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151.
    
MICHAEL FREUND 《Theoria》2001,67(3):189-213
Abstract: We show how to construct partial nontrivial base revision operators that satisfy the analogues of the AGM postulates and depends on no extra‐logical consideration. These operators, closely related to the full meet revision process, are defined on stratified bases, in which the information can be ranked in logical sequences. Stratified bases, which can be viewed as sets of graded sheaves, are exactly the knowledge bases for which the full meet revision operator satisfies the rationality postulate K*8. As the revision of a stratified base is again a stratified base, it is possible to perform iterated revisions, and the resulting output is particularly easy to determine.  相似文献   
152.
    
John Teehan 《Zygon》2003,38(1):49-60
In this article I reevaluate Immanuel Kant's moral philosophy from a post–Darwinian perspective. Taking an evolutionary approach to human reasoning and incorporating some recent work on the science of the emotions, I argue that the Kantian bifurcation of reason and emotion, which underlies his moral philosophy, is no longer tenable. Kant's practical defense of his ethics as being the only option that can save morality from the dangers posed by naturalism is also considered and rejected. Instead, I argue that an evolutionary view of reason and emotion can provide an adequate ground for morality and explore the possibility and advantages of such an ethics.  相似文献   
153.
Experimentally naive mice matched the proportions of their temporal investments (visit durations) in two feeding hoppers to the proportions of the food income (pellets per unit session time) derived from them in three experiments that varied the coupling between the behavioral investment and food income, from no coupling to strict coupling. Matching was observed from the outset; it did not improve with training. When the numbers of pellets received were proportional to time invested, investment was unstable, swinging abruptly from sustained, almost complete investment in one hopper, to sustained, almost complete investment in the other-in the absence of appropriate local fluctuations in returns (pellets obtained per time invested). The abruptness of the swings strongly constrains possible models. We suggest that matching reflects an innate (unconditioned) program that matches the ratio of expected visit durations to the ratio between the current estimates of expected incomes. A model that processes the income stream looking for changes in the income and generates discontinuous income estimates when a change is detected is shown to account for salient features of the data.  相似文献   
154.
Research suggesting both a superiority of frequencies over single‐event probabilities and of smaller reference classes over very large reference classes have utilized tasks that vary in computational complexity. The present research sought to simply and directly evaluate if—apart from simplifying statistical inference tasks—frequencies and small reference classes are clearer than other formats. After eliminating possible computational confounds, simple frequencies (based on small reference classes, e.g. 1/3) and to some extent relative frequencies (percentages, e.g. 33%) were perceived as clearer than absolute frequencies (based on very large reference classes, e.g. 90 million Americans) and single‐event probabilities (e.g. 0.33). Concurrently, these different formats were evaluated in terms of their relative influence. Absolute frequencies were relatively more persuasive for smaller magnitudes (e.g. 2.7 million) but less persuasive for larger magnitudes (e.g. 267 million), as compared to analogous presentations. Single‐event probabilities were judged to minimize the significance of information. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   
155.
    
Much research shows that when it comes to preferences over sequences of money, such as a monthly paycheck, people do not always maximize present value. Rather, they often choose the lower‐valued of a pair of sequences, especially when it has attractive properties such as an increasing trend. To unearth the reasons for sequence preferences we conducted a verbal‐protocol analysis of choices between money sequences, including lifetime and one‐year earnings and one‐year lottery winnings, as well as lifetime health sequences. Participants thought aloud while choosing between visual representations of sequences. Their verbalizations contained reference to a wide range of previously hypothesized, as well as new, reasons for choice. These reasons were also correlated in sensible ways with the choices made. There was some evidence of solid economic reasoning (which we called maximization), although this was largely restricted to choices for one‐year earnings. More commonly, respondents did not distinguish between earnings and consumption, and thought about money as if they would automatically spend it at the rate it was received. This meant the most frequently given reason was what we called appropriateness—how well the money received at a given point matched the desired consumption at that point. Other common explanations include the expectedness of a sequence (we argue this is mediated by appropriateness), the way that parts of the sequence constitute reference points for other parts, and the ease with which incoming money can be managed (convenience). Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   
156.
    
