FREE YOUR MIND: BUDDHISM,CAUSALITY, AND THE FREE WILL PROBLEM

The problem of free will is associated with a specific and significant kind of control over our actions, which is understood primarily in the sense that we have the freedom to do otherwise or the capacity for self-determination. Is Buddhism compatible with such a conception of free will? The aim of this article is to address three critical issues concerning the free will problem: (1) what role should accounts of physical and neurobiological processes play in discussions of free will? (2) Is a conception of mental autonomy grounded in practices of meditative cultivation compatible with the three cardinal Buddhist doctrines of momentariness, dependent arising, and no-self? (3) Are there enough resources in Buddhism, given its antisubstantialist metaphysics, to account for personal agency, self-control, and moral responsibility?     

Regularity as a Form of Constraint

Regularity theories of causation are guided by the idea that causes are collectively sufficient for their effects. Following Mackie [1974], that idea is typically refined to distinguish collections that include redundant members from those that do not. Causes must be collectively sufficient for their effects without redundancy. While Mackie was surely right that the regularity theory must distinguish collections that are in some sense minimally sufficient for an effect from those that include unnecessary hangers-on, I believe that redundancy is the wrong mark of that distinction. I propose a way to develop the regularity theory without it. Instead of distinguishing minimal from mere sufficiency in terms of redundancy, we should look to the influence that events have in the world. Causes, so construed, must have just enough collective influence to ensure that an effect occurs. I argue that such an account provides a uniform solution to the problem of epiphenomena and to a pair of related problems that arise for prior iterations of the regularity theory.     

Probabilities,causation, and logic programming in conditional reasoning: reply to Stenning and Van Lambalgen (2016)

Oaksford and Chater (2014 Oaksford, M., &; Chater, N. (2014). Probabilistic single function dual process theory and logic programming as approaches to non-monotonicity in human vs. artificial reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning, 20, 269–295. doi:10.1080/13546783.2013.877401[Taylor &; Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], Thinking and Reasoning, 20, 269–295) critiqued the logic programming (LP) approach to nonmonotonicity and proposed that a Bayesian probabilistic approach to conditional reasoning provided a more empirically adequate theory. The current paper is a reply to Stenning and van Lambalgen's rejoinder to this earlier paper entitled ‘Logic programming, probability, and two-system accounts of reasoning: a rejoinder to Oaksford and Chater’ (2016) in Thinking and Reasoning. It is argued that causation is basic in human cognition and that explaining how abnormality lists are created in LP requires causal models. Each specific rejoinder to the original critique is then addressed. While many areas of agreement are identified, with respect to the key differences, it is concluded the current evidence favours the Bayesian approach, at least for the moment.     

Behaviorism and Society

A probable list of causes for the limited acceptance of behaviorism in our society is identified. This is followed by a summary review of the proposed solutions identified in other papers in this special issue of The Behavior Analyst, most of which relate to either better marketing of either the behavior analytic process or the results achieved as a consequence. One paper proposes a more broad conception of behavior analysis. This paper endorses the solutions identified in previous papers and then goes on to propose an even more broad conception of behavior analysis and makes the point that behavior analysis is unlikely to flourish unless behavior analysts understand a good deal more about the cultural and other contextual features of the environments in which they work.     

Causality and Subjectivity in the Religious Quest

The dynamics of seeking causation and the dynamics of subjectivity are presented and then brought together in a consideration of the three core components of the religious quest: the search for and experience of ultimate explanations, the interiority of religious experience ("spirituality"), and the empathic experience of religious fellowship.     

Developing coherence in community and clinical psychology: the integration of idealism and pragmatism

Illustrations of how ideas from community psychology may be integrated with clinical psychological thinking and practice are described from the perspective of a clinical psychologist working in the NHS. The intentions are to consider socially relevant conceptualizations of the causes of people's well-being and distress, and to develop ways of helping individuals and communities to clarify and address these causes. Incorporating an analysis of social power also necessitates a critical awareness of the limited potency of psychological interventions. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Substance or System as Foundational Metaphor for a Contemporary Christian World View?

Natural scientists increasingly employ the notion of system, i.e. organized groups of individual entities in dynamic interrelation, as a controlling metaphor in their analysis of physical reality, thereby reflecting a new emphasis on ecology and a holistic approach to reality. A.N. Whitehead’s understanding of the reciprocal cause-and-effect relation between constituent actual entities and the governing structure of the “society” to which they belong provides philosophical grounding for this new methodology and removes the danger of regarding systems as completely deterministic rather than open-ended and self-organizing. Likewise, a systems-oriented approach to the Christian doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation and Eschatology clears up residual ambiguities in the traditional understanding of those same beliefs.     

Contiguity and the causal theory of memory

In Memory: A Philosophical Study, Bernecker argues for an account of contiguity. This Contiguity View is meant to solve relearning and prompting, wayward causation problems plaguing the causal theory of memory. I argue that Bernecker’s Contiguity View fails in this task. Contiguity is too weak to prevent relearning and too strong to allow prompting. These failures illustrate a problem inherent in accounts of memory causation. Relearning and prompting are both causal relations, wayward only with respect to our interest in specifying remembering’s requirements. Solving them requires saying more about remembering, not causation. I conclude by sketching such an account.     

Agent causation as a solution to the problem of action

My primary aim is to defend a nonreductive solution to the problem of action. I argue that when you are performing an overt bodily action, you are playing an irreducible causal role in bringing about, sustaining, and controlling the movements of your body, a causal role best understood as an instance of agent causation. Thus, the solution that I defend employs a notion of agent causation, though emphatically not in defence of an account of free will, as most theories of agent causation are. Rather, I argue that the notion of agent causation introduced here best explains how it is that you are making your body move during an action, thereby providing a satisfactory solution to the problem of action.     

CAUSATION,DISPOSITIONS, AND PHYSICAL OCCASIONALISM

Even though theistic philosophers and scientists agree that God created, sustains, and providentially governs the physical universe and even though much has been published in general regarding divine action, what is needed is a fine‐grained, conceptually coherent account of divine action, causation, dispositions, and laws of nature consistent with divine aseity, satisfying the widely recognized adequacy conditions for any account of dispositions.¹ Such an account would be a basic part of a more comprehensive theory of divine action in relation to the fundamental concepts of science and of mathematics. Our aim in this article is simply to present such a theory.