Implicit theories of intelligence and IQ test performance in adolescents with Generalized Anxiety Disorder

During the past decade, several studies have reported positive effects of cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) in the treatment of children and adolescents with mental disorders. One of the most important CBT interventions is to teach children and adolescents to challenge negative thoughts that lead to maladjusted behaviors. Based on the implicit theories of intelligence framework, the main purpose of this study was to test whether an incremental theory manipulation could be used to affect IQ test performance in adolescents with Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD). Results showed that patients demonstrated enhanced IQ performance and experienced less state anxiety when they were exposed to an incremental theory of intelligence manipulation. Our findings suggest that incremental theory manipulation provides a useful cognitive strategy for addressing school-related anxiety in adolescents with mental disorders such as GAD.     

Subjective education in analytic training: drawing on values from the art academy

Abstract: Kernberg and others have observed that psychoanalytic education has tended to promote the acquisition of theoretical knowledge and clinical technique within an atmosphere of indoctrination rather than of exploration. As a corrective, he proposed four models that correspond to values in psychoanalytic education: the art academy, the technical trade school, the religious seminary and the university. He commended models of the university and art academy to our collective attention because of their combined effectiveness in providing for the objective and subjective education of candidates: the university model for its capacity to provide a critical sense of a wide range of theories in an atmosphere tolerating debate and difference, and the art academy model for its capacity to facilitate the expression of individual creativity. In this paper, I will explore the art academy model for correspondences between artistic and analytic trainings that can enhance the development of the creative subjectivity of psychoanalytic candidates. I will draw additional correspondences between analytic and artistic learning that can enhance psychoanalytic education.     

Verbal and nonverbal behaviour as a basis for credibility attribution: The impact of task involvement and cognitive capacity

Three experiments were able to demonstrate the usefulness of dual-process models for the understanding of the process of credibility attribution. According to the assumptions of dual-process models, only high task involvement and high cognitive capacity leads to intensive processing of verbal and nonverbal information when making credibility judgments. Under low task involvement and/or low cognitive capacity, people predominantly use nonverbal information for their credibility attribution. In Experiment 1, participants under low or high task involvement saw a film in which the nonverbal behaviour (fidgety vs. calm) and the verbal information (low versus high credibility) of a source were manipulated. As predicted, when task involvement was low, only the nonverbal behaviour influenced participants’ credibility attribution. Participants with high task involvement also used the verbal information. In Experiment 2 and 3, the cognitive capacity of the participants was manipulated. Participants with high cognitive capacity, in contrast to those of low cognitive capacity, used the verbal information for their credibility attribution.     

In Defence of Constructive Empiricism: Maxwell’s Master Argument and Aberrant Theories

Over the past years, in books and journals (this journal included), N. Maxwell launched a ferocious attack on B. C. van Fraassen’s view of science called Constructive Empiricism (CE). This attack has been totally ignored. Must we conclude from this silence that no defence is possible and that a fortiori Maxwell has buried CE once and for all? Or is the attack too obviously flawed as not to merit exposure? A careful dissection of Maxwell’s reasoning will make it clear that neither is the case. This dissection includes an analysis of Maxwell’s ‘aberrance–argument’ (omnipresent in his many writings) for the claim that science implicitly and permanently accepts a substantial, metaphysical thesis about the universe, which then paves the way for his own metaphysical-realist hierarchy-view of science. This aberrance-claim, which Maxwell directs against a widely shared and harmful ideology of science called ‘Standard Empiricism’, generally has been ignored too, for more than a quarter of a century. Our conclusions will be that (i) Maxwell’s attacks on CE can be beaten off, and (ii) his ‘aberrance–arguments’ do not establish what Maxwell believes they establish, but (iii) we can draw a number of valuable lessons from these attacks about the nature of science and of the libertarian nature of CE.     

The ontological commitments of inconsistent theories

In this paper I present an argument for belief in inconsistent objects. The argument relies on a particular, plausible version of scientific realism, and the fact that often our best scientific theories are inconsistent. It is not clear what to make of this argument. Is it a reductio of the version of scientific realism under consideration? If it is, what are the alternatives? Should we just accept the conclusion? I will argue (rather tentatively and suitably qualified) for a positive answer to the last question: there are times when it is legitimate to believe in inconsistent objects.     