We examined how people allocate choices between two alternatives when the payoff from each alternative varied as a function of the allocation of recent choices. On any one trial alternative A had a higher immediate payoff than alternative B, but across all trials B had a higher overall payoff than A. Rational choice theory requires that participants allocate all their responses to the alternative with the greatest overall payoff irrespective of which has the higher immediate payoff. Melioration, in contrast, proposes that participants are motivated to choose the alternative with the higher immediate payoff, irrespective of the consequences for future returns. We report four experiments in which we varied the nature of the payoffs. Participants exhibited self‐control consistent with rational choice theory when payoffs varied in magnitude, but exhibited impulsiveness consistent with melioration when the payoffs varied in probability. Finally, we show that impulsivity when payoffs varied in probability can be overcome following un‐reinforced practice. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   
157.
    
Insufficiently regressive intuitive predictions have been attributed to mistaken reliance on the representativeness heuristic. In contrast, we suggest that intuitive predictions stem from a conceptualization of ‘goodness of prediction’ that differs from the accepted statistical definition in terms of error minimization, namely, ecological validity—that is, representation of the substantive characteristics of the predicted variable Y and its distribution as well as of the relationship between Y and the predictor X—rather than minimization of prediction errors. Simultaneous satisfaction of the above representation requirements is achieved by multivalued prediction: The prediction of different Y′ values for the same X value, resulting in conditional distributions Y|X for at least some X values. Empirical results supporting this hypothesis are presented and discussed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   
158.
    
The aim of this study is to examine both coherence and correspondence criteria for rationality in experts' judgments of risk. We investigated biases in risk estimation for sexually transmitted infections (STIs) predicted by fuzzy‐trace theory, i.e., that specific errors would occur despite experts' knowledge of correct responses. One hundred twenty professionals with specific knowledge of STI risks in adolescents were administered a survey questionnaire to test predictions concerning: knowledge deficits (producing underestimation of risks); gist‐based representation of risk categories (producing overestimation of condom effectiveness); retrieval failure for risk knowledge (producing lower risk estimates); and processing interference in combining risk estimates (producing biases in post‐test diagnosis of infection). Retrieval was manipulated by asking estimation questions that “unpacked” the STI category into infection types or did not specify infection types. Other questions differentiated processing biases from knowledge deficits or retrieval failure by directly providing requisite knowledge. Experts' knowledge of STI transmission and infection risks was verified empirically. Nevertheless, under predictable conditions, they misestimated risk, overestimated the effectiveness of condoms, and also suffered from processing biases. When questions provided better retrieval supports (unpacked format), risk estimates improved. Biases were linked to gist representations, retrieval failures, and processing errors, as opposed to knowledge about STIs. Results support fuzzy‐trace theory's dual‐process assumptions that different types of errors are dissociated from one another, and separate failures of coherence and correspondence among the same sample of experts. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   
159.
    
In this article, I examine Michael Bratman’s account of stability in his planning theory of intention (PTI). Future-directed intentions should be stable, or appropriately resistant to change, over time. Bratman claims that the norm of stability governs both intentions and plans. The aim of this article is to critically enrich Bratman’s account of stability by introducing plasticity as an additional norm of planning. I construct plasticity as a kind of stability of intentions which supplements Bratman’s notion of “reasonable stability.” Unlike the latter, plasticity applies mainly to cases in which plan states are abandoned without reconsideration. I focus on the intra-theoretical problems of PTI and elucidate: (1) the distinction between future-directed intentions and plans, (2) the conceptual difference between stability and inertia, which is only implicit in PTI, and (3) the role of the environment of the planner, which has a vestigial role in Bratman’s work. I also defend my incorporation of plasticity against one possible objection and support it in the context of Bratman’s later works. Although critical, my proposal is in moderate harmony with PTI.  相似文献   
160.
    
Whether psychopathic offenders are practically rational has attracted philosophical attention. The problem is relevant in theoretical discussions in moral psychology and in discussions concerning the appropriate social response to the crimes of these individuals. We argue that classical and current experiments concerning the instrumental learning in psychopaths cannot directly support the conclusion that they have impaired instrumental rationality, construed as the ability to transfer motivation by means-ends reasoning. We claim that these experiments appear to show that psychopaths in certain circumstances are not aware of the relevant means for their ends. Moreover, we suggest how further empirical research could help to settle the issue.  相似文献   
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