面孔空想性错视及其神经机制

面孔空想性错视, 是指在不存在面孔的物体或抽象图案上看到面孔, 例如在月球表面看到面孔。它受到自下而上信息与自上而下加工的共同影响。近年来, 研究者通过行为实验、事件相关电位技术以及脑成像技术对不同的空想性错视影响因素进行研究。结果发现, 面孔空想性错视的产生取决于刺激是否包含类似面孔结构, 内部面孔模板是否能与当前刺激匹配, 以及有无面孔相关背景。同时也受到个体差异与情绪状态影响。脑成像研究发现, 在发生空想性错视时, 来自额叶区与枕叶视觉区的信息会在FFA进行整合。未来研究可以致力于探索面孔空想性错视中个体差异的行为与神经机制, 以及不同类型的自上而下调节之间的相互影响及其神经机制。     

文本加工中情境模型建构的五个维度

情境模型理论是当代西方文本阅读加工的一个重要理论。该文通过详细介绍情境模型建构的空间、时间、因果、主人公、意图五大维度,以助于对情境模型理论整体理解。通过总结可知,目前国内外关于情境模型建构中的空间、因果和主人公三个维度的研究成果较多,研究范式也较为成熟,时间和意图维度则研究成果较少     

Communication and Cognition: The Social Beyond Language,Interaction and Culture

Cognition theories describe the social with terms like language, interaction or culture, whose theoretical status has also been discussed in modern sociology. These concepts are not well-positioned to understand the emergence and autonomy of social orders. Sociological theory of self-referential systems can be useful to reconstruct the bottom-up process which contributes to the emergence of the social as communication as well as to describe the way in which society exerts downward causation upon cognitive phenomena. The core of this theory is the systemic category of meaning as a shared horizon for psychic and social systems.     

Temporal Relations vs. Logical Reduction: A Phenomenal Theory of Causality

Kant, in various parts of his treatment of causality, refers to determinism or the principle of sufficient reason as an inescapable principle. In fact, in the Second Analogy we find the elements to reconstruct a purely phenomenal determinism as a logical and tautological truth. I endeavour in this article to gather these elements into an organic theory of phenomenal causality and then show, in the third section, with a specific argument which I call the “paradox of phenomenal observation”, that this phenomenal determinism is the only rational approach to causality because any logico-reductivistic approach, such as the Humean one, would destroy the temporal order and so the very possibility to talk of a causal relation. I also believe that, all things said, Kant did not achieve a much greater comprehension of the problem than Hume did, in his theory of causality, for he did not free a phenomenal approach from the impasse of reductivism as his reflections on “simultaneous causation” and “vanishing quantities” indeed show, and this I will argue in Sect. 4 of this article.

Emergence: Core ideas and issues

This paper explores the fundamental ideas that have motivated the idea of emergence and the movement of emergentism. The concept of reduction, which lies at the heart of the emergence idea is explicated, and it is shown how the thesis that emergent properties are irreducible gives a unified account of emergence. The paper goes on to discuss two fundamental unresolved issues for emergentism. The first is that of giving a “positive” characterization of emergence; the second is to give a coherent explanation of how “downward” causation, a central component of emergentism, is able to avoid the problem of overdetermination.Kim (2004). This paper is largely based on my “Making Sense of Emergence”, Philosophical Studies 95 (1999), 3–36, and “On Being Realistic about Emergence”. The latter was presented at the Emergence/Reduction Workshop at the Institut Jean Nicod in the fall of 2003; as this paper has been promised for another publication, the present paper was expressly composed in order to provide a critical target for the commentaries by Marras and Wong.     

BETWEEN PHYSICALISM AND MENTALISM: PHILIP CLAYTON ON MIND AND EMERGENCE

Abstract. Philip Clayton's work on emergence is a valuable contribution to the fields of religion, science, and philosophy. I focus on three narrow but extremely important areas of Clayton's work. First, Clayton deems that Terrence Deacon's emergence theory is difficult to accept because it is constructed from thermodynamics, thereby rendering it unable to address phenomenological issues. I examine Deacon's theory and show that development from a physics base is warranted. Furthermore, Clayton does not convincingly demonstrate that such a constructive approach is necessarily incapable of attending to mental phenomena or offer an alternative that explains the causal power of a physically nonconstructible mental realm. Second, I argue that Clayton's notion of emergentist supervenience for comprehending the mental/physical relation is unnecessarily redundant and problematic in relation to causal power. Third, I explore Clayton's alternative use of agent causation to make sense of mental properties having causal power in the world. His effort to resolve emergence difficulties by appealing to phenomenology receives primary attention. Clayton's use of emergence theory is an important contribution to the religion‐and‐science community, and I encourage further dialogue on the exchange that Clayton commences.     

SPECIES OF EMERGENCE

Abstract. The category of emergence has come to be of considerable importance to the science‐and‐religion dialogue. It has become clear that the term is used in different ways by different authors, with important implications. In this article I examine the criteria used to state that something is emergent and the different interpretations of those criteria. In particular, I argue similarly to Philip Clayton that there are three broad ranges of interpretation of emergence: reductive, nonreductive, and radical. Although all three criteria have their place, I suggest that the category of radical emergence is important both for science and theology.     

Emergence

Here I offer a precise analysis of what it takes for a property to count as emergent. The features widely considered crucial to emergence include novelty, unpredictability, supervenience, relationality, and downward causal influence. By acknowledging each of these distinctive features, the definition provided below captures an important sense in which the whole can be more than the sum of its parts.

层次,形式与实在

Scientific progress in the 20th century has shown that the structure of the world is hierarchical. A philosophical analysis of the hierarchy will bear obvious significance for metaphysics and philosophy in general. Jonathan Schaffer’s paper, “Is There a Fundamental Level?”, provides a systematic review of the works in the field, the difficulties for various versions of fundamentalism, and the prospect for the third option, i.e., to treat each level as ontologically equal. The purpose of this paper is to provide an argument for the third option. The author will apply Aristotle’s theory of matter and form to the discussion of the hierarchy and develop a theory of form realism, which will grant every level with “full citizenship in the republic of being.” It constitutes an argument against ontological and epistemological reductionism. A non-reductive theory of causation is also developed against the fundamental theory of causation.     

Reviews

Books reviewed:
Robert A. Segal, Theorizing About Myth
Christopher Southgate, Celia Deane-Drummond, Paul D. Murray, Michael Robert Negus, Lawrence Osborn, Michael Poole, Jacqui Stewart, and Fraser Watts, (eds.) God, Humanity and the Cosmos: A Textbook in Science and Religion
Bryan S. Rennie, Reconstructing Eliade: Making Sense of Religion