Definability and decidability of binary predicates for time granularity

In this paper we study the definability and decidability of binary predicates for time granularity in monadic languages interpreted over finitely and infinitely layered structures. We focus our attention on the equi-level (respectively equi-column) predicate constraining two time points to belong to the same layer (respectively column) and on the horizontal (respectively vertical) successor predicate relating a time point to its successor within a given layer (respectively column). We give a number of positive and negative results by reduction to/from a wide spectrum of decidable/undecidable problems.     

How to turn a hawk into a dove and vice versa: Interactions between emotions and goals in a give-some dilemma game

The present study investigated emotional influences on behavior in a one-shot, simultaneous, give-some dilemma game. In accordance with functional perspectives on the role of discrete emotions, we found fear to reduce, and guilt to increase levels of cooperation. Moreover, we showed individual differences in the effect of induced emotional states. Specifically, results indicated that inducing fear reduced cooperation only for individuals with a pro-social value orientation, and that guilt induction increased cooperation only for individuals with a pro-self value orientation. We also established that both social value orientations could be adequately described in terms of differences in chronically accessible goals (as assessed by value-importance ratings). These results, therefore, seem to support our hypothesis that individual differences in the behavioral consequences of induced emotional states are related to variation in chronic accessibility of general goals associated with a particular emotional state.     

Two-Mode Models of Self-Regulation as a Tool for Conceptualizing Effects of the Serotonin System in Normal Behavior and Diverse Disorders

ABSTRACT— The serotonin system is a collection of neural pathways whose overall level of functioning (from low to high) relates to diverse kinds of psychological and behavioral variability. Individual differences in serotonergic function are important both in personality and in vulnerability to psychological disorders. These disorders range widely—from impulsive aggression to depression. One way to understand such diverse reflections of differences in serotonergic function is by viewing serotonergic function through the lens of two-mode (or dual-process) models of self-regulation. Such theories posit a lower-order system that responds quickly to associative cues of the moment and a higher-order system that responds reflectively and planfully. Low serotonergic function appears to enhance influence of the lower-order system. This often yields impulsive reactivity. Why, then, does low serotonergic function also relate to depression, which is characterized by lethargy and unresponsiveness? The answer must be that ascendance of the lower system interacts with other factors. One hypothesis is that low serotonergic function plus high sensitivity to incentives yields vulnerability to impulsive approach, whereas low serotonergic function plus low incentive sensitivity yields vulnerability to depression. Conceptualizing serotonergic function this way helps integrate information pertaining to very different disorders into a coherent picture.     

Differences in preschoolers’ and adults’ use of generics about novel animals and artifacts: A window onto a conceptual divide

Children and adults commonly produce more generic noun phrases (e.g., birds fly) about animals than artifacts. This may reflect differences in participants’ generic knowledge about specific animals/artifacts (e.g., dogs/chairs), or it may reflect a more general distinction. To test this, the current experiments asked adults and preschoolers to generate properties about novel animals and artifacts (Experiment 1: real animals/artifacts; Experiments 2 and 3: matched pairs of maximally similar, novel animals/artifacts). Data demonstrate that even without prior knowledge about these items, the likelihood of producing a generic is significantly greater for animals than artifacts. These results leave open the question of whether this pattern is the product of experience and learned associations or instead a set of early-developing theories about animals and artifacts.     

Correct Responses and the Priority of the Normative

The ‘Wrong Kind of Reason’ problem for buck-passing theories (theories which hold that the normative is explanatorily or conceptually prior to the evaluative) is to explain why the existence of pragmatic or strategic reasons for some response to an object does not suffice to ground evaluative claims about that object. The only workable reply seems to be to deny that there are reasons of the ‘wrong kind’ for responses, and to argue that these are really reasons for wanting, trying, or intending to have that response. In support of this, it is pointed out that awareness of pragmatic or strategic considerations, unlike awareness of reasons of the ‘right kind’, are never sufficient by themselves to produce the responses for which they are reasons. I argue that this phenomenon cannot be used as a criterion for distinguishing reasons-for-a-response from reasons-for-wanting-to-have-a-response. I subsequently investigate the possibility of basing this distinction on a claim that the responses in question (e.g. admiration or desire) are themselves inherently normative; I conclude that this approach is also unsuccessful. Hence, the ‘direct response’ phenomenon cannot be used to rule out the possibility of pragmatic or strategic reasons for responses; and the rejection of such reasons therefore cannot be used to circumvent the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem.