Finding unconscious phantasy in the session: Recognizing form

The concept of unconscious phantasy has played – and still does play – a central role in psychoanalytic thinking. The author discusses the various forms by which unconscious phantasies manifest themselves in the analytic session as they are lived out and enacted in the transference relationship. This paper also aims at expanding the kleinian theory of symbol formation by exploring the impact that emotional aspects connected to early “raw’, “pre‐symbolic’ phantasies have in the analysis and how their corporeal elements interlock with the signifying process. The author follows the expressive forms of primitive unconscious phantasies as they appear in a psychoanalytic session and proposes that the emotional effect that can be experienced in the communication between patient and analyst depends in great measure on “semiotic’ aspects linked to primitive phantasies that are felt and lived out in embodied ways. Rather than a move from unconscious phantasies that typify symbolic equations to those showing proper symbolization, these can coexist and simultaneously find their way to what is communicated to the analyst. As early phantasies bear an intimate connection to the body and to unprocessed emotions when they are projected into the analyst they can produce a powerful resonance, sometimes also experienced in a physical way and forming an integral part of the analyst's counter‐transference.     

The case for neuropsychoanalysis: Why a dialogue with neuroscience is necessary but not sufficient for psychoanalysis

Recent advances in the cognitive, affective and social neurosciences have enabled these fields to study aspects of the mind that are central to psychoanalysis. These developments raise a number of possibilities for psychoanalysis. Can it engage the neurosciences in a productive and mutually enriching dialogue without compromising its own integrity and unique perspective? While many analysts welcome interdisciplinary exchanges with the neurosciences, termed neuropsychoanalysis, some have voiced concerns about their potentially deleterious effects on psychoanalytic theory and practice. In this paper we outline the development and aims of neuropsychoanalysis, and consider its reception in psychoanalysis and in the neurosciences. We then discuss some of the concerns raised within psychoanalysis, with particular emphasis on the epistemological foundations of neuropsychoanalysis. While this paper does not attempt to fully address the clinical applications of neuropsychoanalysis, we offer and discuss a brief case illustration in order to demonstrate that neuroscientific research findings can be used to enrich our models of the mind in ways that, in turn, may influence how analysts work with their patients. We will conclude that neuropsychoanalysis is grounded in the history of psychoanalysis, that it is part of the psychoanalytic worldview, and that it is necessary, albeit not sufficient, for the future viability of psychoanalysis.     

Testing Our Quasi‐Statistical Sense: News Use,Political Knowledge,and False Projection

Although widely studied, previous research of projection in the context of public opinion did not incorporate the distinction between adequate and false projection developed in the cognitive studies: Adequate projection contributes to accurate perceptions of public opinion while false projection impairs it. The analysis presented in this study includes the above distinction, building on two case studies: (1) a dataset comprised of 25 surveys conducted over a period of 10 years (N = 11,313) and (2) a panel study of the 2013 Israeli general election. Relying on the assumptions of the Bayesian model, we tested if frequent news exposure and factual political knowledge reduce false projection. We found that false projection is a highly persistent psychological tendency with little variance. Although news exposure and political knowledge did contribute to a more accurate perception of public opinion, they did not reduce false projection. Conversely, knowledge increased false projection among moderates and had no effect in this respect among proponents of a more extreme ideology. These findings align better with the motivated reasoning model than with the Bayesian model.     

Memory Errors Reveal a Bias to Spontaneously Generalize to Categories

Much evidence suggests that, from a young age, humans are able to generalize information learned about a subset of a category to the category itself. Here, we propose that—beyond simply being able to perform such generalizations—people are biased to generalize to categories, such that they routinely make spontaneous, implicit category generalizations from information that licenses such generalizations. To demonstrate the existence of this bias, we asked participants to perform a task in which category generalizations would distract from the main goal of the task, leading to a characteristic pattern of errors. Specifically, participants were asked to memorize two types of novel facts: quantified facts about sets of kind members (e.g., facts about all or many stups) and generic facts about entire kinds (e.g., facts about zorbs as a kind). Moreover, half of the facts concerned properties that are typically generalizable to an animal kind (e.g., eating fruits and vegetables), and half concerned properties that are typically more idiosyncratic (e.g., getting mud in their hair). We predicted that—because of the hypothesized bias—participants would spontaneously generalize the quantified facts to the corresponding kinds, and would do so more frequently for the facts about generalizable (rather than idiosyncratic) properties. In turn, these generalizations would lead to a higher rate of quantified‐to‐generic memory errors for the generalizable properties. The results of four experiments (N = 449) supported this prediction. Moreover, the same generalizable‐versus‐idiosyncratic difference in memory errors occurred even under cognitive load, which suggests that the hypothesized bias operates unnoticed in the background, requiring few cognitive resources. In sum, this evidence suggests the presence of a powerful bias to draw generalizations about kinds.     

