Relaciones entre el deseo de control y la superstición

Resumen

El deseo de control hace referencia a la motivación por controlar los acontecimientos que suceden en la vida cotidiana. En los últimos años han proliferado investigaciones sobre la relación entre el deseo de control y la superstición. Los resultados ponen de manifiesto que las diferencias individuales en el deseo de control moderan la emergencia del pensamiento supersticioso. El objetivo de este trabajo es doble, instrumentalmente se pretende aportar evidencias de validez de la versión española de una escala de deseo de control al relacionarla con la presencia de supersticiones. Por otro lado, se pretende abordar el estudio de las relaciones entre el deseo de control y la superstición en facetas no estudiadas hasta el momento. Han participado 162 personas, 48 hombres y 114 mujeres, con una edad media de 30 años. Los resultados muestran que en una situación no amenazante, las personas con bajo deseo de control son más supersticiosas y reconocen más supersticiones que las personas con medio y alto deseo de control. Se ha encontrado que la confianza que aportan las supersticiones parece ser la causa por la que las personas las utilizan, frente a la buena suerte o la protección.     

Conflict-driven adaptive control is enhanced by integral negative emotion on a short time scale*

ABSTRACT

Negative emotion influences cognitive control, and more specifically conflict adaptation. However, discrepant results have often been reported in the literature. In this study, we broke down negative emotion into integral and incidental components using a modern motivation-based framework, and assessed whether the former could change conflict adaptation. In the first experiment, we manipulated the duration of the inter-trial-interval (ITI) to assess the actual time-scale of this effect. Integral negative emotion was induced by using loss-related feedback contingent on task performance, and measured at the subjective and physiological levels. Results showed that conflict-driven adaptive control was enhanced when integral negative emotion was elicited, compared to a control condition without changes in defensive motivation. Importantly, this effect was only found when a short, as opposed to long ITI was used, suggesting that it had a short time scale. In the second experiment, we controlled for effects of feature repetition and contingency learning, and replicated an enhanced conflict adaptation effect when integral negative emotion was elicited and a short ITI was used. We interpret these new results against a standard cognitive control framework assuming that integral negative emotion amplifies specific control signals transiently, and in turn enhances conflict adaptation.     

Attentional interference by threat and post-traumatic stress disorder: The role of thought control strategies

Attentional interference by threat is associated with PTSD, but the mechanisms of this relationship remain unclear. Attentional interference might be related to increased use of maladaptive thought control strategies, such as suppressing unwanted thoughts (thought suppression) or replacing threatening thoughts with everyday concerns (worry), which increase PTSD risk. Conversely, attentional interference might be associated with reduced use of adaptive strategies, such as talking about threatening thoughts (social control), which decrease PTSD risk. This study tested if thought control strategies mediate the relationship between attentional interference and PTSD. Sixty-one male Vietnam-era veterans completed measures of PTSD symptoms and thought control strategies. Participants also completed a Visual Search Task measuring attentional interference, which required participants to identify a target letter string among a group of threat or neutral words. Attentional interference by threat was related to PTSD symptoms, and mediation analyses revealed significant indirect effects of attentional interference through thought suppression and worry. Attentional interference was related to re-experiencing and avoidance, but not hyperarousal, symptom clusters. Thought suppression was a unique mediator for re-experiencing, whereas thought suppression and worry both mediated the relationship with avoidance. These results offer evidence for maladaptive thought control strategies as a mechanism linking attentional biases for threat to PTSD.     

Emotional and non-emotional memories are suppressible under direct suppression instructions

Research on retrieval suppression has produced varying results concerning whether negatively valenced memories are more or less suppressible than neutral memories. This variability may arise if, across studies, participants adopt different approaches to memory control. Cognitive and neurobiological research points to two mechanisms that achieve retrieval suppression: thought-substitution and direct suppression (Benoit & Anderson, 2012; Bergström, de Fockert, & Richardson-Klavehn, 2009). Using the Think/No-think paradigm, this study examined whether participants can inhibit neutral and negatively valenced memories, using a uniform direct suppression strategy. Importantly, when strategy was controlled, negative and neutral items were comparably inhibited. Participants reported high compliance with direct suppression instructions, and success at controlling awareness predicted forgetting. These findings provide the first evidence that direct suppression can impair negatively valenced events, and suggest that variability in forgetting negative memories in prior studies is unlikely to arise from difficulty using direct suppression to control emotionally negative experiences.     

Components of working memory predict symptoms of distress

Working memory (WM) is a cognitive system that allows us to select, organise, and integrate perceptual information with memories and current goal-directed intentions. As such, this system is central to day-to-day functioning and would be expected to be especially important in decision making and problem solving. We hypothesised that to the extent that individuals differ in WM capacity they would also be differentially vulnerable to the experience of depression and anxiety. Undergraduate students completed a computerised change detection task in which storage capacity and filtering efficiency measures were obtained. It was found that low WM storage and poor filtering efficiency interacted to predict higher levels of emotional distress as measured by self-reported depressive symptoms, ruminative coping, and state anxiety. It was suggested that low capacity and a poor ability to ignore task-irrelevant information may lead to poorer problem solving, more extreme judgements of oneself and circumstances, increased rumination, and poorer emotional regulation.     

