政治心理学的争辩议题述评

作为政治学与心理学的交叉学科, 政治心理学在欧美学界的发展逐步走向成熟。作者详细归纳了政治心理学学科发展史和理论史上的争辩议题, 包括政治心理学与理性的关系问题, 政治心理学的主导范式与分散化关系问题, 政治心理学解释的性情和情境取向的分歧问题, 政治学路径还是心理学路径的平衡问题, 以及文化因素如何影响政治心理的问题。最后, 作者讨论了中国政治心理学研究如何看待文化差异问题、文化与理性的关系等问题。     

Practical rationality for pluralists about the good

I argue that if a normative theory of practical rationality is to represent an adequate and coherent response to a plurality of incommensurable goods, it cannot be a maximising theory. It will have to be a theory that recognises two responses to goods as morally licit – promotion and respect – and one as morally illicit – violation. This result has a number of interesting corollaries, some of which I indicate. Perhaps the most interesting is that it makes the existence of a plurality of incommensurable goods incompatible with consequentialism.     

Rationality and Judgment

Abstract: Philosophical/epistemic theories of rationality differ over the role of judgment in rational argumentation. According to the “classical model” of rationality, rational justification is a matter of conformity with explicit rules or principles. Critics of the classical model, such as Harold Brown and Trudy Govier, argue that the model is subject to insuperable difficulties. They propose, instead, that rationality be understood, ultimately, in terms of judgment rather than rules. In this article I respond to Brown's and Govier's criticisms of the classical model, and to the “judgment model” they propose in its place. I argue that that model is unable both to distinguish between rational and irrational judgment and to avoid recourse to rules, and is therefore inadequate as an account of rationality, critical thinking, or argument appraisal. More positively, I argue that an adequate account of rationality must include a place for both rules and judgment.     

That Way Madness Lies: At the Intersection of Philosophy and Clinical Psychology

Abstract: I argue that philosophical practice is a clinically active and influential endeavor, with both positive (therapeutic) and negative (detrimental) psychological possibilities. Though some have explicitly taken the clinical aspects of philosophy into the therapeutic realm via the new field of philosophical counseling, I am interested in the clinical context of philosophers as philosophers, engaged in standard, philosophical pursuits. In arguing for the clinical implications of philosophical practice I consider the relation between philosophical despair and depression, the cognitive etiology of depression and other clinical disorders, selected DSM‐IV entries, attribution theory, and cognitive therapy.     

Trichotomous preferences for gambles

Let G_X be the set of all gambles on a set X of decision outcomes. Trichotomous preferences divide G_X into three disjoint subsets, viz., the set P⁺ of preferable gambles, the set P⁰ of indifferent gambles, and the set P^- of unpreferable gambles. Those preference comparisons are made against the status quo, i.e., the do-nothing alternative. This paper presents and discusses dyadic representations of such trichotomous preferences and identifies necessary and sufficient axioms for the existence of those representations.     

Certainty,reasonableness and argumentation in law

This paper defends a position that parts ways with the positivist view of legal certainty and reasonableness. I start out with a reconstruction of this view and move on to argue that an adequate analysis of certainty and reasonableness calls for an alternative approach, one based on the acknowledgement that argumentation is key to determining the contents, structure, and boundaries of a legal system. Here I claim that by endorsing a dialectical notion of rationality this alternative account espouses an ambitious approach to reasoning in law and conceives of the theory of legal argumentation as the vantage point from which to analyze legal systems and tackle the main problems connected with their existence. Next, I look at what this alternative approach does for the way we should go about treating certainty and reasonableness, considered singularly as well as in their reciprocal relationship. I conclude on this basis that when argumentation receives its due emphasis in law we have to redefine certainty and reasonableness and recast their connection as non-conflictive.     

A re‐examination of probability matching and rational choice

In a typical probability learning task participants are presented with a repeated choice between two response alternatives, one of which has a higher payoff probability than the other. Rational choice theory requires that participants should eventually allocate all their responses to the high‐payoff alternative, but previous research has found that people fail to maximize their payoffs. Instead, it is commonly observed that people match their response probabilities to the payoff probabilities. We report three experiments on this choice anomaly using a simple probability learning task in which participants were provided with (i) large financial incentives, (ii) meaningful and regular feedback, and (iii) extensive training. In each experiment large proportions of participants adopted the optimal response strategy and all three of the factors mentioned above contributed to this. The results are supportive of rational choice theory. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

灾区民众的公正观与幸福感及其与非灾区的比较

作为公德的社会公正与作为私情的个人幸福,是个体作为社会成员的两个方面,二者在逻辑上是统一的,以往的心理学研究也证实了这一点,但在低标准下,二者却可能出现分离。本研究探讨了灾区民众的公正观和幸福感及其与非灾区的对比,以及中国本土文化背景下二者的关系。本研究发现,与非灾区相比,处在灾区的民众持有更高的公正观与更平和的情感状态,男性尤其如此,并且其情感幸福对公正观有微弱的正向预测（主要是积极情感）,但八个月后随着公正观与幸福感的回落,这种关联变得不显著。民众的情感幸福与公正观在常态下表现为分离的关系,但生活满意度这一幸福感的认知因素却与公正观一直有正向的关联。总之,情感幸福、认知幸福与社会认知的矛盾、变换关系,暗示了建立在私情基础之上的、在灾难中不断强化的中国人特定的情感与理性诉求。     

Satisficing in financial decision making — a theoretical and experimental approach to bounded rationality

We apply the theoretical construct of bounded rationality to an investment game, allowing participants to invest their monetary endowment in riskless bonds and risky assets. In our experiment, we elicit aspiration levels from participants: one captures a subsistence threshold, the other a success threshold. Participants can be classified according to these aspirations and the corresponding investment behavior. We differentiate between potential and actual satisficing. By presupposing specific cardinal utility functions, we also relate the bounded rationality approach to the traditional rational choice model.     

Narrative rationality and the logic of scientific discourse

This essay argues that scientific discourse is amenable to interpretation and assessment from the perspective of the narrative paradigm and its attendant logic, narrative rationality. It also contends that this logic entails a revised conception of knowledge, one that permits the possibility of wisdom. The text analyzed is James D. Watson and Francis H. Crick's proposal of the double helix model of DNA.