The analytic setting today: using the couch or the chair?

This paper re‐visits Murray Jackson's 1961 paper in the Journal of Analytical Psychology, ‘Chair, couch and countertransference’, with the aim of exploring the role of the couch for Jungian analysts in clinical practice today. Within the Society of Analytical Psychology (SAP) and some other London‐based societies, there has been an evolution of practice from face‐to‐face sessions with the patient in the chair, as was Jung's preference, to a mode of practice where patients use the couch with the analyst sitting to the side rather than behind, as has been the tradition in psychoanalysis. Fordham was the founding member of the SAP and it was because of his liaison with psychoanalysis and psychoanalysts that this cultural shift came about. Using clinical examples, the author explores the couch/chair question in terms of her own practice and the internal setting as a structure in her mind. With reference to Bleger's (2013) paper ‘Psychoanalysis of the psychoanalytic setting’, the author discusses how the analytic setting, including use of the couch or the chair, can act as a silent container for the most primitive aspects of the patient's psyche which will only emerge in analysis when the setting changes or is breached.     

When symptom is symbol: some comments on Rosemary Gordon's, ‘Masochism: the shadow side of the archetypal need to venerate and worship’

This paper is a commentary on Rosemary Gordon's paper, ‘Masochism: the shadow side of the archetypal need to venerate and worship’, with a suggestion for an alternative interpretation of masochism as a part of a sado‐masochistic couple. Gordon postulates an archetypal need to venerate and worship that can be hidden in the shadow and distorted in such practices as sexual masochism. Her paper also offers several avenues of exploration for further studies in connection with the phenomenon of masochism, including sexual perversion (‘paraphilia’), chronic psychological victimhood, PTSD and traumatology, religious extremist behaviour such as self‐flagellation, transformation in the individuation process and numinous experience. An extension of her hypothesis to include religious problems of modernity is suggested.     

Possible research area bias in the Excellence in Research for Australia (ERA) draft journal rankings

An analysis of the Excellence in Research for Australia (ERA) draft rankings of 661 psychology journals points to systematic differences between research areas in the distribution of ranks. Journals in experimental, biological and neuroscientific psychology obtained higher mean ranks, consistent with a tendency for “hard‐science” areas to have higher bibliometric journal impact. The ERA will influence the distribution of resources and rewards within psychology and create powerful incentives for institutions and researchers, so differences in ranks across research areas may alter the shape of the discipline. Although they do not necessarily imply bias, such differences raise the possibility that psychology researchers will not operate on a level playing field.     

Belief in a just world and subjective well-being: mothers of normal and Down syndrome children

A cross-sectional study examined the relationship between three dimensions of the belief in a just world and the subjective well-being of Pakistani mothers of normal and Down syndrome children (n = 100 each). Personal belief in a just world and two dimensions of general belief in a just world-beliefs in immanent and ultimate justice-were assessed along with four dimensions of subjective well-being: life satisfaction, mood, state anxiety, and depression. It was hypothesized that personal belief in a just world and belief in ultimate justice would be positively associated with subjective well-being for both groups of mothers. Results were obtained through moderated regression analyses. In line with our hypothesis, personal belief in a just world positively predicted life satisfaction and mood level and negatively predicted state anxiety and depression in both groups of mothers. In contrast, beliefs in immanent and ultimate justice were not consistently adaptive. In particular, the more the mothers of a Down syndrome child believed in immanent justice, the more anxiety they experienced the previous week. In addition, the more the mothers of normal children believed in ultimate justice, the more they experienced anxiety. The pattern of results persisted when controlled for mothers' education, the total number of their children and marital status. Overall, the results support the role of personal belief in a just world as a personal resource in adverse as well as normal life circumstances.     

Personal and general belief in a just world as judgement norms

Research on the belief in a just world (BJW) has focused on its intra-individual functions (e.g., psychological well-being) and its inter-individual consequences (e.g., derogation of victims). Recent theorizing, however, has indicated that the BJW may also have more societal functions and consequences, serving as a legitimizing device of the status quo. The studies in the current paper focus on this latter view and are based on Alves and Correia's ( 2008 ) research which found that the expression of high personal and general belief in a just world is injunctively normative. Two experimental studies aimed at ascertaining three issues: (1) the dimension(s) of social value (social utility and/or social desirability) on which the BJW normativity anchors; (2) whether the expression of moderate BJW is also injunctively normative; and (3) whether the injunctive normativity of the BJW is related to perceptions of truth. Results indicate that moderate and high personal and general BJW are normative. Yet, whereas the normativity of personal BJW anchors both on social utility and social desirability, that of general BJW anchors only on social utility. We discuss personal and general BJW as judgement norms, whose normativity may not be personally acknowledged (in the case of general BJW) and does not necessarily derive from being perceived as true, but from the fact that such norms carry social value at least in individualistic societies.     

