Intergroup threat,social dominance,and the malleability of ideology: The importance of conceptual replication

Consistent with the theory of malleable ideology, research has shown that, under intergroup threat, antiegalitarian individuals will exploit the malleable character of color blindness and strategically claim to be strong supporters of it. In three studies conducted in France, we found no support for this theory when measuring color blindness but strong support when using measures of laïcité, an ideology of secularism. Indeed, those who score low on social dominance orientation (SDO) were more likely to support laïcité than antiegalitarian individuals. However, a situational threat (Study 1), a symbolic threat experimentally induced (Study 2), and a perceived symbolic threat (Study 3) were all related to increased support for laïcité by people high in SDO, without affecting those low in SDO. Thus, laïcité is a malleable ideology that can be adopted by individuals having contrasting motivations, as color blindness in the United States. Implications for the role of exact and conceptual replications in the development of a psychological science are discussed.     

情绪面孔的意识神经相关物及其无意识自动加工：来自事件相关电位的证据

意识的神经相关物尚有争议, 且个体能否无意识自动检测视觉环境变化尚不清楚。本研究采用非注意视盲范式操控视觉意识, 并引入具有社会信息的情绪面孔, 探讨意识的神经相关物以及视觉意识与自动检测变化机制的关系。在A阶段, 部分被试对任务无关的情绪面孔处于无意识水平; 在B阶段, 所有被试对任务无关的情绪面孔处于意识水平; 在C阶段, 所有被试对任务相关的情绪面孔处于意识水平。结果显示, 任务无关的情绪面孔的意识过程诱发视觉意识负波(visual awareness negativity, VAN)、晚期正成分(late positivity, LP)和晚期枕区正成分(late occipital positivity, LOP)。此外, 无意识的情绪面孔能诱发视觉失匹配负波(visual mismatch negativity, vMMN), 且其幅值不受意识影响, 但是受任务相关性调制。这些结果提示对情绪面孔的视觉意识在不同的时间进程上有不同的ERP指标——VAN反映早期知觉经验, 而LP和LOP反映晚期意识过程, 而且面孔情绪信息的自动加工独立于视觉意识, 但是受视觉注意调制。     

The influence of distracter and target features on distracter induced blindness

The inhibitory effect of the processing of target-like distracters has already been shown to affect the conscious detection of simple motion and simple orientation stimuli in a random dot kinematogram. In two experiments we examined the effects of single-feature motion distracters, single-feature orientation distracters, and combined-feature distracters containing both motion and orientation information. The target was specified as a coherent motion episode (Experiment 1) or as a combined-feature episode where the coherent motion was accompanied by an abrupt change in line orientation (Experiment 2). Results showed that (a) the respective feature-specific inhibitory processes operate separately even when the distracter features are presented simultaneously and (b) both inhibitory processes contribute to the blindness effect when the conjunction of two features is defined as the target. Again, this inhibitory-process is feature-specific: Only features that are defined in the task are represented in the inhibitory task set. In case of combined- feature task-sets, these representations remain separate, so that combined-feature distracters as well as single-feature distracters are able to induce blindness effects.     

Change detection inflates confidence on a subsequent recognition task

A face viewed under good encoding conditions is more likely to be remembered than a face viewed under poor encoding conditions. In four experiments we investigated how encoding conditions affected confidence in recognising faces from line-ups. Participants performed a change detection task followed by a recognition task and then rated how confident they were in their recognition accuracy. In the first two experiments the same faces were repeated across trials. In the final two experiments novel faces were used on each trial. Target-present and target-absent line-ups were utilised. In each experiment participants had greater recognition confidence after change detection than after change blindness. The finding that change detection inflates confidence, even for inaccurate recognitions, indicates recognition certainty can be a product of perceived encoding conditions rather than authentic memory strength.     

Using real-world scenes as contextual cues for search

Research on contextual cueing has demonstrated that with simple arrays of letters and shapes, search for a target increases in efficiency as associations between a search target and its surrounding visual context are learned. We investigated whether the visual context afforded by repeated exposure to real-world scenes can also guide attention when the relationship between the scene and a target position is arbitrary. Observers searched for and identified a target letter embedded in photographs of real-world scenes. Although search time within novel scenes was consistent across trials, search time within repeated scenes decreased across repetitions. Unlike previous demonstrations of contextual cueing, however, memory for scene-target covariation was explicit. In subsequent memory tests, observers recognized repeated contexts more often than those that were presented once and displayed superior recall of target position within the repeated scenes. In addition, repetition of inverted scenes, which made the scene more difficult to identify, produced a markedly reduced rate of learning, suggesting semantic information concerning object and scene identity are used to guide attention.     