计算难度和知识背景对消费者百分数基数忽略的影响

在选择促销品时,消费者经常会出现百分数基数忽略错误,即价值判断时只基于百分数大小而忽略基数。本研究以150名大学生为被试,考察计算难度和知识背景对百分数基数忽略的影响。结果表明:仅了解百分数基数忽略现象的消费者无论计算难度高低均会出现百分数基数忽略错误;而了解促销计算原理的消费者在高难度下会出现这种错误,在低难度下则不会,且了解促销原理有助于减轻消费者在高难度下出现该错误的倾向。     

知识背景效应对分类加工过程影响的眼动研究

在目标匹配范式下,使用表示现实生活中的物体和场景关系的手绘黑白图片材料,通过眼动记录法考察了68名知识背景不同的文理科大学生分类加工过程的差异。结果表明,知识背景对大学生分类加工过程有影响,其主要作用于分类加工的首次加工阶段。文科学生在首次加工中对问题区分配的注意多于选项区,而理科学生对问题区和选项区平均分配注意。文科生相对于理科生能够更早的注意到正确选项,在加工中重视对上位概念概括(问题区目标概念)和下位概念与上位概念间(选项区待分类概念和目标概念)的比较,而理科生更加重视同水平概念间的比较。     

Obesity Bias in Children: The Role of Actual and Perceived Body Size

The aim of this study was to examine how children perceive their body size and whether their actual or perceived body size can explain their anti‐fat views. Four hundred and fourteen 5–6, 7–8 and 9–10‐year‐old children were read short vignettes depicting two characters, one possessing a positive and the other a negative quality. Following each vignette, participants were asked to pick the story characters among thin, average and obese figures. Obesity bias was defined as the attribution of the positive quality to the thin or average figure and the corresponding negative one to the obese. Body mass index determined children's actual body size. Perceived body size was determined with the use of Collins' (1991) figures of increasing size. The results showed that actual body size affected the accuracy of perceived body size. While the majority of average children were accurate at identifying their body size, most overweight and obese children tended to underestimate it. The accuracy of body size perception improved with age. Obesity bias did not relate to children's actual but to their perceived body size: Those who perceived themselves as heavier exhibited less bias. The implications of the findings are discussed in relation to children's developing identity, and suggestions are made for future research. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Self‐Images and “Perspicuous Representations”: Reflection,Philosophy, and the Glass Mirror

Reflection names the central activity of Western philosophical practice; the mirror and its attendant metaphors of reflection are omnipresent in the self‐image(s) of Western philosophy and in metaphilosophical reflection on reflection. But the physical experiences of being reflected by glass mirrors have been inadequately theorized contributors to those metaphors, and this has implications not only for the self‐image and the self (or selves) of philosophy but also for metaphilosophical practice. This article begins to rethink the metaphor of reflection anew. Paying attention to the history of the glass mirror in Europe reveals and challenges the modern emergence of clear ontological distinctions between disembodied subjects and the objects of their knowledge, and suggests a compelling terrain of metaphilosophical analysis. On the reading offered by the article, the inherent complexity of the relationship between selves and their mirror images, a complexity mediated by social location, historical situation, and particular projects, points to significant spaces of unknowing, of indeterminacy, and of ontological ambiguity.     

Easy Knowledge,Closure Failure,or Skepticism: A Trilemma

This article aims to provide a structural analysis of the problems related to the easy knowledge problem. The easy knowledge problem is well known. If we accept that we can have basic knowledge via a source without having any prior knowledge about the reliability or accuracy of this source, then we can acquire knowledge about the reliability or accuracy of this source too easily via information delivered by the source. Rejecting any kind of basic knowledge, however, leads into an infinite regress and, plausibly, to skepticism. The article argues that the third alternative, accepting basic knowledge but rejecting easy knowledge, entails closure failure. This is obviously the case for deductive bootstrapping, but, notably, the problem also arises for inductive bootstrapping. Hence, the set of problems related to the easy knowledge problem has the structure of a trilemma. We are forced to accept easy knowledge, closure failure, or skepticism.