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161.
A Concept Divided: Ralph Johnson's Definition of Argument 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Christopher W. Tindale 《Argumentation》2002,16(3):299-309
Ralph Johnson's Manifest Rationality (2000) is a major contribution to the field of informal logic, but the concept of argument that is central to its project suffers from a tension between the components that comprise it. This paper explores and addresses that tension by examining the implications of each of five aspects of the definition of argument. 相似文献
162.
The Sunk Costs Fallacy or Argument from Waste 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Douglas Walton 《Argumentation》2002,16(4):473-503
This project tackles the problem of analyzing a specific form of reasoning called sunk costs in economics and argument from waste in argumentation theory. The project is to build a normative structure representing the form of the argument, and then to apply this normative structure to actual cases in which the sunk costs argument has been used. The method is partly structural and partly empirical. The empirical part is carried out through the analysis of case studies of the sunk costs argument found in business decision-making, as well as other areas like medical decision-making and everyday conversational argumentation. The structural part is carried out by using existing methods and techniques from argumentation theory, like argumentation schemes. The project has three especially significant findings. First, the sunk costs argument is not always fallacious, and in many cases it can be seen to be a rational precommitment strategy. Second, a formal model of argumentation, called practical reasoning, can be constructed that helps a rational critic to judge which sunk costs arguments are fallacious and which are not. Third, this formal model represents an alternative model of rationality to the cost-benefit model based on Bayesian calculation of probabilities. This alternative model is called the argumentation model, and it is based on interpersonal reasoning in dialogue as the model of rational thinking. This model in turn is based on the underlying notion of commitment in dialogue. 相似文献
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Trip Glazer 《Philosophical Psychology》2018,31(7):1114-1119
Eric Funkhouser argues that beliefs can function as social signals. I argue that Funkhouser’s argument for this conclusion rests on a problematic definition of “signal,” and that on standard definitions, the imperceptibility of beliefs disqualifies them from counting as signals. However, I also argue that Funkhouser’s insights about the social functions of beliefs can be true even if his claim that beliefs are signals is false. 相似文献
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Whether psychopathic offenders are practically rational has attracted philosophical attention. The problem is relevant in theoretical discussions in moral psychology and in discussions concerning the appropriate social response to the crimes of these individuals. We argue that classical and current experiments concerning the instrumental learning in psychopaths cannot directly support the conclusion that they have impaired instrumental rationality, construed as the ability to transfer motivation by means-ends reasoning. We claim that these experiments appear to show that psychopaths in certain circumstances are not aware of the relevant means for their ends. Moreover, we suggest how further empirical research could help to settle the issue. 相似文献
167.
Piotr Tomasz Makowski 《Philosophical Psychology》2016,29(7):1045-1056
In this article, I examine Michael Bratman’s account of stability in his planning theory of intention (PTI). Future-directed intentions should be stable, or appropriately resistant to change, over time. Bratman claims that the norm of stability governs both intentions and plans. The aim of this article is to critically enrich Bratman’s account of stability by introducing plasticity as an additional norm of planning. I construct plasticity as a kind of stability of intentions which supplements Bratman’s notion of “reasonable stability.” Unlike the latter, plasticity applies mainly to cases in which plan states are abandoned without reconsideration. I focus on the intra-theoretical problems of PTI and elucidate: (1) the distinction between future-directed intentions and plans, (2) the conceptual difference between stability and inertia, which is only implicit in PTI, and (3) the role of the environment of the planner, which has a vestigial role in Bratman’s work. I also defend my incorporation of plasticity against one possible objection and support it in the context of Bratman’s later works. Although critical, my proposal is in moderate harmony with PTI. 相似文献
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Michael J. Shaffer 《Metaphilosophy》2018,49(4):589-594
This paper introduces a new argument against Richard Foley's threshold view of belief. Foley's view is based on the Lockean Thesis (LT) and the Rational Threshold Thesis (RTT). The former thesis is the claim that it is epistemically rational to believe a proposition if and only if it is epistemically rational to have a degree of confidence in that proposition sufficient for belief. The latter thesis is the claim that it is epistemically rational to believe a proposition if and only if it is epistemically rational to have a degree of confidence in that proposition that meets or exceeds a specified threshold. The argument introduced here shows that the views derived from the joint endorsement of the LT and the RTT violate the safety condition on knowledge in way that threatens the LT and/or the RTT. 相似文献