The effect of cueing on change blindness and same blindness

We used the change blindness paradigm of Landman, Spekreijse, and Lamme (2003) to measure the effect of cues on the ability to detect changes between two presentations of an array of eight rectangles separated by an interstimulus interval (ISI). Next, we measured the ability to detect sameness as the target rectangle remained the same when all of the others changed orientation. We were surprised to find no difference between change-detection and same-detection performance. These results (1) are consistent with the notion that some kind of internal representation was cued during the ISI, (2) mitigate against the recruitment of grouping strategies and/or forming a Gestalt, and (3) imply that under conditions facilitated by cues same-detection performance can be as good as change-detection performance.     

Iconic memory for natural scenes: Evidence using a modified change-detection procedure

ABSTRACT

Change blindness for the contents of natural scenes suggests that only items that are attended while the scene is still visible are stored, leading some to characterize our visual experiences as sparse. Experiments on iconic memory for arrays of discrete symbols or objects, however, indicate observers have access to more visual information for at least several hundred milliseconds at offset of a display. In the experiment presented here, we demonstrate an iconic memory for complex natural or real-world scenes. Using a modified change detection task in which to-be changed objects are cued at offset of the scene, we show that more information from a natural scene is briefly stored than change blindness predicts and more than is contained in visual short-term memory. In our experiment, a cue appearing 0, 300, or 1000?msec after offset of the pre-change scene or at onset of the second scene presentation (a Post Cue) directed attention to the location of a possible change. Compared to a no-cue condition, subjects were significantly better at detecting changes and identifying what changed in the cue condition, with the cue having a diminishing effect as a function of time and no effect when its onset coincided with that of the second scene presentation. The results suggest that an iconic memory of a natural scene exists for at least 1000?msec after scene offset, from which subjects can access the identity of items in the pre-change scene. This implies that change blindness underestimates the amount of information available to the visual system from a brief glance of a natural scene.     

Interactively guided introspection is getting science closer to an effective consciousness meter

The ever-increasing precision of brain measurement brings with it a demand for more reliable and fine-grained measures of conscious experience. However, introspection has long been assumed to be too limited and fallible. This skepticism is primarily based on a series of classic psychological experiments, which suggested that more is seen than can be retrospectively reported (Sperling, 1960), and that we can be easily fooled into retrospectively describing intentional choices that we have never made (Johansson et al., 2005, Nisbett and Wilson, 1977). However, the work by Petitmengin, Remillieux, Cahour, and Carter-Thomas (2013) could resolve this dilemma. They showed that subjects can be interactively guided to become better aware of their past experience, thereby overturning the “choice blindness” results of Johansson et al. (2005). Although some more fine-tuning of the experimental protocol is needed, interactively guided introspection may well become the most reliable and exhaustive measure of consciousness.     

The Impact of Regulatory Fit on Performance in an Inattentional Blindness Paradigm

The influence of timing and frequency of instructions on the reasoning of jurors in a simulated grand larceny trial was investigated. Mock jurors were given definitions of grand larceny before and after the testimony, only before, only after, or not at all. Although timing of instructions was not significantly related to reasoning or to verdicts, frequency of instructions influenced the aspects of testimony deemed relevant and increased juror use of legal rules in making verdicts. Selective encoding of testimony could not account for the instruction effect.     

Witnesses' failure to detect covert manipulations in their written statements

Law enforcement agencies and legal professionals often have to rely on witness statements. Undetected errors in witnesses' statements, however, could impede the accurate reconstruction of a crime and lead to the incrimination of innocent suspects. Here, we examined whether witnesses can detect manipulations in their written statements. We expect that writing a statement could provide a good means for discrimination between what is truly recalled and what is an error. This is because writing allows to monitor and control the previously produced information. In 3 experiments, participants watched a mock crime film and subsequently provided a written statement of what they had witnessed. Following a delay of several minutes (Experiment 1), 48 hr (Experiment 2), or 1 month (Experiment 3), participants were exposed to and interviewed about their testimony. Unknown to them, they were confronted with statements, which included 4 secretly manipulated details. Participants' missed a substantial number of manipulations in their written statements. Importantly, the detection rates varied as a function of delay (Experiments 1 and 2: 74–89%; Experiment 3: 36%–52%). Detection rates also varied as a function of the type of details that were manipulated. Our findings indicate that writing a statement comes with limited benefits in witnesses' ability to detect errors in their statements.