Gauthier and the Capacity for Morality

In Morals by Agreement, David Gauthier tries to provide a justification of morality from morally neutral premises within the constraints of an instrumental conception of reason. But his reliance on this narrow conception of reason creates problems, for it suggests that moral motivation is self-interested. However, Gauthier holds that to act morally is to act for the sake of morality and others, not oneself. An individual who so acts has what he calls an affective capacity for morality. He attempts to reconcile the tension between the self-interested account of moral behaviour and the affective capacity for morality by showing that the latter could develop from the former without violating the constraints of instrumental rationality. I argue, first, that his account is incomplete and assumes what it has to demonstrate; and, second, that this cannot be remedied with any plausibility. Finally, I argue that Gauthier covertly relies on a substantive claim about human good that is inconsistent with the instrumental conception of reason. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Reasoning under Scarcity

Practical deliberation consists in thinking about what to do. Such deliberation is deemed rational when it conforms to certain normative requirements. What is often ignored is the role that an agent's context can play in so-called ‘failures’ of rationality. In this paper, I use recent cognitive science research investigating the effects of resource-scarcity on decision-making and cognitive function to argue that context plays an important role in determining which norms should structure an agent's deliberation. This evidence undermines the view that the norms of ‘ideal’ rationality are necessary and universal requirements on deliberation. They are a solution to the problems faced by cognitively limited agents in a context of moderate scarcity. In a context of severe scarcity, the problems faced by cognitively limited agents are different and require deliberation structured by different norms. Agents reason rationally when they use the norms best suited to their context and cognitive capacities.     

What makes delusions pathological?

Bortolotti argues that we cannot distinguish delusions from other irrational beliefs in virtue of their epistemic features alone. Although her arguments are convincing, her analysis leaves an important question unanswered: What makes delusions pathological? In this paper I set out to answer this question by arguing that the pathological character of delusions arises from an executive dysfunction in a subject’s ability to detect relevance in the environment. I further suggest that this dysfunction derives from an underlying emotional imbalance—one that leads delusional subjects to regard some contextual elements as deeply puzzling or highly significant.     

Anthropomorphism and anthropectomy as friendly competitors

Principles help comparative psychologists select from among multiple hypotheses that account for the data. Anthropomorphic principles select hypotheses that have the most human–animal similarities while anthropectic principles select hypotheses that have the most human–animal differences. I argue that there is no way for the comparative psychologist on their own to justify their selection of one principle over the other. However, the comparative psychologist can justify their selection of one principle over the other in virtue of being members of comparative psychology as a community. As it turns out, though, this justifies both competing principles: the community benefits most from competition between the two principles so comparative psychologists are justified in implementing the principles by which they can best contribute to the competition. Thus, I argue that common arguments to unify principle implementation in comparative psychology are defeated by the conservative arguments to preserve and foster competition.     

Affective attunement and the experience of the numinous: reflections on Rudolf Otto’s Das Heilige

In this article, Rudolf Otto’s seminal work, Das Heilige, is explored in the German original and in relation to his other writings, his debts to Lutheranism, German romanticism and neo-Kantianism, and the rich context of Marburg in the interwar period. The article stresses Otto’s own attested religious experiences and his profound influence among leading ‘religionists’ of the later twentieth century such as Jung, Tillich, Eliade, and Corbin.     

简论墨家的技术思想

墨家主张各种技术发明以利民实用为上,技术活动以节俭实用为原则,技术行为必须遵循基本规范,这些思想认识既有历史合理性,也有一定的局限性。今天看来,墨家的这些思想也有一定的现实启发和教育意义。     

Rationality, Reason and the History of Thought

Philosophers over the course of the last century, including Edmund Husserl, Chaim Perelman, and Jacques Derrida, have attempted to unravel the tangled relationship between the rational and the reasonable in order to understand how the history of thought progresses. Critical political theorists, including Michel Foucault and Ernesto Laclau have also investigated this issue from a range of perspectives, especially as it relates to the relationship between ideational limits and their transgression and the universal and the particular. This essay compares these perspectives to locate the rational dimensions of the reasonable, and to relate that “meta-reason” to the irrational and unreasonable aspects of identity formation and the unfolding of world history.     

社会两难行为理性特点的实验分析

本研究运用定量和定性的方法探讨了动态适应性学习条件下两难行为的理性特点及其影响因素。72名杭州本科生参加了本实验,结果发现:1、在有限次重复的两难博弈实验中,人们的两难行为不符合纳什博弈理论,进一步的定性分析指出,这种两难行为体现出“社会理性”的特征;2、在高奖罚的条件下,人们更容易做出接近“纳什均衡点”决策;3、群体规模和反馈方式对人们的对策行为影响不显著,但是,进一步的定性分析部分支持了群体规模的社会理性解释。     

人非理性且难教化?论支持自由家长主义的证据

基于心理学的研究, 自由家长主义者认为人们的思维有个体难以克服的、根深蒂固的系统性缺陷, 并难以通过教育来避免和消除, 因此主张因势利导, 仰仗外部专家的“助推”把人们的行为引导到正确方向。然而, 从生态理性的角度看, 人们依照自由家长主义者所谓的认知偏差做出的选择未必导致糟糕的结果, 而依照自由家长主义者所推崇的理性方法做出的选择也未必导致理想的结果。本文分析了自由家长主义者用来支持助推的证据后发现：(1)它们源于一些研究者对“何为理性”的狭隘定义, 误解了人类理性的本质; (2)它们对研究结果进行了选择性的报告, 忽视了与这些证据相反的证据。通过这些分析, 我们认为“人非理性且难教化”这一自由家长主义者的论断过于武断并有失偏颇。投入教育, 教会人们如何精明老练地处理风险不仅是可行的, 而且是替代助推的一个更为持久有效的解决方案。