Thought-action fusion and its relationship to schizotypy and OCD symptoms

Thought-action fusion (TAF) is a cognitive bias that has been linked to obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Preliminary evidence suggests schizotypal traits may be associated with some types of OCD obsessions but not others. We examined the relationship between each of the two major types of TAF (i.e., likelihood and moral), schizotypal traits, and OCD symptoms in 969 nonclinical undergraduate students. We hypothesized that likelihood TAF would be associated with schizotypal traits; whereas moral TAF would not. Consistent with prediction, schizotypal-magical thinking was significantly associated with likelihood TAF even after controlling for the effects of OCD symptoms, general anxiety, and depression. Moreover, the relationship between likelihood TAF and OCD symptoms was significantly attenuated after controlling for schizotypal traits. In contrast, moral TAF demonstrated negligible association with OCD symptoms, depression, or schizotypal traits. These findings provide preliminary support for the linkage between likelihood TAF and schizotypal traits.     

The relationship of thought-action fusion to pathologicial worry and generalized anxiety disorder

Meta-cognitive beliefs associated with pathological worry and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) may encompass the likelihood subtype of thought-action fusion (TAF), the belief that one's thoughts can influence outside events. In the current study of 494 undergraduate college students, positive correlations between scores on the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) and the two Likelihood subscales of the TAF Scale were found, and participants endorsing at least some DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for GAD scored significantly higher on both TAF-Likelihood subscales than participants reporting no GAD symptoms. However, these TAF scales did not predict GAD diagnostic status with PSWQ included as a predictor. In contrast to previous research, the TAF-Moral scale did not correlate with worry. Relationships between TAF, pathological worry, and meta-cognition are discussed in relation to GAD.     

Thought action fusion: can it be corrected?

The goal of this study was to investigate whether or not a brief educational intervention delivered prior to engaging in an anxiety-provoking task (writing a sentence about hoping that a friend/relative was in a car accident) would be effective in offsetting anxiety in college students with a strong propensity to endorse statements of thought action fusion (TAF). As hypothesized, individuals receiving the educational intervention were less anxious than a placebo intervention control group at post task; they were also less likely to endorse statements of TAF after receiving the educational intervention. Also, those who chose to neutralize after writing the sentence (regardless of experimental group) were more likely to report feeling guiltier, more immoral and a greater sense of responsibility about writing the sentence prior to neutralizing than those who did not subsequently neutralize. These results are discussed in relation to the cognitive theory of obsessive-compulsive disorder and implications for prevention programs.     

Borderline Personality Organization predicts Machiavellian interpersonal tactics

Despite the phenomenological (e.g., manipulativeness) and dynamic (i.e., emotion dysregulation) analogies between Machiavellianism and Borderline Personality Organization (BPO), the relationship between these constructs has not yet been investigated. In our study, 225 non-clinical, non-student adults (130 females; 32.33 ± 5.42 years of age on average) completed measures of BPO and Machiavellianism. Results showed that Machiavellian personality traits were positively correlated with fear of fusion, diffuse identity, and use of primitive defenses. Machiavellianism, in general, and Machiavellian interpersonal tactics were predicted by fear of fusion and use of primitive defenses. Results are discussed from the perspective of Life History Theory.     

The idea of the self in the evolution of Hume's account of the passions

Terence Penelhum has written extensively about the role of the idea of the self in Hume's account of the emotional and moral life of persons. Penelhum fails to notice, however, a change that takes place in the way that the idea of the self functions in Hume's account of the passions as that account evolved after the Treatise. This paper charts part of that evolution, and reflects on its significance for Hume's moral psychology.     

Cosmopolitan anger and shame

ABSTRACT

Sentimental cosmopolitans argue that cultivating empathy for distant others is necessary in order to motivate action to address global injustices. This paper accepts the basic premises of the sentimental cosmopolitan project but argues that it ought to be extended to include cultivating other cosmopolitan emotions, particularly anger and shame. There is a tendency to think of anger and shame as unworthy, or as base motives to be overcome; but I argue that, in fact, they constitute an important resource for motivating action to address global injustices. The argument proceeds in three parts. Section 1 outlines sentimental cosmopolitanism and explicates the relationship between empathy, and anger and shame. Section 2 examines the link between anger and shame and responsibility, arguing that anger and shame are well-suited to capturing notions of responsibility for injustice, something lacking in an empathy-based account of sentimental cosmopolitanism. Section 3 provides two further arguments in favour of anger and shame: (i) anger represents a powerful source of energy for political action, and (ii) shame can motivate cosmopolitan action where empathy is absent.     

The Moral Implications of Immorality

This essay focuses on the issue of immorality, an issue that has largely been understudied in anthropology. It examines two types of immoral behavior in contemporary Chinese society, drawing on cases widely agreed upon by ordinary people to be morally wrong. Next, it analyzes moral experiences and moral sentiments among individuals who either were victims of immoral acts or recalled their own feelings of being immoral. Ethnographic evidence shows that immorality tends to be intuitive and emotional in actual social actions but in recollections of moral experiences it is reflected upon with rational reasoning and justification. Immorality is essentially the violation of the social, which may explain why ordinary people use immorality to define and defend their social behavior in everyday life. The recent emphasis on moral reasoning and ethical choice in anthropological studies of moralities has overlooked the social in the moral as well as the role of moral sentiments and intuitions in social actions.