Cognitive-emotional dysfunction among noisy minds: Predictions from individual differences in reaction time variability

Mental noise can be defined as less reliable information processing. Individuals with high levels of mental noise are thought to be disadvantaged in cognitive, emotional, and behavioural realms. The present five studies (total N=298) investigated such potential disadvantages among normally functioning college undergraduates. Mental noise was operationalised in terms of the reaction time coefficient of variation (RTCV), a measure of RT variability that corrects for average levels of mental speed. Individuals with higher RTCV exhibited less effective cognitive control (Studies 1 and 5), less controlled behaviour (Study 2), and were more prone to negative emotional experiences (Study 3) and depressive symptoms (Study 4). Study 5 extended these results and found that individuals higher (versus lower) in RTCV were more adversely affected by their attentional lapses in daily life. Results converge on the idea that mental noise is an important individual difference dimension with multiple adverse correlates and consequences.     

Optimal versus heuristic planning of object manipulations: A review and a computational model of the continuous end-state comfort effect

Human beings select actions that facilitate the execution of later actions. For example, humans tend to select grasps that ensure that forthcoming object manipulations end in a comfortable posture (“end-state comfort effect”). Basic experimental results and their explanation within the optimal control framework are reviewed. I conclude that the discrete grasp selection tasks, which are commonly used to study anticipatory planning, leave room for alternative explanations. Moreover, the results of seven experiments employing a continuous grasp selection task seem incompatible with the optimal control (of end-state comfort) account. I introduce the weighted integration of multiple biases (WIMB) model, which accounts for many aspects of the selection of human grasp orientations in continuous tasks. Additionally, it accounts for the precision effect and hysteresis effect. The model shows that the brain may rely on a simple heuristic and does not actually has to anticipate the end-state of a movement to select effective grasps for object manipulations.     

Interference Effects in a Numerical Stroop Paradigm in 9- to 12-year-old Children with ADHD-C

Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is characterized by deficient self-regulation, poor attentional control, and poor response inhibition. To date, however, the extent to which these deficits affect basic interference control remains a matter of controversy. Secondly, ADHD has been reported to be associated with arithmetic deficits. It remains unclear whether such deficits are a secondary consequence of the above-mentioned characteristics of ADHD or whether basic numerical magnitude representations are also affected. In the present study we attempted to investigate these issues using a basic numerical interference paradigm.

Nine- to twelve-year-old children with ADHD-C (attention-deficit hyperactivity-disorder combined type) and control children without ADHD (each n = 16) were presented with two digits of possibly different physical sizes (e.g., 3 7). This numerical Stroop task requires subjects to make a magnitude classification concerning either the physical or the numerical stimulus dimension. The irrelevant dimension can be congruent (same response), incongruent (different response), or neutral (no response association).

Children with ADHD-C performed worse than control children in most analyses. The most important finding was a significant interaction of congruity effects with group in the numerical comparison task. Children with ADHD-C tended to show larger congruity and interference effects than controls, and these were not attributable to a speed-accuracy trade-off.

The results might reflect differential processing speeds, or a different degree of automatic activation of physical and numerical magnitudes in children with and without ADHD-C. Alternative explanations, such as insufficient inhibition of selective (domain-specific) attention are also discussed.     

Internet‐based CBT intervention for gamblers in Finland: Experiences from the field

From September 2007 to May 2011 a total of 471 participants (325 males and 146 females) signed up for an 8‐week Internet‐based cognitive behavioral therapy offered for gamblers in Finland. Sixty‐four percent of the participants were pathological gamblers (PGs) (NODS 5> points), 14% were problem gamblers (NODS 3–4 points) and 10% were at risk of gambling problems (NODS 1–2 points). Two hundred and twenty four participants completed the treatment and after the treatment period significant changes were found in the following variables: gambling related problems (NODS), gambling urge, impaired control of gambling, alcohol consumption (AUDIT‐C), social consequences, gambling‐related cognitive erroneous thoughts and depression (MARD‐S). In this sample co‐morbid alcohol consumption was stronger among males. The main finding of this study was that the onset age of gambling was associated with a greater amount of gambling‐related cognitive erroneous thoughts.     

The temporal dynamics of first versus second language production

In this study we explored the temporal origin of processing differences between first and second language production. Forty highly proficient bilinguals named objects of high and low lexical frequency aloud for both L1 and L2 separately while event-related brain potentials (ERPs) were recorded. The first electrophysiological differences elicited by response language occurred at the same early P2 peak (∼140–220 ms) where we observed the onset of the lexical frequency effect, but only for those bilinguals who started naming in an L1 context and afterwards switched to an L2 naming context. The bilinguals who named objects in the reverse direction did not display a language effect in the ERPs. Taken together, the data show that the L2 naming disadvantage originates during the onset of lexical access and seems to be driven by both representational strength, which is lower for L2 words, and language control demands, which are higher for L2 words.