑当代社会科学中流行的强势理性观及其推演出来的方法论和知识体系的可靠性, 但并不质疑人的理性本身, 摆脱了历史上形形色色的理性论或非理性论非此即彼的二元论思维模式, 为我们提供了从资源观、量化观及动态发展观角度理解和把握人类理性本质的新视角。在价值理性意义上, 有限理性是有缺陷的, 但在工具理性意义上, 有限理性具有合理性, 需要在二者之间寻找适当的均衡点。心理学的有限理性研究及其产生的广泛影响酿成了继文艺复兴的概率革命之后又一次人类理性观的革命, 是这门学科为人类知识和思想宝库做出的最重要的贡献之一, 不仅具有深远的历史意义, 而且具有跨学科的方法论意义。     

Science and Technology in Non-Western Cultures

Seline's edited volume relevates non-Western interaction between religious and scientific domains of human intellectual history. Middle Eastern, South Asian, and Chinese thinkers have played central roles in pursuing intellectual inquiry into topics of broad human concern. Although copious and nuanced literary collections in Arabic, Sanskrit, Chinese, and Tibetan languages document non-Western contributions, these primary sources often are inaccessible to Western scholars, creating the false illusion that members of non-Western cultures have offered only marginal contributions to the rigorous investigation of the natural world. This illusion is dispelled thoroughly by a number of excellent articles contained in Seline's volume.     

Modernist Creativity and the Construction of Reality in Einstein and Kandinsky

In this article, I limn the remarkable ascent of Albert Einstein and Wassily Kandinsky into our cultural pantheon. I depict how both figures mastered and transcended their respective fields, and how they called into question long-established disciplinary assumptions and practices. I also demonstrate how the creative works of Einstein and Kandinsky constructed, and were constructed by, the reality we now call “modern.”     

Global–Local Incompatibility: The Misperception of Reliability in Judgment Regarding Global Variables

A number of important decision domains, including decisions about hiring, global warming, and weather hazards, are characterized by a global–local incompatibility. These domains involve variables that cannot be observed by a single decision maker (DM) and require the integration of observations from locally available information cues. This paper presents a new bifocal lens model that describes how the structure of the environment can lead to a unique form of overconfidence when generalizing the reliability of the local environment to a global scale. When the local environment does not reliably reflect the global environment, they are incompatible. While local perspectives vary across DMs, global–local incompatibility can be understood using the structure of classical test theory as the difference between (a) perceived estimates of the reliability derived from the local environment and (b) the true reliability of the local environment. I model global–local incompatibility as the difference between the true and estimated reliability when the assumptions of classical test theory are violated. Using a series of case studies and an empirical study, I demonstrate the widespread utility of this framework, and I conclude by discussing implications for cognitive–ecological theory, risk communication, and overconfidence.