I know the rule,but I'll just go with my gut: is there a rational use of intuition?

ABSTRACT

Research has established that human thinking is often biased by intuitive judgement. The base-rate neglect effect provides such an example, so named because people often support their decisions in stereotypical individuating information, neglecting base-rates. Here, we test the hypothesis that reasoners acknowledge information provided by base-rates and may use individuating information in support of a “rational” decision process. Results from four experiments show that “base-rate neglecting” occurs when participants acknowledge sample distributions; participants who prefer individuating over base-rate information perceive base-rates as less diagnostic and are more confident in their individuating-based responses; and that posterior probabilities (assigned after all relevant information is considered) predict more individuating-based responses for individuating-preference participants (suggesting a rational process). However, data also show a deeper form of base-rate neglect: even when some participants report to prefer base-rate information, define individuating information as non-diagnostic, and their posterior probabilities suggest otherwise, they still provide individuating-based responses.     

韦伯命题的合理性与中国企业伦理的建构

回答新教伦理与资本主义精神的内在生成关系的韦伯命题一直是人们讨论的热点,本文考量了韦伯命题关于伦理与现代化的关系和"精神转型"的合理性,寻求其在改变人们心智模式、重估企业伦理的作用力以及运用"精神转型"建构中国企业伦理的方法论启示。     

Rationality and autonomy from the Enlightenment and Islamic perspectives

Rationality and autonomy are foundational concepts in anglophone or ‘Western’ countries that originated primarily from the Enlightenment period. When compared with ‘Western’ ideologies, non-Western belief systems such as Islam may not appear, at first glance, to place as much emphasis on the value and attainment of rationality and autonomy. This may lead some people to conclude that Islam necessarily marginalises or even suppresses its believers’ development of rationality and autonomy. This article compares the concepts of rationality and autonomy from the Enlightenment and Islamic perspectives. It is argued that there exist Islamic traditions that promote the inculcation of ‘normal rationality’ and ‘normal autonomy’ within a convictional community from which beliefs develop. However, the extent to which Muslims are encouraged to cultivate and exercise their rationality and autonomy would depend, among other factors, on the specific interpretations of rationality and autonomy privileged by the Islamic tradition they belong to.     

The Potentiality of the Embryo and the Somatic Cell

Recent arguments on the ethics of stem cell research have taken a novel approach to the question of the moral status of the embryo. One influential argument focuses on a property that the embryo is said to possess—namely, the property of being an entity with a rational nature or, less controversially, an entity that has the potential to acquire a rational nature—and claims that this property is also possessed by a somatic cell. Since nobody seriously thinks that we have a duty to preserve the countless such cells we wash off our body every day in the shower, the argument is intended as a reductio ad absurdum of the claim that the embryo should be afforded the same moral status as a fully developed human being. This article argues that this argument is not successful and that it consequently plays into the hands of those who oppose embryonic stem cell research. It is therefore better to abandon this argument and focus instead on the different argument that potentiality, as such, is not a sufficient ground for the creation of moral obligations towards the embryo.     

One and Done? Optimal Decisions From Very Few Samples

In many learning or inference tasks human behavior approximates that of a Bayesian ideal observer, suggesting that, at some level, cognition can be described as Bayesian inference. However, a number of findings have highlighted an intriguing mismatch between human behavior and standard assumptions about optimality: People often appear to make decisions based on just one or a few samples from the appropriate posterior probability distribution, rather than using the full distribution. Although sampling‐based approximations are a common way to implement Bayesian inference, the very limited numbers of samples often used by humans seem insufficient to approximate the required probability distributions very accurately. Here, we consider this discrepancy in the broader framework of statistical decision theory, and ask: If people are making decisions based on samples—but as samples are costly—how many samples should people use to optimize their total expected or worst‐case reward over a large number of decisions? We find that under reasonable assumptions about the time costs of sampling, making many quick but locally suboptimal decisions based on very few samples may be the globally optimal strategy over long periods. These results help to reconcile a large body of work showing sampling‐based or probability matching behavior with the hypothesis that human cognition can be understood in Bayesian terms, and they suggest promising future directions for studies of resource‐constrained cognition.     

决策与决策执行的关系——一种行动理性的观点

本文以分析决策与执行的关系为出发点,对人类理性的本质进行了讨论。指出决策研究中存在的“理性分析范式”偏面地把认知分析当作人类理性的本质,忽视了行动的作用,提出了人类理性是“行动理性”的思想。行动既是一种分析方法,是人们深化对客观世界的认识,理解决策问题的独特手段,也是人们创造外界环境、实现决策目标的有效途径。由此提出,决策研究,尤其是组织决策研究,应该重视“行动分析范式”。     

“基因编辑婴儿”事件的工具理性批判

工具理性在利用技术手段达到技术目的的过程中创造了支撑现代社会的技术和物质。但工具理性也因过度重视技术和“去情感化”、“对象化”等特征忽视人的价值意义。在众多被工具理性主义渗透、强力冲击的领域中,使用基因编辑技术对人类胚胎细胞按照既定目标进行编辑就是被工具理性控制的例子。将人类胚胎视为研究对象,崇拜唯技术论、机械思维主导、道德情感缺场,展现社会责任虚化,导致社会信任危机。把作为主体的人客体化为试验对象进行基因人为修改试验,违背法律规定,挑战伦理界限,是未能有效引导工具理性导致的技术事故。     

KNOWLEDGE,VALUES, AND BELIEFS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT SINCE 1948: AN OVERVIEW

In this contribution, an overview of the distinct ways in which the interplay between knowledge, values, and beliefs took shape in the South African context since 1948 is offered. This is framed against the background of the paleontological significance of South Africa and an appreciation of indigenous knowledge systems, but also of the ideological distortion of knowledge and education during the apartheid era through the legacy of neo‐Calvinism. The overview includes references to discourse on human rationality (as an implicit critique against ideology), on the use of social sciences in theological reflection, on the teaching of evolution in public schools, on science and religion, and on religion and ecology. The essay concludes with a survey of some of the major voices regarding the interface between religion and science in South Africa.     

Representation and rationality

David Lewis (1974, 1994/1999) proposed to reduce the facts about mental representation to facts about sensory evidence, dispositions to act, and rationality. Recently, Robert Williams (2020) and Adam Pautz (2021) have taken up and developed Lewis's project in sophisticated and novel ways. In this paper, we aim to present, clarify, and ultimately object to the core thesis that they all build their own views around. The different sophisticated developments and defenses notwithstanding, we think the core thesis is vulnerable. We pose a dilemma by considering the two sides of a current epistemological controversy over the relation between evidence and rational belief: permissivism vs. uniqueness. As we argue, the prospects for the Lewisian project look dim when either supposition is clearly made.