Early Muslim Scholarship in Religionwissenchaft: A Study of Muhammad ‘Abd Al-Karīm Al-Shahrastānī's On the Concept of the People of a Dubious Book (Ahl Shubhat Kitāb)

The issue of the People of the Book has long been of central significance to Islam and later to the study of comparative religion. Many Muslim and European scholars have hence taken close heed of the People of the Book and their role as the holders of sacred books. The question of the People of the Book becomes more crucial when Muhammad ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Shahrastānī (d.548/1153) develops another category identified as “Man Lahu Shubhat Kitāb,” (those who possess doubtful sacred scrolls) or “Ahl Shubhat Kitāb” (the People of a Dubious Book), the term that may be considered similar to that of al-Shahrastānī. The question of the People of a Dubious Book remains vague or confusing for many people. This confusion occurs not only among lay Muslims, but also among the Jews and Christians. In effect, the condition of these groups has not yet been systematized properly, although they have been treated in several major works of theology as well as in Qur’ānic commentary. The present analysis is an attempt to evaluate the nature of the People of a Dubious Book as exclusively developed by al-Shahrastānī. Considering the fact that some of the Muslim scholars have considered these groups as belonging either to People of the Book or Polytheists, a critical study shall be attempted to investigate why al-Shahrastānī exclusively expands this concept in Islamic Religious Tradition. It is hoped that the study will provide a preliminary yet clear understanding of the People of a Dubious Book, which hopefully can inspire further investigation leading to a critical study on these groups of peoples.     

Reasons and practical possibility

According to a common thesis about normative reasons for action, you have a reason to perform a given action only if you can act for that reason. This thesis has long had broad appeal and is intended to capture the practical character of practical reasons. I’ll call it the ‘Practicality Thesis’. Recently, however, various writers have developed subtly different objections to it, each designed to show that there can be actions you have a reason to perform even though you could not act for that reason – because, were you aware of the reason-giving facts in the ways needed to act for the reason, it would no longer be a reason for you to so act. This article defends the Practicality Thesis against such objections. It considers some extant defences but shows that these are inadequate. It then advances an alternative approach intended to counter any structurally similar objection.     

Las dimensiones del desarrollo sostenible en el discurso social

Resumen

El concepto de Desarrollo Sostenible ha sido manejado en el discurso político, económico y social de forma recurrente y en numerosas ocasiones de manera retórica, llegando a estar alejado en muchos momentos de la definición que se establece en el Informe Brundtland en 1987. El posible abuso de este término ha vaciado de contenido su significado, llegando a ser un recurso literario en el discurso sobre el medio ambiente lejos de su significado original.

Con el fin de aproximarse al discurso que sustenta a este concepto, se hizo un primer estudio de análisis de contenido de las páginas del Informe Brundtland en donde se define el Desarrollo Sostenible. En un segundo estudio se analiza cuáles son las dimensiones que subyacen a este concepto en una muestra d 213 estudiantes. Para ello se les preguntó que definieran por escrito qué entendían por Desarrollo Sostenible. Las respuestas fueron analizadas atendiendo a dos variables criterio: el año en que se daba la definición—1998, 1999 y 2000—y la ideología política que se atribuían los participantes. Los resultados muestran cómo dos de los atributos centrales del concepto: la pobreza y el desarrollo tecnológico y social están prácticamente ausentes en ambos análisis.     

Dimensiones de preocupación ambiental: una aproximación a la hipermetropía ambiental

Resumen

La percepción de la seriedad de los problemas ambientales como más preocupantes cuanto más lejos se producen ha sido denominado « hipermetropía ambiental ». Algunos estudios han mostrado cómo los problemas ambientales locales son percibidos como menos importantes que los problemas generados en otros lugares, como el calentamiento global o la deforestación amazónica, a menos que el problema conlleve un riesgo inmediato. El presente trabajo es parte de una investigación más amplia que intenta analizar las variable que son relevantes en la formación de actituds proambientales. Específicamente, aquí intentamos explorar la distinción entre medio ambiente global y local, y presentamos un estudio de evaluación percibida de diversos problemas ambientales, en las cuales se usaron 12 escalas para medir la importancia de cada uno de ellos en conexión con la preocupación manifestada por una muestra de trabajadores de una empresa petrolífera. Los resultados se han analizado con métodos multidimensionales de tratamiento de datos que permiten establecer diferentes categorizaciones de los problemas medioambientales en función de la educación y del voto. Las conclusiones nos permiten no sólo explorar la representación social de los problemas ambientales, sino también establecer prioridades y recomendaciones para futuros programas de educación ambiental.     

Con D. A. Norman

RESUMEN

J. J. Aparicio presenta a D. A. Norman como uno de los representantes más cualificados de lo que se ha dado en llamar “psicología cognitiva”, siendo uno de los primeros que rompieron con la tradición de Ebbinhaus al incorporar la investigación sobre la memoria. En esta entrevista el autor responde a cuestiones tales como la relación entre sus trabajos y los del resto de psicólogos cognitivos, las limitaciones de la psicología cognitiva en sus comienzos y el papel que ha desempeñado Chomsky y la lingüística en general en el desarrollo de ésta. Seguidamente nos explica qué entiende por esquema -cuestión en la que se ha centrado últimamente- y las diferencias entre la concepción piagetiana y la suya. También comenta el concepto de profundidad de procesamiento, la distinción entre memoria episódica y semántica y el estudio del control consciente e inconsciente. La última parte de la entrevista se centra en las relaciones entre el trabajo teórico y el experimental, finalizando con algunas alusiones al camino que deben seguir los psicólogos españoles para contribuir al desarrollo de su disciplina.